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Abstract
High-Level Analysis of the Impact of Soft-Faults in
Cyberphysical Systems
Marwan Ammar, Ph.D.
As digital systems grow in complexity and are used in a broader variety of safety-
critical applications, there is an ever-increasing demand for assessing the dependabil-
ity and safety of such systems, especially when subjected to hazardous environments.
As a result, it is important to identify and correct any functional abnormalities and
component faults as early as possible in order to minimize performance degradation
and to avoid potential perilous situations. Existing techniques often lack the ca-
pacity to perform a comprehensive and exhaustive analysis on complex redundant
architectures, leading to less than optimal risk evaluation. Hence, an early analysis
of dependability of such safety-critical applications enables designers to develop sys-
tems that meets high dependability requirements. Existing techniques in the field
often lack the capacity to perform full system analyses due to state-explosion limita-
tions (such as transistor and gate-level analyses), or due to the time and monetary
costs attached to them (such as simulation, emulation, and physical testing).
In this work we develop a system-level methodology to model and analyze the
effects of Single Event Upsets (SEUs) in cyberphysical system designs. The proposed
methodology investigates the impacts of SEUs in the entire system model (fault tree
level), including SEU propagation paths, logical masking of errors, vulnerability to
specific events, and critical nodes. The methodology also provides insights on a sys-
tem’s weaknesses, such as the impact of each component to the system’s vulnerability,
as well as hidden sources of failure, such as latent faults. Moreover, the proposed
methodology is able to identify and categorize the system’s components in order of
criticality, and to evaluate different approaches to the mitigation of such criticality
(in the form of different configurations of TMR) in order to obtain the most efficient
mitigation solution available.
iii
The proposed methodology is also able to model and analyze system components
individually (system component level), in order to more accurately estimate the com-
ponent’s vulnerability to SEUs. In this case, a more refined analysis of the component
is conducted, which enables us to identify the source of the component’s criticality.
Thereafter, a second mitigation mechanic (internal to the component) takes place, in
order to evaluate the gains and costs of applying different configurations of TMR to
the component internally. Finally, our approach will draw a comparison between the
results obtained at both levels of analysis in order to evaluate the most efficient way
of improving the targeted system design.
iv
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Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are a new class of embedded Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) systems. These systems require tight integration of
computing, communication, and control technologies to achieve performance, stabil-
ity, reliability, efficiency and robustness in physical systems targeting many applica-
tion domains. Embedded systems have been successfully employed in almost every
aspect of our daily lives, ranging from medical devices, buildings, mobile devices,
robots, transportation, and energy systems. Such applications impose requirements
that are among the most challenging for CPSs being designed today. Furthermore,
advancements in technology are likely to increase the complexity of these CPSs even
more, with systems required to perform more functions while being smaller in size.
Combined with tight time, cost, and design constraints, these factors contribute to
making the development of CPSs a major technical challenge. In addition, many
CPSs are critical in nature, and they must be highly dependable, even in unknown
and hostile environments. This requires powerful methods for failure detection, diag-
nosis, and recovery to ensure correct system operation. For instance, the failure rate
per chip has been reported to increase 100-fold from the 180nm to the 16nm CMOS
technology node [111]. Exponential growth in the number of transistors per chip with
time has brought tremendous progress in the performance of semiconductor devices;
however, it may also increase the device’s vulnerability to some types of radiation.
State-of-the-art verification techniques that investigate the unreliability of safety-
critical CPSs are very costly, time consuming, and inefficient. In industry, the verifi-
cation of CPSs is mainly conducted at high level through simulation based techniques,
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or at low level through hardware testing. Simulation based techniques are less than
optimal, since they rely on the generation of input vectors, which means that the
full verification of a complex design is generally unattainable. Moreover, the short-
comings of these techniques are made evident in scenarios where exceptional or low
probability events (e.g., failure caused due to non-functional sources) have to be eval-
uated. For example, despite all the testing and certification that medical devices are
submitted to, there are several reports of death induced by pacemaker malfunctions.
Reportedly, these malfunctions have originated from the unforeseen effects of external
radiation originated in MRI machines, x-rays, and even cosmic ray exposure during
a commercial flight [58, 111]. The main challenge in the analysis of CPSs comes from
the fact that these systems are very complex, since they comprise several sub-systems
and sub-components. The verification of such systems requires the analysis of the
vulnerability of all the sub-components and sub-systems individually, as well as the
analysis of the interactions between them. Safety-critical systems are often time-
critical. Thus, the safety of these systems depends on their ability to correctly collect
and process data with real-time requirements. Specification and verification of timing
constraints further adds to the complexity of the system. Therefore, efficient ways
to analyze these complex systems are of decisive importance. Furthermore, a new
methodology which integrates different analysis techniques of this type of systems is
required. This methodology must be able to accommodate all the sub-components of
the system, and the synergies between them, at different levels of abstraction.
Due to the previously mentioned complexity and composition of cyber-physical
systems, the efficient and effective design of distributed multi-scale systems is still
an unsolved problem. The design process of these systems must encompass heteroge-
neous components, often uncertain in specification, their interconnections, and their
relationship to the environment. The dynamic of all these elements is critical to
the reliability of the system. Technology advances further increase the challenges to
the design process, adding the possibility of placing significantly more functionality
into products, but also increasing interconnectivity at the risk of unwanted system
interactions. Currently in the industry, overdesign is the most used path for safe
system design and deployment. However, due to the reasons explained above, this
approach is rapidly becoming intractable and it will soon reach its saturation point.
Furthermore, some critical CPSs are required to operate with very tight power, area,
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and cost constraints. Medical implants, for example, are required to be very small
and to have very low power consumption, in order to operate within the patient’s
body for extended periods of time. To obtain reliable CPSs without excessive overde-
sign, we need a rigorous methodology for system-level functional verification that is
able to: 1) Provide guarantees of performance and reliability against the require-
ments, even is extremely harsh environments. 2) Produce scalable, fast and cheap
verification environments for complex CPS. 3) Exploit analytical tools and techniques
to determine design choices and ensure robust system performance. 4) Achieve these
goals through the coordinated execution of a prescriptive, repeatable, and measurable
process. These points are further elaborated below, in Section 1.3.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Formulation
The failure of a critical CPS can be due to different classes of uncertainties, such as
manufacturing defects, aging, end of life failures, and transient faults. An example
of the existing reliability analysis of CPSs is the analysis of the impact transient
faults due to external radiation have on implantable devices. Radiation are of special
interest in critical CPSs as they keep occurring even if these systems are otherwise
fault-free and defect-free, in which case such systems could wrongly be expected to
have a 0-failure rate. Due to the criticality of many CPSs, the most accepted way
of evaluating their vulnerability to the effects of radiation is through a process called
dynamic radiation testing [82]. This method consists in exposing the target system to
a radiation flux and counting the number of errors observed. However, this method
is very expensive and time-consuming, since any change in the application requires a
new dynamic test. Alternative methods have emerged, with the goal of reducing the
time and cost constraints associated with dynamic radiation ground testing. These
techniques are mostly based on system vulnerability analysis through emulation and
simulation [17]. However, current techniques are not able to scale to the complexity
of these systems. Moreover, such analysis normally consumes large amounts of time
and requires full details of the design structure and of the characteristics of the fault.
In other words, with detailed circuit level techniques, normally required for detailed
modeling, this type of analysis would be intractable at the chip level and is only
tractable at the cell level (for hundreds of transistors at most) to get a certain level
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of accuracy. Moreover, the verification of CPSs requires accurate fault and system
models, as well as the use of comprehensive methods of analyzing the impact of
faults in each of the components. This is only possible with an analysis method
that works at several levels of abstraction. However, it is unlikely that the existing
single verification techniques will suffice at every level. A collection of techniques
with suitable integration of the results is required.
There has been much interest in developing formal verification frameworks to ver-
ify the correctness of the implementation of CPSs, at different abstraction levels.
These formal verification techniques are very efficient in providing guarantees about
the model correctness, as well as locating corner-cases and hard-to-find bugs. For
example, different formal verification frameworks were developed to verify the im-
plementation of pacemaker’s systems. In the work proposed by [66, 75, 76, 131], a
model-based framework for the automatic verification of the functionality of cardiac
pacemakers was developed. The authors developed a detailed model of a basic dual
chamber pacemaker. This model is constructed based on the timed automata (TA)
of each of the pacemaker sub-components. Moreover, in this work, the authors have
developed a TA of the heart behavior. The functionality of the pacemaker model
has been verified using statistical model checking. However, existing formal-based
techniques are designed to detect implementation bugs in the CPS (i.e., identification
of functional errors) [121, 122]. In other words, such techniques assume that the CPS
always operates in an error free environment. Therefore, with these techniques, it
is not possible to detect non-functional faults, such as radiation-induced soft-errors.
These errors are often generated when a sensitive area of a CPS is hit by a strong
enough flux of external ionizing radiation, such as X-rays and Gama-rays. These
external radiation fluxes may change the output of a transistor for a short period of
time, which, in turn, may the value stored in a state element. This event is known as
a Single Event Upset (SEU).
1.1.1 Radiation Ground Testing
The traditional and most direct approach to evaluate the SEU vulnerability of a
system (i.e., an application running in a processor) is through a process called dynamic
radiation ground testing [26, 133]. This method consists in exposing the target system
to a radiation flux and counting the number of errors observed. The outcome is
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computed in the form of a parameter known as the dynamic cross section (σ), which
is defined as the ratio between the number of errors observed at the output of a
design configured into the SRAM-based FPGA, divided by the fluence of hitting
particles [116]. A problem with that metric is that any change in the application
requires a new dynamic test, thus resulting in a very expensive and time-consuming
method. Alternative methods for SEU estimation have emerged, with the goal of
reducing the time and cost constraints associated with dynamic radiation ground
testing. In [16, 117, 135], the authors introduce a method of injecting SEUs at random
time intervals through emulation, by making use of an interrupt routine to alter
values within the processor’s internal registers and memory. Fault injection through
emulation is also used in the direct memory access SEU emulation method [55], where
a dedicated hardware component, controlled externally, selects the time instant and
the bit to be altered in the memory. This approach is further explored in [56, 57],
where the SEU injection is performed through probabilistic models of the system,
with the goal of estimating the system’s time to failure (TTF) and time to recover
(TTR). However, this technique still requires emulation in order to obtain certain
system rates which the model is built upon (i.e., coverage factor, error factor, and
failure factor).
1.1.2 Radiation Testing through Simulation
Another branch of SEU estimation techniques focus on fault injection through sim-
ulation, which is usually done by injecting faults at logical or electrical levels [48,
64, 83, 85]. The advantage of these techniques is the high level of control over the
fault injection scenarios, since the user has free access to the entirety of the system
and the timing of the injections is very accurate. However, emulation and simulation
based techniques have severe drawbacks. Disregarding the considerable time required
to simulate or to emulate a scenario of thousands of injected faults [17], both ap-
proaches are limited in terms of accuracy. This problem arises due to the fact that
these techniques are not exhaustive (only consider a small subset of the possible fault
injection scenarios) [84].
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1.1.3 Radiation Testing through Formal Verification
Recently, the use of formal based techniques to analyze soft errors at logical and higher
abstraction levels has been proposed, such as the work done in [15, 23, 101]. These
techniques provide new insights into the vulnerability of digital designs to SEUs.
This is mainly because they are exhaustive and not limited by the number of test
vectors as in simulation based techniques. However, at logical abstraction level, these
techniques suffer from the state explosion problem [65]. Therefore, it is expected for
these techniques to be more efficient at higher abstraction levels, such as system-level.
The need to take the complete digital system design into consideration for quanti-
tative safety analysis has led to the widespread acceptance of Fault Trees (FTs). FTs
are top-down graphical representations of various combinations of lower level events
that may cause the system to reach a top level failure (i.e., system failure) [138].
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can provide insightful information to designers regarding
the reliability of their systems, such as how is their system most likely to fail and what
are the most efficient ways to make it safer. However, the traditional way of conduct-
ing FTA is either through paper and pencil proof or through computer simulation
techniques, which are inefficient and prone to inaccuracy. The most prominent use of
FTA in the literature is by converting the system’s FT into a Boolean function and
simulating that function with different low level component failure rates [35, 51, 124].
However, these approaches are also costly in time and resources. This is mainly due
to the fact that their modeling of FT is limited to the Boolean representation, which
may exponentially increase the resource requirements to reach the desired results.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
Since the vast majority of techniques found in the literature rely heavily on low-
level testing (i.e., after manufacturing) the main scientific objectives of this thesis
are to provide practical frameworks to evaluate and improve CPS reliability at early
stages of development and to reduce the complexity of the reliability analysis while
improving the accuracy of the results. Due to technological limitations, however, the
work presented in this thesis is limited to the analysis of the main processing units of
CPSs. Namely, this thesis seeks to provide answers for the following questions:
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 Q1: How to accurately model a CPS processing unit, at high-level of abstrac-
tion?
 Q2: How to abstract the SEU propagation behavior observed at transistor level
at high-levels of abstraction?
 Q3: How to efficiently utilize formal verification methods to model and analyze
SEU vulnerability at high-levels of abstraction?
 Q4: How to utilize formal verification methods to evaluate and to propose im-
provements to the system design?
 Q5: How to measure the vulnerability of complex designs, at high-level, without
losing the accuracy provided from the low-level analyses?
 Q6: Is it possible to improve scalability while preserving accuracy ?
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In this work, I propose and develop a solution to the aforementioned issues found
in the literature. A multi-phased cross-layer methodology is proposed to compute
an accurate early estimation of a design’s vulnerability to errors. This methodology
is also able to identify and isolate the most critical components of the design, and
to pinpoint the most efficient ways to mitigate the design’s weaknesses through the
implementation of architectural mitigation, such as TMR. The methodology is also
able to investigate the source of a component’s vulnerability and to propose the im-
plementation of redundancy inside of the critical component, if that option is deemed
to be the most beneficial. This is achieved by investigating the dependability results
obtained from the Fault Tree Abalysis (FTA) and the component-level analysis of a
design. This work includes the construction of a library of models of FT gates and
relationships, as well as a library of models of component-level elements (i.e., regis-
ters, ALU, logic gates, etc.). Much like classes in an object-oriented language, these
libraries can be used to generate any FT diagram and any component-level descrip-
tion needed. The analysis of these elements is performed through Probabilistic Model
Checking (PMC) and Stochastic Model Checking (SMC), both of which provide au-
tomatic investigation of the design at multiple levels of detail. To the best of our
7
knowledge, the above capabilities are not shared by any other existing vulnerability
estimation technique. Furthermore, those capabilities will allow us to provide a more
comprehensive study of the system and its vulnerability to the designers, before the
system is manufactured.
The analysis methodology proposed in this thesis follows cross-layer approach, with
the purpose of improving the scalability and efficiency of the modeling as well as of the
analysis of the reliability of CPSs. The methodology is composed by two core phases:
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Figure 1: Overview of the Proposed Framework
1.3.1 Fault-Tree Analysis Phase
At the highest level of abstraction, the design’s vulnerability is evaluated through
FTA. The objective of this phase is to conduct an analysis on the complete system
design. This provides an estimation of the probabilistic failure rates of the system,
the probabilistic failure rates of each individual component, the fault propagation
rates between different components (i.e., how different components impact each other
as well as how they impact the overall system vulnerability), and the most relevant
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causes of failure to be considered. This phase include the following steps:
 First, a fault tree of the design is generated from the high-level system speci-
fications. This can be done either manually or through special tools, such as
the tool introduced in [99], which is able to synthesize the fault tree of a design
from its SysML model representation [61]. At this stage, each component of the
system is treated as a black box.
 Next, the probabilistic model of the fault tree is constructed from the fault tree
diagram representation. This fault tree model is constructed in the language
of the probabilistic model checker to be used (in this case, PRISM). The fault
tree model is build from our existing libraries of FT gates and relationships.
 A set of properties is derived from the system specifications, denoting how the
system is expected to perform.
 With the fault tree model and the properties ready, probabilistic model checking
is performed in order to evaluate the design’s vulnerability to faults, as well as
the impact of each component to the system vulnerability.
 The impact of each component to the vulnerability of the system is recorded in
a library called Component Contribution Matrix (CCM).
 If the system’s estimated vulnerability is below the accepted threshold, the anal-
ysis stops. However, if the system’s vulnerability is higher than the threshold,
a new step is performed, in which the most critical components of the system
are identified within the CCM.
 Next, the components classified as the most critical are isolated and a study is
performed on them with the goal of identifying the best TMR configuration to
help mitigating the component’s vulnerability.
 The final step in this phase is to record the impact of the different TMR configu-
rations on each critical component, and to update the fault tree model with the
most efficient TMR configuration, followed by a new analysis with probabilistic
model checking.
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Many different modeling and analysis advancements have been incorporated in
the fault-tree analysis phase of the proposed methodology. The problem tackled in
this phase encapsulates questions Q1. Q2, Q4 and Q5, presented in Section 1.2. The
contributions of this work to the state-of-the-art are the following:
1. Investigate the impact of different stochastic models on the analysis
of a system: The modeling methodology is applied to a case study of a solar ar-
ray mechanical system. Next, multiple experiments are conducted on the same
system, first by modeling it using Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) to
model known environment scenarios where the probabilistic distribution of the
system’s behavior is known, and then using Markov Decision Process (MDP) to
model the non-deterministic behavior of the system when subjected to unknown
environments. These analyses have led to the following publication:
C1: Ammar, M., Hoque, K.A., Ait Mohamed, O. Formal analysis of fault
tree using probabilistic model checking: A solar array case study. In Annual
IEEE Systems Conference (SysCon 2016).
2. Investigate system vulnerability to soft-faults and how to efficiently
mitigate it: Redundant architectures, such as Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR), are broadly used as alternatives for fault tolerance, in order to improve
the reliability of safety-critical systems. However, the type and placement of
the redundant architecture may have a significant impact on the outcome. The
experiments that I have conducted demonstrate that redundancy may have neg-
ative impacts on the system, in some cases. To avoid issues, an early-analysis
is required to determine the type and location of the fault mitigation option.
This analysis resulted in the following publication:
C2: Ammar, M., Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O., Savaria, Y. Effi-
cient probabilistic fault tree analysis of safety critical systems via probabilistic
model checking. In Forum on Specification and Design Languages (FDL 2016).
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3. High-level modeling and vulnerability analysis of complex real sys-
tems over time: Fault-trees are an excellent tool to investigate fault propa-
gation in the system, identifying the ways in which the system is most likely to
fail. However, most FTA approaches are not suitable for safety-critical analy-
sis, since current FT modeling techniques cannot capture sequences of actions.
Moreover, the binary representation of FTs is not adequate for systems with
complex state-spaces. Finally, FTA is unable to predict the state of the system
over a period of time. To solve these shortcomings, I have proposed e new
fault-tree paradigm entitled Temporal-Dynamic Fault Trees (TDFTs). I have
proposed a new analysis method, based on stochastic model checking, and new
FT gate models that evolve over time and that are sensitive to temporal events,
such as SEUs. The proposed modeling and analysis advance the state-of-the-
art, allowing the power and efficiency of FTs to be used in predictive system
evaluation, as well as in significantly more accurate vulnerability assessment to
soft-errors. These advances have resulted in the following publications:
C3: Ammar, M., Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O. and Savaria, Y.,
2018, December. Reliability Analysis of the SPARC V8 Architecture via Fault
Trees and UPPAL-SMC. In 2018 25th IEEE International Conference on Elec-
tronics, Circuits and Systems (ICECS) (pp. 437-440). J1: Ammar, M.,
Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O., and Savaria, Y. Towards an Accurate
Probabilistic Modeling and Statistical Analysis of Temporal Faults via Tempo-
ral Dynamic Fault-Trees (TDFTs). IEEE Access Volume 7, page(s): 29264 –
29276 DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2902796, 2019.
1.3.2 Component-Level Analysis Phase
In this phase, the analysis of vulnerability is focused on each individual component
that forms the system design. Unlike the fault tree analysis phase, where the compo-
nents were treated as black boxes, in this phase each component is further elaborated
and analyzed based on its internal architecture. The goal of this phase is to identify
the sources of the component’s vulnerability and to study the most efficient ways to
internally mitigate that vulnerability. This phase include the following steps:
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 Obtention of the component’s behavior description. For example, if the com-
ponent to be analyzed is an Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU), we must obtain
information about it’s architecture, what operations it performs, what is it con-
nected to, etc.
 Next, a library of system operations is built. Much like classes in an object
oriented language, this library contains models of the operations (subcompo-
nents) that serve as the building blocks for the component to be analyzed, such
as logic gates, adders, multipliers, etc.
 Based on the component’s behavior description, operations from the library
of system operations are instantiated in order to construct the model of the
component at system-level.
 Once the model is ready, an exhaustive fault injection analysis is conducted in
order to identify any weaknesses in the component.
 The component, subjected to fault injections, is verified against a set of prop-
erties derived from the system specifications. This verification process is done
through probabilistic model checking with PRISM. With this analysis, the im-
pact of each fault injection scenario is obtained.
 Next, with the results obtained through the probabilistic analysis, the limit of
the component’s availability is estimated.
 If the availability of the component does not meet the preestablished perfor-
mance metrics, TMR mitigation is applied to the most critical subcomponents.
In this case, the model is updated to reflect the changes, and an evaluation of
the mitigation overhead is conducted. Then, the probabilistic analysis process
is repeated.
 If the availability of the component meets the preestablished performance met-
rics partially (i.e., the component passes the test but some of its subcomponents
do not), fault mitigation must be applied to the critical components and the
model must be reevaluated, restarting the fault injection process.
 If all the availability metrics are met (component overall, and all the subcom-
ponents), the phase ends and the results are reported.
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 Finally, an additional step takes place, in which the mitigation proposed by
each of the phases is compared and the most efficient solution is chosen.
The problems addressed by this phase of the methodology are encapsulated in
questions Q1. Q2, Q3, Q5 and Q6, presented in Section 1.2. The advancements
achieved by the proposed techniques are the following:
1. Investigate the impact of soft-errors at system-level using PMC: The
proposed system-level approach consists in modeling the system to be tested
with all its components and their expected logical behaviors. Then, the fault-
injection points are identified and the fault propagation paths are obtained by
counter-example generation with PMC. Subsequently, the analysis performed
consists in the probabilistic evaluation of several vulnerability metrics, such as
Mean Time to Failure and Mean Time To Recover. These metrics are evaluated
for each individual type of fault in the system. Furthermore, the analysis com-
putes of the contribution of each component of the system to a failure. This
idea generated the following publications:
C4: Ammar, M., Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O., Savaria, Y., Ve-
lazco, R. Comprehensive vulnerability analysis of systems exposed to SEUs via
probabilistic model checking. In IEEE European Conference on Radiation and
Its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS 2016).
J2: Ammar, M., Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O., Savaria, Y. System-
Level Analysis of the Vulnerability of Processors Exposed to Single-Event Upsets
via Probabilistic Model Checking. IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. 2017
Sep;64(9):2523-30.
B1: Ammar, M., Bany Hamad, G., Ait Mohamed, O., Savaria, Y. (2018).
System-Level Modeling and Analysis of the Vulnerability of a Processor to Single
Event Upsets (SEUs). Velazco R, McMorrow D, Estela J. Radiation Effects on
Integrated Circuits and Systems for Space Applications.: (pp. 13-38), Springer,
2019. DOI: 978-3-030-04660-6 2.
2. Application-based analysis of the impact of soft-errors on a CPS us-
ing PMC: To provide a better estimation of CPS vulnerability, not only the
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hardware but also the software (application) must be considered in the anal-
ysis. Based on my component-level modeling approach for fault injection and
generation of fault propagation paths, I have proposed a new analysis technique
to perform PMC on an application execution trace. For each instruction, the
propagation of SEUs is modeled as a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC),
based on the hardware’s microarchitecture. From these models, a full estima-
tion of the fault propagation probabilities and latency through each instruction
is computed. Furthermore, this model allows the analysis of fault propagation
probabilities through the entire program execution. This analysis resulted in
the following publications:
C5: Bany Hamad, G., Ammar, M., Ait Mohamed, O., and Savaria, Y.
System-Level Characterization, Modeling, and Probabilistic Formal Analysis of
LEON3 Vulnerability to Transient Faults. In IEEE European Conference on
Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS 2018).
J3: Bany Hamad, G., Ammar, M., Ait Mohamed, O., and Savaria, Y. New
Insights Into Soft-Faults Induced Cardiac Pacemakers Malfunctions Analyzed
at System-Level Via Model Checking. IEEE Access. PP. 1-1. 10.1109/AC-
CESS.2018.2876318, 2018.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 briefly discusses the most relevant SEU vulnerability analysis techniques
in the literature.
In Chapter 3, the formal verification methods and tools utilized in this thesis to model
and analyze the propagation of SEU at high-level abstraction are introduced.
Chapter 4 explains the basics of FT modeling and analysis with PMC. The introduced
PMC-based methodology for FTA modeling is easily expandable with state-efficient
models that are modular and constructed by parallel composition. The modeling
methodology is applied to a case study of a solar array mechanical system, first using
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Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) to model known environment scenarios where
the probabilistic distribution of the system’s behavior is known, then using Markov
Decision Process (MDP) to model the non-deterministic behavior of the system when
subjected to unknown environments. This work focuses on evaluating and character-
izing fault propagation in FTs.
Chapter 5 first introduces a technique, based on FTA and PMC, to evaluate fault
mitigation through triple modular redundancy. This approach consists of model-
ing the behavior of each FT gate as a probabilistic automaton (PA). Thereafter, a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) model of the system’s FT is obtained by the parallel
composition of all the PAs that compose the FT. In the analysis step, a Component
Contribution Investigation (CCI) is performed. The CCI consists in the evaluation of
the contribution of the failure of each subcomponent to the system’s failure. Based
on the obtained data, the impact of different types of TMR is evaluated, determining
the best location and TMR configuration for the system under analysis.
Chapter 6 presents a new system-level approach to compute an accurate estimate of a
processor’s vulnerability to SEU propagation. The propagation of SEUs is modeled as
a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC). Furthermore, probabilistic model check-
ing is utilized to exhaustively estimate the impact of SEUs on the system’s behavior.
The proposed CTMC model is analyzed for different SEU injection scenarios and
different bit-flip rates. Such analysis is capable of producing an accurate estimation
of different reliability metrics, such as Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), Mean Time to
Recover (MTTR), and the probability of failure for each SEU injection scenario in the
system’s subcomponents. Finally, the chapter shows how the proposed probabilistic
system-level analysis can also investigate the optimal self-repair rate required in the
system to obtain the desired level of availability.
Chapter 7 introduces a new DFT approach to compute an accurate estimation of
a system’s vulnerability to soft-faults in complex real-world systems, using a new
modeling of FT gates that is based on the Priced-Timed Automata theory. The
chapter discusses the modeling of FTs of complex systems and it is centered around a
case-study of the 32-bit SPARC V8 integer pipeline. The analysis is fully automatic,
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conducted through stochastic model checking, with UPPAAL-SMC. The analysis pre-
sented consists in the estimation of the probability of each type of Trap Exception
(TE) to occur in the targeted architecture, as well as the impact of individual registers
to the overall reliability of the processor, and the probability of failures over time.
Chapter 8 proposes a new fault tree modeling paradigm, to capture the impact of
temporal events in systems, called Temporal Dynamic Fault Trees (TDFTs). The
proposed TDFTs are utilized to model fault propagation in complex systems while
conserving the characteristics and dependencies between different temporal events,
soft-faults, and permanent faults. This chapter also introduces a new analysis ap-
proach utilizing stochastic model checking with UPPAAL-SMC, which, combined
with efficient modeling, is able to circumvent the state-explosion problem that is in-
herent to other model-checking approaches. The analysis proposed in this chapter is
able to evaluate the impact of temporal faults in systems, as well as to estimate the
reliability and availability of the system over extended periods of time.
Chapter 9 provides a general discussion about the present work, which has been
detailed in Chapters 4 through 8, and finally Chapter 10 summarizes this thesis and




The modeling and analysis of SEU relevant faults and their mitigation for dependabil-
ity analysis is an active research area. The most common approach to evaluate the
SEU vulnerability of a system is through a process called dynamic radiation ground
testing [26, 134]. This method consists in exposing the target system to a radiation
flux and counting the number of errors observed. The outcome is computed in the
form of a parameter known as the dynamic cross-section (σ), which is defined as the
ratio between the number of errors observed at the output of a Design Under Test
(DUT), divided by the fluence of hitting particles [116]. A problem with that metric
is that any change in the application requires a new dynamic test, thus resulting in
an expensive and time-consuming method.
Alternative methods for SEU estimation have emerged, with the goal of reducing
the time and cost constraints associated with dynamic radiation ground testing. In
[117, 135], the authors introduce a method of injecting SEUs at random time intervals
through emulation, by making use of an interrupt routine to alter values within the
processor’s internal registers and memory. Fault injection through emulation is also
used in the direct memory access SEU emulation method [55], where a dedicated
hardware component, controlled externally, selects the time instant and the bit to be
altered in the memory. This approach is further explored in [56, 57], where the SEU
injection is performed through probabilistic models of the system, with the goal of
estimating the system’s time to failure (TTF) and time to recover (TTR). However,
this technique still requires emulation in order to obtain certain system rates which the
model is built upon (i.e., coverage factor, error factor, and failure factor). Another
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branch of SEU estimation techniques focus on fault injection through simulation,
which is usually done by injecting faults at logical or electrical levels [64, 83, 85].
The advantage of these techniques is the high level of control over the fault injection
scenarios, since the user has free access to the entirety of the system and the timing of
the injections is very accurate. However, emulation and simulation based techniques
have severe drawbacks. Disregarding the considerable time required to simulate or to
emulate a scenario of thousands of injected faults [17], both approaches are limited
in terms of accuracy. This problem arises due to the fact that these techniques are
not exhaustive, but rather reliant on input vectors [84]. These approaches are also
reliant on detailed models of the DUT, which are not always available.
Recently, the use of formal based techniques to analyze soft errors at logical and
higher abstraction levels has been proposed, such as the work done in [23]. These
techniques provide new insights into the vulnerability of digital designs to SEUs. This
is mainly because they are exhaustive and not limited by the number of test vectors
as in simulation based techniques. In formal techniques, the user starts out by stating
what output behavior is desirable and then lets the formal checker prove or disprove
it. In other words, given a property, formal verification exhaustively searches all
possible input and state conditions for failures. However, at logical abstraction level,
these techniques suffer from state explosion (i.e., exponential growth in the number
of states of the model) [65]. Therefore, it is expected for these techniques to be more
efficient at higher abstraction levels, such as system-level.
In recent years, a number of works related to fault tree analysis of SEUs has
emerged. In [14] a tool for fault tree analysis is presented, called DFTCalc, which
is capable of modeling fault trees via compact representations. That work uses the
stochastic technique to perform the analysis of dependability properties. The ad-
vantage of DFTCalc is a more expressive syntax for FTD, but it cannot check the
correctness and completeness of fault trees. Moreover, an important difference is that
their work does not include the possibility of fault masking, whereas in our work this
important phenomenon is taken into account. The work presented in [6] gravitates to-
wards theorem proving, using HOL4 and higher-order logics to analyse safety-critical
systems through FTA by formalizing the gates of a fault tree and conducting FTA-
based failure analysis. However, a model checking approach has several advantages
over theorem proving, such as being systematically exhaustive, fully automated, and
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more time efficient. However, FTA analysis of SEUs is very limited in the literature,




3.1 Fault Tree Analysis
The fault tree analysis method was developed in 1962 by Bell Telephone Laboratories
and it is a widely used method for risk assessment, mainly in the area of avionics,
nuclear and chemical industries [138]. FTA follows a deductive approach, which
means that it starts from an undesirable general event in order to find the origins of
said event. In the context of FTA, the general event is known as the top event, from
which the fault tree branches out vertically. The top event is defined as the failing
point of a system in operating conditions, whether those conditions are considered
normal or abnormal. A single fault tree can be used to analyse one single top event,
which can then be fed into another fault tree as a bottom event. Bottom events are
the ones at the very bottom of the fault tree, independent from any other events,
and, assuming the FTA is performed following a quantitative evaluation, these events
receive fault probabilities that will dynamically spread through the rest of the tree
during the analysis. The elements of a Fault Tree and their graphical representations
are summarized in Table 2.
Other elements compose the fault tree, such as conditioning events, which are specific
restrictions applied to a logic gate within the fault tree, like a mode of operation or a
sequence of other events that serve as a prerequisite to its activation. These events can
prevent or enforce the activation of a node or a gate, according to the circumstances.
An external event is an event expected to occur and it is not considered as a fault;
as such it may or may not affect the FTA. Lastly, an undeveloped event is an event
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Table 1: TMR configurations and Respective FTs
Figure Event Type Description
Component na System component
Bottom Event na Basic event that may lead to a failure
AND Gate Static The output is true if all inputs are true
OR Gate Static
The output is true if at least one input is
true
Combination Gate Dynamic The output is true if n inputs are true
Priority AND Gate Dynamic
The output is true if all the inputs become
true in a specific sequence
Inhibit Gate Dynamic
The output is true if the single input
becomes true in the presence of an enabling
condition
Spare Gate Dynamic
The output is true if the component and all
its spares fail
about which insufficient information is available or which is of no consequence to the
system. Normally these events are overlooked and have no real impact over the FTA.
In recent years, a number of works related to fault tree analysis has emerged. In [14]
a tool for fault tree analysis is presented, called DFTCalc, which is capable of model-
ing fault trees via compact representations. That work uses the stochastic technique
to perform the analysis of dependability properties. The advantage of DFTCalc is a
more expressive syntax for FTD, but it cannot check the correctness and completeness
of fault trees. Moreover, an important difference is that their work does not include
the possibility of fault masking, whereas in our work this important phenomenon is
taken into account. The work presented in [6] gravitates towards theorem proving,
using HOL4 and higher-order logics to analyse safety-critical systems through FTA
by formalizing the gates of a fault tree and conducting FTA-based failure analysis.
However, a model checking approach has several advantages over theorem proving,
such as being systematically exhaustive, fully automated, and more time efficient. In
[124], authors propose the use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) to perform quan-
titative analysis in fault trees. Their method improves the accuracy of the calculated
failure rates of bottom events over simulation techniques. It consists of converting
the FTD into a format compatible with Shannon’s decomposition, allowing the failure
rates to be accurately calculated. The binary decision diagram approach is extended
to qualitative FTA analysis, in [125], where BDDs are employed to evaluate minimal
cutsets of a fault tree without creating probabilistic inaccuracies like in the conven-
tional qualitative analysis techniques.
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3.2 Triple Modular Redundancy
One of the most important architectural patterns used in safety engineering is the
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [4, 70, 79, 93]. The idea of TMR consists in
triplicating a module that is considered critical in order to guarantee a correct be-
havior of the system. As shown in Figure 2 [33], the input is replicated to each copy
of the module M, and the output is provided to a voter V whose role is to propagate
the value that is in accordance with the majority of M outputs. The impact of a
Triple Modular Redundancy approach is to increase the reliability when compared
with a single module. In other words, the main goal is to decrease as much as possi-
ble the gap with respect to a perfect (faultless) component. This concept drives the
evaluation of redundant architectures.
Figure 2: Example of TMR Applied to a Generic Component
Redundant architectures exploiting Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) are broadly
used to obtain fault tolerant safety-critical systems. In the literature, the utilization
of formal methods to analyze these architectures is rather limited. In [? ] the be-
havior of a single TMR is formalized through Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSPs). The work in [152] uses Uppaal model checker to analyze a timed automata
model of a TMR system design. Both techniques are limited to a single system and
do not consider multi-staged TMRs. In [33, 34], the fault tree of a redundant sys-
tem is modeled and analyzed through Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs), giving
an estimation of the reliability gain across different TMR configurations. The main
problem of these approaches is the amount of redundancy required to perform the
analysis. Furthermore, their proposed modeling has the same limitation as previous
approaches because they also rely on boolean representation. Due to the increased
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cost and physical size constraints, the main challenge of implementing fault tolerance
through TMRs is knowing where in the system to apply the redundancy and knowing
which TMR configuration is the most beneficial to the overall reliability.
3.3 Probabilistic Model Checking
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique, derived from regular
model checking, applied on systems that present a random or probabilistic behavior,
like real life applications, where the resulting models usually contain a very large
number of states. It would be very impractical for the user to explicitly model every
state and transition of these applications. The power of model checkers comes from
the exhaustive nature of the analysis they perform. The model checker is capable of
traversing all reachable states in the model in order to generate a solution. One of the
most notable features of this technique is not only being able to receive probabilities
as an input but also to return probabilities as output. Given that a perfect, bug-free
system is something near impossible to achieve, probabilistic model checking allows
the user to work with tolerance percentages rather than absolute values.
Examples of the use of probabilistic model checkers are widely found in the lit-
erature. In [145] the authors assess the feasibility of using model checking for veri-
fication of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in civil airspace. The authors begin
by modeling simple UAS systems into the SPIN tool and then refining the model
by incorporating probabilities and using probabilistic model checking with PRISM.
Lastly, they model the UAS using the autonomous agent language Gwendolen and
compare and contrast the various approaches. The work in [72] uses PRISM tool
and language to perform the formal modeling and verification of RAM related prop-
erties on satellite systems, using Erlang distribution to improve discrete time delays
in CTMC by approximating nonexponential holding times with intermediate states
based on a phase type distribution.
3.3.1 PRISM Model Checker
PRISM [91] is a free, open source probabilistic symbolic model checker developed at
the University of Birmingham. It works with its own high-level modeling language,
based on the Reactive Modules formalism [7], which is written in form of state-based
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modules, each composed by a set of guarded commands. PRISM uses Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDD) (Binary Decision Diagrams) and Multi-Terminal Binary Decision
Diagrams (MTBDD) [88] to construct and compute the reachable states of even very
large probabilistic models.
PRISM is a very flexible tool to work with probabilistic real-life models as it
allows for the specification of probabilities inside the model and in the properties.
Additionally the software will inform what’s the probability of given property failing
after the verification. PRISM allows for step-by-step simulation where the user may
chose which variables on the system he wants to manipulate as well as their initial
values. The simulation may be guided, where the user manually selects the next
step to be taken, or random, where the user selects the number of random steps the
program should simulate. The tool supports a wide range of model analysis methods
and it features a very efficient implementation, making use of a symmetry reduction
technique [89] to help mitigate state-space explosion. PRISM works by creating a
probabilistic model of the system and computing its reachable states. The model
checking is done by dynamically creating graph-based computations [97] in order
to reach a numerical solution (based on linear equation systems and optimization
problems).
3.3.2 UPPAAL-SMC
UPPAAL is a toolbox for verification of real-time systems, represented by a network
of timed automata, extended with integer variables, structured data types, and chan-
nel synchronization. For the efficient analysis of probabilistic performance properties,
UPPAAL-SMC proposes to work with Statistical Model Checking (SMC). SMC works
by monitoring some simulations of the system, and then use statistical results (in-
cluding sequential hypothesis testing or Monte Carlo simulations) to decide whether
the system satisfies some property with a sufficient degree of confidence. The mod-
eling formalism of UPPAAL-SMC is based on a stochastic interpretation and an
extension of the Timed Automata (TA) formalism used in the classical model check-
ing version of UPPAAL. For individual TA components, the stochastic interpretation
replaces the non-deterministic choices between multiple transitions enabled by proba-
bilistic choices (that may or may not be user-defined). Similarly, the nondeterministic
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choices of time delays are refined by probability distributions, which at the compo-
nent level are given either uniform distributions in cases with time-bounded delays
or exponential distributions in cases of unbounded delays [46].
An illustrative example of the UPPAAL formalism is given by the PTA in Fig.
34. In this example and through the rest of this paper, the weight annotations
on locations and edges are ignored and defaulted to “1”. For Fig. 34, the delay
distribution determined by the upper and lower paths to the END state is given by
sums of uniform distributions, where X ≥ 2 (green label) is the guard of the transition
(i.e., minimum time), and X ≤ 4 (purple label) is the invariant distribution (i.e.,
maximum time delay) of the transition. The stochastic choice that determines which
path will be taken is represented by a forked transition, where each path is weighted





update may be performed during each transition (blue labels). Therefore, the END
location in the example is reachable within the interval X = [4, 12].
Figure 3: Illustrative Example of the UPPAAL Formalism. Reproduced from [46].
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Chapter 4
Article I: Formal Analysis of Fault
Tree using Probabilistic Model
Checking: A Solar Array Case
Study
Authors: Marwan Ammar, Khaza Anuarul Hoque, Otmane Ait Mohamed
Abstract: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widespread technique used to assess the
reliability of safety-critical systems. The traditional way of conducting FTA is either
through paper and pencil proof or through computer simulation techniques, which
are inefficient and prone to inaccuracy. In this paper, we propose the use of proba-
bilistic model checking to automatically analyze fault trees of safety-critical systems.
Our methodology consists in the probabilistic formalization of the gates used in a
fault tree to a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) and a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), and the subsequent probabilistic verification using PRISM tool to quantita-
tively analyze the system. To illustrate the proposed approach we perform the fault
tree analysis of a solar array system, used as power source for the DFH-3 satellite.
The results show that harsh thermal environment is the main cause of system failures.
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4.1 Introduction
Fault Tree Diagram (FTD) is a top-down graphical model of a system, which repre-
sents all paths and events that may lead to failure within that system [138]. Events
in FTDs are nodes, connected through logic gates in such a way that an error in one
of the bottom nodes can propagate to the higher level nodes and reach the top-level
event, compromising the functionality of the entire system. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
is the study of such diagrams in order to discover and assess the effect of undesirable
events or faults [138]. FTA allows safety and reliability engineers to better understand
how the system can fail, identifying the best possible ways to make it safer, as well as
the system’s event rates. FTA is commonly used in the aerospace industry for both
hardware and software [138] as means for investigating a system’s modes, potential
faults occurrences with their causes, and to quantify their contribution to system un-
reliability in the course of product design. Traditionally, FTA is based on simulation
techniques [96, 114, 138], with the main techniques being: Monte-Carlo simulation,
Quasi-Monte-Carlo method, time-sequential simulation, and discrete event simulation
[53]. Assessing the causes and the probability of a punctual failure occurrence in the
system using simulation-based techniques is very costly, since each failure condition
must be evaluated separately, one at a time, creating a very large state-space and
requiring tremendous effort to analyze the whole scope of the system.
An alternative to avoid the aforementioned problem is the use of Probabilistic
Model Checking(PMC). PMC is a formal verification method that designates a col-
lection of techniques for the automatic analysis of reactive, finite state concurrent
systems. This technique has several advantages over simulation. Notably, probabilis-
tic model checking is an exhaustive, accurate, efficient and completely automated
verification technique [20], providing a comprehensive and reliable solution for fault
tree analysis. In this work, we propose a PMC-based methodology for FTA modeling,
using PRISM language [1]. Added to the inherent advantages of PMC listed above,
PRISM’s modularity allows for easily expandable, state-efficient models. The model-
ing methodology is applied to a case study of a solar array mechanical system [147],
first using Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) [106] to model known environment
scenarios where the probabilistic distribution of the system’s behavior is known, then
using Markov Decision Process (MDP) to model the non-deterministic behavior of
the system when subjected to unknown environments.
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Our goal is to provide a way for developers to evaluate the weaknesses of their
systems. Through PMC properties, our approach can be used to ascertain not only
correctness, but also quantitative measures such as performance and reliability, with-
out the time and intensive processing required by simulation techniques. This work
focuses on evaluating the dynamics of fault propagation in FTDs, and we observe
that the lowest levels in the tree are the most positively affected by fault masking,
events connected to multiple gates are especially unreliable in non-deterministic en-
vironments (MDP), and that events connected to AND gates are more affected by
non-determinism than events connected to OR gates.
The following section presents some important background information about
PMC, the PRISM tool and FTA. Section 4.3 considers related works. In Section
5.3.1 we describe our modeling approach. In Section 5.4 we demonstrate the applica-
tion of our proposed methodology, performing the analysis on a solar array FTD and
Section 5.5 concludes the paper with some future research directions.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Probabilistic Model Checking with PRISM
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique derived from regular
model checking and applied on systems that present a random or probabilistic be-
havior, like real life applications, where the resulting models usually contain a very
large number of states. This technique can deal with a wide range of quantitative
measures; the results show an exact figure of the property being verified, usually in
parts-per-hundred; it can be fully automated, provides an exhaustive analysis of the
model, and it is very efficient. PMC works with several model types and temporal
logic specification languages. In this paper we use DTMC and MDP as the model
types and Probabilistic Computation-Tree Logic (PCTL) as the property specification
language. In [60] DTMC is defined as a tuple D=(S, s,P,L) where S is a countable
set of states, s ∈ S is an initial state, P : S ×S → [0, 1] is a transition probability
matrix such that
∑
s′∈ s P (s, s
′) = 1 for all s ∈ S, and L : S → 2AP is a labeling
function mapping each state to a set of atomic propositions taken from a set AP.
An MDP is defined in [60] as a tuple M = (S, s, αM, δM,L) where S is a finite set of
states, s ∈ S is an initial state, αM is a finite alphabet, δM : S × αM → Dist (S) is
29
a (partial) probabilistic transition function and L : S → 2AP is a labelling function
mapping each state to a set of atomic propositions taken from a set AP. As such, the
MDP is a stochastic system where all the decisions are made in a non-deterministic
manner.
To complete the model checking process, we specify properties using a probabilistic
extension of CTL temporal logic called PCTL. PCTL can be used with both DTMC
and MDP models, working at discrete time domain. The main difference is that
using PCTL over MDP model requires to extend the P[](probability query) operator
with the min and max operators. As such, each path formula is evaluated in a best
or worse case scenario [12]. Below are two illustrative examples with their natural
language translation:
1. DTMC - P>0.8 [¬ a
⋃
b] - “The probability of a being false until b is true is
bigger than 0.8.
2. MDP - Pmin [ F (a > 0)
⋃ ¬ b] - “What’s the minimum probability that
eventually a will be bigger than zero until b is false.
We perform PMC with PRISM [1], a free, open source probabilistic symbolic
model checker. It works with its own high-level modeling language, written as state-
based modules. Each module is composed by a set of guarded commands. PRISM
supports a wide range of model analysis methods and it features a very efficient im-
plementation, making use of multiple model checking engines (based on BDDs and
their extensions). These engines enable PRISM to handle models with up to 108
states. The model checking is done by dynamically creating graph-based computa-
tions [100] in order to reach a numerical solution based on linear equation systems and
optimization problems. PRISM also features advanced algorithms such as symmetry
reduction and abstraction refinement. The syntax of the PRISM language as well as
some examples will be given in Section 5.3.1.
4.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis
The fault tree analysis method was developed in 1962 by Bell Telephone Laboratories
and it is a widely used method for risk assessment, mainly in the area of avionics,
nuclear and chemical industries [138]. FTA follows a deductive approach, which means
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that it starts from an undesirable general event in order to find what circumstances
may lead to that event. In the context of FTA, the general event is known as top
event, from which the fault tree branches out vertically. The top event is defined
as the failing point of a system in operating conditions, whether those conditions
are considered normal or abnormal. A single fault tree can be used to analyse one
single top event, which can then be fed into another fault tree as a bottom event.
Bottom events are the ones at the very bottom of the fault tree, independent from any
other events, and, assuming the FTA is performed following a quantitative evaluation,
these events receive fault probabilities that will dynamically spread through the rest
of the tree during the analysis. The elements of a Fault Tree and their graphical
representations are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Elements of a Fault Tree
Token Element Description
Top or Intermediary Event System or component failure
Bottom Event A basic initiating fault event
Conditioning Event
Specific condition or restriction that can apply
to any gate
External Event Event that is normally expected to occur
Undeveloped Event
Event that’s not further developed due to lack
of importance or knowledge
AND Gate The output is true if all inputs are true
OR Gate The output is true if at least one input is true
Combination Gate The output is true if n inputs are true
Exclusive OR Gate
The output is true if exactly one of the inputs
is true
Priority AND Gate
The output is true if all the inputs become
true in a specific sequence
Inhibit Gate
The output is true if the single input becomes
true in the presence of an enabling condition
4.3 Related Works
PRISM model checker has several application domains, specially for safety critical
systems. In [145] the authors assess the feasibility of using model checking for ver-
ification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in civil airspace. The authors begin
by modeling simple UAS systems into the SPIN tool and then refining the model
by incorporating probabilities and using probabilistic model checking with PRISM.
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Lastly, they model the UAS using the autonomous agent language Gwendolen and
compare and contrast the various approaches. The work in [72] uses PRISM tool to
perform the formal modeling and verification of RAM related properties on satelite
systems, using Erlang distribution to improve discrete time delays in CTMC by ap-
proximating nonexponential holding times with intermediate states based on a phase
type distribution.
In recent years, a number of works related to fault tree analysis has emerged. In
[14], DFTCalc tool for fault tree analysis is presented. It is capable of modeling
fault trees via compact representations and the dependability analysis is performed
using stochastic techniques. DFTCalc allows modelling of most FTD constructs but
it cannot check the correctness and the completeness of fault trees. Moreover, an im-
portant difference is that their work does not include the possibility of fault masking,
whereas in our work this important phenomenon is taken into account. The work
presented in [6] gravitates towards theorem proving, using HOL4 and higher-order
logics to analyse safety-critical systems through FTA by formalizing the gates of a
fault tree and conducting FTA-based failure analysis. However, a model checking
approach has several advantages over theorem proving, such as being systematically
exhaustive, fully automated, and more time efficient. In [124], authors propose the
use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) to perform quantitative analysis in fault
trees. Their method improves the accuracy of the calculated failure rates of bottom
events over simulation techniques. It consists of converting the FTD into a format
compatible with Shannon’s decomposition, allowing the failure rates to be accurately
calculated. The binary decision diagram approach is extended to qualitative FTA
analysis, in [125], where BDDs are employed to evaluate minimal cutsets of a fault
tree without creating probabilistic inaccuracies like in the conventional qualitative
analysis techniques.
All these works exemplify the versatility and importance of fault tree diagrams
and their relevance for assessment of safety-critical systems related to diverse areas.
The research presented in this paper is different than what is found in the related
work because on top of formalizing the various gates of a fault tree, allowing for the
representation of virtually any system, we introduce a modeling technique that is
state-efficient and easily scalable. In addition, our modeling can handle both quan-




In this section we show how the fault tree diagrams are modeled in PRISM. Our
emphasis is on AND and OR gates, since those are the types of gates present in the
case study, presented in Section 5.4. The fault-masking mechanic adds a probability of
fault mitigation inside the gates, which are designed to allow easy system composition
with a reduced number of state transitions. The modeling of the other FTA gates
follow a similar approach but are not included in this paper due to space constraints.
Since the DTMC and the MDP modeling approaches are similar in PRISM, we will
focus our explanation on the DTMC modeling, with graphical representations and a
detailed explanation of each gate’s state transitions in Subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
It is important to note that the main difference between DTMC and MDP is that
in DTMC, in each state, the successor state is determined by a discrete probability
distribution, whereas in MDP, in each state, the successor state is determined by a
nondeterministic choice between several discrete probability distributions.
MDP model, in each state S, the successor state is decided in two steps: the first
step is non-deterministic and the second step is random, according to the probability
distribution of the transition matrix. The DTMC model only has one step, which is
















Figure 4: Fault Tree Gates
4.4.1 Modeling of an AND Gate
The AND gate is defined as follows:
Definition 1: Given two inputs X and Y and their output Z, connected through
an AND gate, output Z becomes true if and only if X and Y are true. Figure 14(a)
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is a representation of an AND gate. The AND modeling in PRISM follows these
assumptions:
1. All the inputs to the AND gate represent events, each of which have a probability
of being triggered.
2. Only one input can trigger at a time.
3. If one of the inputs of the AND gate is triggered then the other will be given
an additional probability of triggering.
4. Before an output is generated, there is a certain probability that the fault will
be masked.
The model of the AND gate can be defined formally as a finite transition system
(S, s, P, L), where S is the set of states S = (S0, S1, S2, S3), s is the initial state
s = S0, P is a transition probability matrix, Pij, such that Ps,S1 = (p1), Ps,S2 = (p2),
PS1,S3 = (p3), PS1,S4 = (p5), PS2,S3 = (p4), PS2,S4 = (p5) and L : S → 2AP is a labeling
function, mapping states with properties of interest, where L(S3)=propagate. The











Figure 5: 2-input AND gate DTMC
Starting from an initial state S0(X=0, Y=0) the next state can either be S1(X=1,
Y=0) or S2(X=0, Y=1), with probabilities p1 and p2, respectively. At this point, the
system can either move to S3(X=1, Y=1, Z=1), with probability p3 or p4, signifying
fault propagation, or the system can move to S4(X=0, Y=0, M=1), with probability
p5, signifying fault masking. The model in Fig. 5 is then encoded into PRISM. A
PRISM command is a tuple cmd = (act, guard, rate, action) following the format
[<act>] <guard> → <rate> : <action>;, where act is an action label, guard is
a predicate over a variable, rate is a numerical evaluation referent to the probability of
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an action and action is a set of n variable updates that will translate into transitions
in the model. Fig. 6 shows the PRISM representation of the AND gate. Please note
that variable M stands for masking and variable and indicates if the module is idle
(and=0), waiting for first input (and=1) or waiting for second input (and=2).
module and_gate





Figure 6: PRISM modeling of an AND gate
4.4.2 Modeling of an OR Gate
The OR gate, seen in Figure 14(b), is defined as:
Definition 2: Given two inputs A and B and their output C, output C becomes
true if any of the inputs A or B are true.
The modeling process takes into consideration the following assumptions:
1. All the inputs to the gate represent an event, each of which have a probability
of being triggered.
2. Only one input can trigger at a time, after which no other input can trigger.
3. Before an output is generated, there is a certain probability that the fault will
be masked.
We formally define the OR gate as a finite transition system (S, s, P, L), where S
is the set of states S = (S0, S1, S2, S3), s is the initial state s = S0, P is a transition
probability matrix, pij, such that Ps,S1 = (p6), Ps,S2 = (p7), PS1,S3 = (p8), PS2,S3 =
(p9), PS1,S4 = (p10), PS2,S4 = (p10) and L : S → 2AP is a labeling function, mapping
states with properties of interest, where L(S3)=propagate. The OR gate DTMC model
is shown in Figure 7.
From an initial state S0(A=0, B=0) the next state can either be S1(A=1, B=0)
or S2(A=0, B=1) with probabilities p6 and p7 respectively. At this point, the system












Figure 7: 2 input OR gate DTMC
fault propagation, or to S4(A=0, B=0 and M=1), with probability p10, signifying
fault masking. The OR gate model is then encoded into PRISM as shown in Fig. 8.







Figure 8: PRISM modeling of an OR gate
4.4.3 Sample Modeling of a 2-Gate System
To illustrate the modeling process of a fault tree using our modular approach (pre-
modeled gates in PRISM), we provide an example using a simple two gates fault tree
with three inputs A, B, E, and one output F. A, B and E are bottom events. D is
an intermediary event and F is the top event for this example, as shown in Figure
14(c).The assumptions listed in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 are also applicable for this
example, with two additions:
1. There exists one additional module twogate, in the PRISM code, that serves as
a control module, where the order of the gates in the system can be specified.
2. The system starts at the OR gate, where inputs A and B each have a probability
of triggering.
3. Output C becomes input D as it enters the AND gate.
4. Input E has a chance of being triggered after the output C propagates, following
our AND gate assumptions.
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In this small example, we illustrate how to use the gates, defined in the previous
sections, as building blocks to construct more complex fault tree diagrams. Fig. 9
















Figure 9: 2-gate DTMC
From state S0, the system is initialized and moves to S1. In S1 the system can go to
S2 or S3 with probabilities p1 or p2. From S2 or S3, the system can go to S7, with
probability p5, signifying masking, or to S4, signifying propagation of the OR gate.
The output of the OR gate serves as one of the inputs of the AND gate, thus the
system moves to S5. In S5, if input E is triggered and the output propagates, the
system moves to state S6, otherwise the system moves to S7, signifying masking. The
two-gates model is encoded in PRISM as shown in Fig. 10.
module twogate
[] or=0 -> (or ’=1);














Figure 10: PRISM modeling of the 2-gate example
It is important to note that all variables are declared globally, with starting value
of zero. The variable declarations are suppressed in Fig. 10 for space constrains. The
module twogate controls the flow of the system. In the first line of the module, the
or variable sets the starting point of the system, activating the OR gate. The second
line of the module takes the output of the OR gate, C, and channels it to the input
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of the AND gate, D. The modules above can be used to build a fault tree diagram,
in any desired configuration, by PRISM’s module renaming feature.
4.5 Case Study
To show the applicability of our approach, we perform a quantitative analysis on
the solar array case study, taken from [147]. We will present the obtained analytical
results and a possible solution to improve reliability. Solar arrays are one of the most
important components of any satellite mission, as they generate power for all other
components of the satellite. The arrays are usually in a folded position during the
launch phase of the satellite, becoming unfolded once the satellite is fully deployed in
space. The goal of this component is to have the solar array aimed at the sun at all
times in order to maximise power generation for the satellite. Fig. 11 shows the fault
tree diagram of the mechanical components in the solar array. A detailed description
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Figure 11: Solar Array Fault Tree
The top event X24 represents the failure of the solar array system. Intermediary
events X19, X20, X21, X22 and X23, in the second level of the tree, represent the
possible causes of failure in the solar array. At the third and fourth levels, X1, X2,
X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X12, X13, and X14 are the bottom events,
that can cause a failure in events X19, X20, X21, X22 and X23. The solar array
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fault tree was modeled first, as a DTMC and then, as an MDP. We reiterate that the
choice of those types of Markov chain was motivated by the need to verify the sys-
tem in a known and predictable environment as well as in an unknown environment.
Every bottom event in the fault tree has a probability of being triggered and such a
probability is based on the truth degree values specified in Table 3 [147]. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that only one bottom event can trigger at a time, with the
exception of X4 and X5, since those events are connected to an AND gate and thus
both must be triggered to model the behavior of fault propagation. All other events
in the tree are connected through OR gates. The objective of the experiment is to
assess and compare the likelihood of faults originated at the different bottom events
of the tree to reach the top event X24 causing a system failure. It is important to
note that bottom event X3 is connected to multiple gates in the system. This makes
X3 the most important bottom event in the tree since it has the highest probability
of triggering a fault in another node. The model is encoded in PRISM following
the approach specified in Section 5.3.1. The output of each logical gate has intrinsic
probability of fault masking which, in the real world, means a non-destructive failure
or a transient fault, which the system is able to detect and fix by itself, continuing its
normal operation. The probabilities of fault masking are the same for all gates of the
model. We performed our analysis using two different values for masking probabili-
ties, 5% then 10%. However, since the model is parametric, any other value can be
easily evaluated. The probabilities of each bottom event to reach a system failure are
evaluated by verifying PCTL properties in PRISM, for both the DTMC and MDP
models. The property for a node Xa, connected to an OR gate, is defined in PCTL
as follows:
Property 1: Pmax =? [(F Xa = 1)& (F X24 = 1)] - “What is the maximum proba-
bility that eventually Xa will trigger and eventually the fault will propagate to X24,
causing a system failure”.
The property for two nodes Xb and Xc, connected to an AND gate, is written as
follows:
Property 2: Pmax =? [(F Xb = 1)& (F Xc = 1)&(F X24 = 1)] - “What is the
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maximum probability that eventually Xb will trigger and eventually Xc will trigger
and eventually the fault will propagate to X24, causing a system failure”.
We use DTMC in the first experiment to assess the probability that a failure orig-
inated in a bottom event will reach the top event and the results are presented in
Table 4.
Table 3: Fault Probability of Bottom Events
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
4% 6% 10% 4% 6% 4% 8%
X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14
6% 8% 3% 5% 8% 8% 8%
Table 4: Top Event Failure Probability(DTMC)
Event 5% Mask 10% Mask Event 5% Mask 10% Mask
X1 0.0361% 0.0324% X8 0.0514% 0.0437%
X2 0.0541% 0.0486% X9 0.0722% 0.0648%
X3 0.0868% 0.0749% X10 0.0270% 0.0243%
X4 0.0342% 0.0291% X11 0.0451% 0.0405%
X5 0.0021% 0.0018% X12 0.0722% 0.0648%
X6 0.0021% 0.0018% X13 0.0722% 0.0648%
X7 0.0685% 0.0583% X14 0.0685 0.0583%
The second set of experiments is conducted using MDP, to add non-determinism into
the model. The scenarios are evaluated in the same manner as the DTMC experiment
and Table 5 summarizes the result.
Table 5: Top Event Failure Probability(MDP)
Event 5% Mask 10% Mask Event 5% Mask 10% Mask
X1 0.0361% 0.0324% X8 0.0514% 0.0437%
X2 0.0541% 0.0486% X9 0.0722% 0.0648%
X3 0.0902% 0.0810% X10 0.0270% 0.0243%
X4 0.0342% 0.0291% X11 0.0451% 0.0405%
X5 0.0041% 0.0034% X12 0.0722% 0.0648%
X6 0.0041% 0.0034% X13 0.0722% 0.0648%
X7 0.0685% 0.0583% X14 0.0685 0.0583%
After comparing the results, it becomes clear that the increased probability of masking
is considerably more effective for errors occurring in the lower layers of the fault tree.
It is notable that while most results are the same for DTMC and MDP, they do
differ in X3, X5 and X6. The observed reason for these differences lies in the non-
determinism present at the core of an MDP. OR gates are simple because one error
is enough to trigger an output and a chance of propagation to the next node thus,
according to out modeling assumptions, the path from bottom to top event becomes
more linear and has less room for randomness. For an AND gate the scenario is
different because the output generation and propagation depends on faults that occur
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on two bottom events concurrently. As such, there are multiple ways the error scenario
can play out (input 1 before input 2, input 2 before input 1, input 1 but not input 2
and so forth), thus opening more possibilities for non-determinism.
It is also of importance that event X3 is connected to multiple OR gates at the
same time, alowing for non-determinism. Another very important observation is that
the drop in system failure rate between 5% and 10% masking in the AND gates of
the MDP model was 17.07%, which is the biggest gain in reliability observed in this
experiment. Although the overall reliability of AND gates is greater in the DTMC
model, the reliability gain of those gates is higher in the presence of non-determinism.
Our analysis shows that the main causes of system failures in the solar array are
components X3, X9, X12, and X13. Remarkably, the bottom events that generate all
the above failures are located in the second layer of the fault tree and are connected
through OR gates. As an additional experiment, we take the number one cause of
system failure listed above (bottom event X3 propagating through OR gate to X21 )
and we run a test in a hypothetical scenario where we add system redundancy and
replace the OR gate with an AND gate, as seen in Fig. 12. Since X21 and X24 are





Figure 12: Redundancy Test
In such hypotetical scenario, the drop in system failure would be of 99.2%, using a
DTMC model and a masking rate of 10%. At the end of these experiments, it is
clear that the best way to improve the reliability of a fault tree, and consequently the
system that the tree is based on, is to place the most critical nodes under AND gates,
preferably with system redundancy, and to place such critical nodes further down in
the tree.
4.6 Conclusion
The accuracy of the failure assessment is of utmost importance in safety-critical en-
vironments, where a system error may lead to catastrophic outcomes. In this paper,
we have proposed a methodology for accurately performing fault tree analysis using
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probabilistic model checking. The technique consists of modeling the logic gates in
a fault tree diagram into DTMCs and MDPs that are encoded into the probabilistic
model checker PRISM. The methodology is, then, used to conduct a probabilistic
analysis on a solar array fault tree diagram, focusing on the likeness of a single fault
to propagate and cause a top event failure. A comparison is shown between the
results of both Markov chain models, with an analysis conducted on those results,
pointing out the FTD’s critical points. Building upon the methodology presented
in this paper, a few other elements can be added to make for more complex FTA
scenario, such as the introduction of time and concurrency of events.
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Chapter 5
Article II: Efficient Probabilistic
Fault Tree Analysis of Safety
Critical Systems via Probabilistic
Model Checking
Authors: Marwan Ammar, Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, Yvon
Savaria
Abstract: The cost and complexity involved in the development of critical systems
encourage the use of reliability assessment techniques as early in the design cycle
as possible. Existing techniques often lack the capacity to perform a comprehensive
and exhaustive analysis on complex redundant architectures, leading to less than
optimal risk evaluation. This paper addresses the aforesaid weakness by 1) proposing
a new probabilistic modeling of Fault Tree gates and their composition as Markov
Decision Process; 2) developing a new formal-based technique to perform an in-depth
verification of the system’s reliability. This technique makes use of the expressiveness
of fault trees and the power of probabilistic model checking in order to investigate
the best Triple Modular Redundancy partitioning and configuration of a system.
The presented approach greatly improves the overall scalability with respect to other
techniques, while also improving the accuracy of the results. For example, we can




Ensuring the proper functionality of safety-critical systems is of utmost importance
and, as such, dealing with faults at early stages of development has become increas-
ingly important. To this end, many techniques for fault analysis and fault tolerance
have been developed. In this context, Fault Trees (FTs) have gained widespread
acceptance for quantitative safety analysis. FTs are top-down graphical represen-
tations of various combinations of lower level events that may cause the system to
reach a top level failure (i.e., system failure). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can provide
insightful information to designers regarding the reliability of their systems, such
as how is their system most likely to fail and what are the most efficient ways to
make it safer. Traditionally, FTA is performed by converting the system’s FT into
a Boolean function and simulating that function with different low level component
failure rates [30–32, 35, 51, 124, 138]. However, these approaches are costly in time
and resources. This is mainly due to the fact that their modeling of FT is limited to
Boolean representation, which exponentially increases the resource requirements to
reach the desired results.
Redundant architectures, such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), are broadly
used as alternatives for fault tolerance, in order to improve the reliability of safety-
critical systems. In the literature, the utilization of formal methods to analyze these
architectures is rather limited. In [? ] the behavior of a single TMR is formalized
through Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The work in [152] uses Uppaal
model checker to analyze a timed automata model of a TMR system design. Both
of these techniques are limited to a single system and do not consider multi-staged
TMRs. In [33, 34], the fault tree of a redundant system is modeled and analyzed
through Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs), giving an estimation of the reliabil-
ity gain across different TMR configurations. These approaches present new problems
due to their intrinsic modeling approach, namely the amount of redundancy required
to perform the analysis. Furthermore, their proposed modeling has the same limita-
tion as previous approaches because they also rely on boolean representation.
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Due to the increased cost and physical size constraints, the main challenge of im-
plementing fault tolerance through TMRs is knowing where in the system to apply
the redundancy and knowing which TMR configuration is the most beneficial to the
overall reliability. In order to address the above mentioned issues, a new formal prob-
abilistic FTA methodology is proposed. This work is distinct in the following ways:
1) A new probabilistic modeling of FTs is introduced. This approach consists of mod-
eling the behavior of each FT gate as a probabilistic automaton (PA). Thereafter, a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) model of the system’s FT is obtained by the parallel
composition of all the PAs that compose the FT. 2) A recursive formal probabilis-
tic analysis of the MDP model of the FT is proposed. This is achieved by utilizing
the efficiency of Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) techniques. In this analysis, a
Component Contribution Investigation (CCI) is performed. The CCI consists in the
evaluation of the contribution of the failure of each subcomponent to the system’s
failure. 3) A new methodology to recursively evaluate the impact of TMR on the
reliability of the system. The goal of this technique is to determine the best TMR
partitioning and configuration for a system. The impact of the application of different
TMR configurations on each critical subcomponent is investigated. This process is
repeated until the resultant system reliability falls below the desired system failure
rate.
The proposed methodology is experimentally evaluated on different system ar-
chitectures, including the ones analyzed in [33, 34], demonstrating clear advantages.
Our methodology is more scalable and provides approximately 80 times of speed-
up. For example, the technique proposed in [33] fails to analyze a chain of 10 TMR
components. The technique proposed in [34] is able to analyze a chain of 140 TMR
components in 110 seconds, while our approach can analyze the same chain in less
than 1.5 seconds. Our methodology significantly widens the possible analyses of TMR
architectures. As well as evaluating the best TMR configuration (like in [33, 34]) our
methodology can determine the optimal TMR partitioning and the impact of TMR
at different FT levels.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, the most relevant
related works are discussed. In Section 5.3, we present the proposed methodology. In
Section 5.4, we describe the experiments and report the main results. In Section 5.5,
we draw some conclusions and discuss future work.
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5.2 Related Work
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used method for risk assessment, mainly in
the area of avionics, nuclear, and chemical industries [138]. FTA follows a deductive
approach, which means it starts from an undesirable general event in order to find
the origins of said event. In the context of FTA, the general event is known as
top level event (TLE), from which the fault tree branches out vertically. The top
event is defined as the failing point of a system in operating conditions, whether
those conditions are considered normal or abnormal. Basic events are the ones at the
very bottom of the fault tree, called low level events(LLE), independent from any
other events. A quantitative FTA is performed by assigning fault probabilities to the
bottom events which will dynamically be distributed through the rest of the tree. The
relationship between fault tree events is expressed using relational constructs called
logic gates, such as AND and the OR gates.
In [124, 125] quantitative and qualitative FTA techniques are proposed, respec-
tively. These techniques consist of converting the FT into a format compatible with
Shannon’s decomposition (i.e., boolean formulas). Thereafter, the proposed analysis
is performed on the FT boolean formula to generate fault configurations that can
cause system failure. The problem with these approaches lies in the boolean repre-
sentation which limits their expressiveness of the system’s behavior. For instance,
it is not possible to trace the source of the error without performing step-by-step
comparison between the faulty and the reference models of the system. The works
in [31] and [30] focus on the analysis of dynamic FTs. The FTs are represented as
cause-effect diagrams known as Bayesian networks The analysis is performed through
the Galileo tool [128], which performs FTA through the use of DIFTree algorithms.
A model-based safety assessment approach to analyze redundant components is
proposed in [33]. In this technique, SMT solvers are utilized to generate all fault
configurations that can lead to a system failure. This technique is an improvement
(in terms of speed and accuracy) over traditional reliability analyses [70? ], which
utilize manual algorithms. However, the problem with the approach proposed in [33]
lies in the amount of overhead it requires to generate the model. This is mainly due
to the need to incorporate a reference and a redundant model of each subcomponent.
Moreover, the redundant model of the subcomponents, must be duplicated, with
one added multiplexer between each duplicated items, to allow fault injection. As
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such, this modeling approach is very costly, with serious scalability issues due to
the complexity and the size of the final SMT model. According to [33], with such
modeling approach, even the most efficient SMT solvers cannot handle a chain of
more than 10 TMR components.
An attempt to address the scalability issues of [33] is presented in [34], where
the complexity is reduced through predicate abstraction. This technique replaces the
reference and the redundant models with their abstracted versions to allow larger
systems to be modeled. However, even if the behavior of the models is preserved,
another problem arises with [33, 34]. Generating all possible fault configurations
that may lead to a system failure is impractical. According to [33], a chain of 100
TMR components can have 26×100 possible fault configurations. An SMT solver can
only generate a subset of these possible fault configurations (i.e. the obtained system
failure rate will be underestimated).
5.3 Proposed Methodology
In this section, the proposed probabilistic fault tree analysis of redundant architec-
tures is introduced. The flow chart of the proposed methodology is shown in Fig.
13. We start from a system-level model, in which a system is composed of inter-
connected hardware components. This system-level model must be provided by the
designer in a general-purpose modeling language, such as SysML [61]. The failure
rate of each component is characterized from the system-level specification. From the
SysML model, a fault tree of the system is automatically synthesized using the tool
proposed in [99]. Subsequently, a formal MDP model of the system’s FT is obtained
through the parallel composition of the PAs of the FT gates. A library of the PAs
of the FT gates is modeled a priori and each gate can be instantiated as needed.
In this work, the composition of the MDP model of the FT is done automatically
through the probabilistic model checker PRISM. The next step is to exhaustively
analyze the generated MDP model in order to evaluate the maximum probability of
the TLE (i.e., compute the system’s failure rate), in the presence of all LLEs. This
is done by performing probabilistic model checking of the following property: “What
is the maximum probability that eventually TLE will be true (i.e. system will fail)”.
According to the specification and based on the criticality of the system, a threshold
47
for an acceptable failure rate is defined. If the computed failure rate is above the
expected threshold, then an exhaustive analysis of the fault tree is required. In this
case, we perform a Component Contribution Investigation (CCI) which is an exami-
nation of the impact of the failure of each subcomponent to the system failure. This
is done by verifying the following property: “What is the maximum probability that
if component A eventually fails, the TLE will eventually fail”
For each system, a Component Contribution Matrix (CCM) is created. The CCM is
a library that records the impact of the failure of each subcomponent to the system’s
failure probability. Subsequently, the proposed methodology investigates the effects
of applying TMR on the critical components (based on the system’s CCM) of the
system. If the system’s failure rate is above the desired threshold, the CCI is repeated
and the CCM is updated. The previous steps are repeated until the system satisfies
































Figure 13: Main Steps of the Proposed Methodology
5.3.1 Probabilistic Modeling of Fault Trees
In fault trees, the set of events that might lead to a top level event failure is defined in
a top-down manner and connected using FT gates. In order to accurately model the
fault dependencies in FT, our approach focuses on the formalization and modeling of
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the probabilistic behavior of FT gates. The general probabilistic model (automaton)
of any FT gate is expressed in Definition 1.
Definition 1: Given a FT gate with a set of inputs X and an output Z, connected
through a certain logic (such as AND, OR). The probabilistic automaton (PA) of this
gate can be formally defined as a finite transition system as follows:
 S, a finite set of states;
 s is the initial state s = S0;
 δ ⊆ (S × S), a set of transitions between the states;
 Fr, a set of components failure rates;
 pi : δ(S × S) → (λ, 1 − λ), a transition function assigning probability λ ∈ Fr
for each transition.
Example: Given two input events X and Y and their output Z, connected
through an AND gate, output Z becomes true if and only if X and Y are true. Two
examples of the PAs of one static and one dynamic gates are depicted in Fig. 14. For
the static AND gate (see Fig. 14(a)), starting from an initial state S0(X=0, Y=0,
Z=0) the next state can either be S1(X=1, Y=0, Z=0) or S2(X=0, Y=1, Z=0), with
probabilities p1 and p2, respectively. At this point, the system can either move from
S1 or S2 to S3(X=0, Y=0, Z=1), with probability p2 or p1, respectively, signifying
fault propagation, or stay in S1 or S2, with probabilities 1-p1 or 1-p2. A dynamic
gate is modeled in the same manner, but with an added degree of complexity due
to the priority constraint. A Priority AND (PAND) gate model (see Fig. 14(b))
starts at state S0(X=0, Y=0, Z=0). The model may move to S1(X=1, Y=0, Z=0)
with probability p1, or to S2(X=0, Y=1, Z=0) with probability p2. If the model is
at S1 and the priority of X is higher than the priority of Y, and event Y happens,
the next state will be S3(X=1, Y=1, Z=1), with probability p2. If the model is at
S1 and the priority of Y is higher than the priority of X, and event Y happens, then
the next state will be S2, with probability p2. Lastly, if the model is at state S2 and
the priority of Y is higher than the priority of X, and event X happens, the model
moves to S3, with probability p1. If the model is at S2 and the priority of X is higher


















p1 : X < Y
p2 : X > Y
p1 : X > Y
p2 : X < Y
(b) 2-input PAND gate
Figure 14: Example of Fault Tree Gate Automata
Due to space constrains, only the PAs of the AND and PAND gates are shown
in Fig. 14. However, a list of all the FT gates that we have modeled and a brief
description of their behavior can be seen in Table 6. After the PAs of the gates in
the FT are modeled, the MDP of the FT is constructed. In this work, the MDP
definition developed in [90] is adapted. An MDP is defined as a finite transition
system (S, s, A, P, L,Steps) as follows:
 S, a finite set of states;
 s is the initial state s = S0;
 A is a set of actions (i.e., LLEs);
 AP is a set of atomic propositions;
 L : S → 2AP is a labelling function that provides, to each state s ∈ S, a set
L(s) of atomic propositions;
 Steps : S×Act→ Dist(S) is the (partial) transition probability function, with
Dist(S) denoting the set of all discrete probability distributions over S.
The MDP, as defined previously, is a stochastic system where all the decisions
are made in a non-deterministic manner. At each state, a non-deterministic choice is
done from a finite set of possible actions by parallel synchronization (‖S) of the PAs
(MMDP = {PA1 ‖S PA2 ‖S . . . ‖S PAn}). Subsequently, the function Steps ran-
domly chooses the successor state according to the probability distribution Steps(s, a).
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The choice of MDP over other types of Markov models, such as the Discrete-Time
Markov Chain (DTMC), lies in the fact that real life systems experience nondeter-
ministic behavior due to the concurrency between components operating in parallel.
Concurrency can be found when an event leads to several different errors (i.e., im-
pacts several subcomponents) in the system. A DTMC model, in this case, divides
the probability of failure equally over all the affected subcomponents. However, this
behavior is not realistic. The MDP implementation of the aforementioned event will
result in a completely random distribution choice, thus reflecting more accurately a
real environment. An example of this can be seen in Fig. 15, where the effects of
non-deterministic (i.e., MDP) versus probabilistic (i.e., DTMC) distribution on the
TLE failure rate (1 − Rsys) of the solar array system of the DHF-3 satellite [147] is
investigated. The solar array FT can be seen in Fig. 15(a). It can be observed from
the results (shown in 15(b)) that the choice of model (MDP or DTMC) does not in-
fluence the computed failure rates when the events only affect a single subcomponent
(e.g., X2 and X7 ). On the other hand, an event that affects several subcomponents
(e.g., event X3 directly affects subcomponents X15, X17, X18, and X21 ) will have
its impact on the system’s failure underestimated, in the DTMC model.
It is important to mention that our probabilistic modeling approach takes full advan-
tage of the concept of FT modularity [138], which means that a fault tree of a big
system can be broken down into smaller sub trees. These smaller fault trees can then
be analyzed separately, and the result of this analysis is fed back to the original FT.
Table 6: Modeled FT gates
Gate OutputCondition
AND Gate All inputs are true
OR Gate At least one input is true
Inhibit Gate
In the presence of a trigger event, one other input
must become true
Functional Dependency
When the trigger event occurs, the dependent basic
events are forced to occur
Combination Gate At least n inputs are true
Exclusive OR Gate Exactly one input is true
Priority AND (Sequence
Enforcing) Gate
The inputs must become true in a specific sequence
Cold Spare Gate
The primary input becomes true, followed by the cold
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(a) Solar Array Fault Tree










(b) MDP versus DTMC
Figure 15: Modeling FT as MDP versus DTMC
5.3.2 Modeling of TMR
The assessment of the impact of the optimal redundant architecture configuration
is of great importance to the development of safety critical systems. Redundancy is
commonly applied to components deemed essential to the system’s correct function-
ality. TMR is a broadly diffused architectural pattern for component redundancy
[4, 54, 95, 129], which consists in triplicating a critical component and feeding each
copy’s output to a majority voter. The voter evaluates each component’s output and
returns the value computed by the majority. Applying TMR to the whole system is
very costly and might not be required based on the system’s criticality level. More-
over, the efficiency of a TMR is dependent on the reliability of each component and
TMR voter, as well as on the TMR configuration.
The proposed methodology determines the optimal TMR partitioning (where the
TMR is required in the system) and the best TMR configuration to be used. Starting
from identifying the best partition, the most critical component, according to the
system’s CCM, is singled out. Following this, the system’s failure rate is evaluated
for each TMR configuration. This process is repeated for all critical components until
the desired system failure rate is achieved, as shown in Fig. 13.
Through our modeling, component redundancy can be applied in two ways: 1) the
sub FT, of which the critical component is the TLE, is triplicated within the system
FT and the new analysis is performed. 2) the sub FT of the critical component is
extracted from the system FT, triplicated, and analyzed separately. The numerical
results of the analysis are then fed back to the system FT, as transfer in events. The
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Table 7: TMR configurations and Respective FTs
a
                 M11
                 M12
                 M13
               V
M11 M12 M11 M13 M12 M13 V1
b
                 M31
                 M32
                 M33                V2
               V1
M31 M32 M31 M33 M32 M33 M31 V1 M31 V2V1 V2
c
                 M41
                 M42
                 M43                V3
               V1
               V2
M41 M42 M41 M43 M42 M43 V1 V3 V2 V3V1 V2
first way involves increasing the size of the MDP model and, consequentially, the
state space. However, the second way reduces the size of the model and increases
the efficiency of the verification, while retaining the accuracy. This is achievable
through FT modularity [138], combined with the proposed probabilistic modeling,
which allows FTs to be divided into sub FTs without losing any properties. Therefore,
throughout this work, the second method is applied.
In this work, all TMR configurations were analyzed, but for space constraints we
only present the most commonly used ones. Table 7 shows the main three TMR
configurations and their equivalent fault trees. The 1-voter and 2-voters TMR con-
figurations can have different sub-configurations depending on how these TMRs feed
their output to the next stage. For instance, a 1-voter TMR can have its output
driven by only the voter, or by a combination of the voter output and the copies of
the component. The number of outputs of a TMR and their origin are taken into
account when building the equivalent FTs. As can be seen in the 2-voters TMR ex-
ample, element M31 has more impact to the TLE than elements M32 and M33, due
to the fact that it is the singled-out element. Another modeling option that impacts
the analysis of redundant systems is the uniformity of failure rates of the TMR copies
of the component. Failure rates can be uniform or non-uniform, meaning that the
triplicated components can have either the same or different failure rates. The same
principle applies to TMR arrangement, where a 2-voters TMR chain can feature ho-
mogeneous or non-homogeneous arrangement of voters at different stages, as seen in
Fig. 16. The variation in the system reliability due to all the above mentioned TMR
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design options is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.
5.4 Experimental Results
The proposed methodology is fully automated on the top of the well known proba-
bilistic model checker PRISM [91], a free, open source probabilistic symbolic model
checker, based on the reactive modules formalism [7]. The probabilistic automata
of the fault tree gates (similar to Fig. 14) are modeled as PRISM modules. Each
module is composed of a set of commands. A PRISM command is a tuple cmd =
(act, guard, rate, action) following the format [<act>] <guard> → <rate>: <action>,
where:
 act is an action label used for synchronization of the different levels of an FT;
 guard is a predicate over the inputs of the FT gates;
 rate is the probability of occurrence of a FT event;
 action is a set of n updates that will translate into transitions in the FT.
Afterwards, an MDP model of the system is automatically generated by PRISM. The
failure rate of the system is investigated by verifying a set of Probabilistic Computa-
tion Tree Logic (PCTL) properties over the MDP model. The maximum probability
of a system failure can be obtained by verifying the following property:
PCTL 1 : Pmax =? [(F TLE = 1)]
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Figure 16: Example of different TMR arrangements
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The contribution of the failure of a component to the system failure (i.e., CCI) is
obtained by verifying the following property:
PCTL 2 : Pmax =? [(F comp = 1)& (F TLE = 1)]
The experiments have been performed on a machine with an Intel Core I5-4200U
CPU and 8 GB of RAM. To show the applicability of our approach, different sizes of
TMR chains are analyzed. This experiment is done with chains of n length, with 1, 2
and 3 voters, considering different TMR combinations. The length of the chain varies
from 10 to 100 components. Fig. 17(a) shows the CPU time consumed to construct
the MDP model and to perform the proposed analysis. Due to the efficiency of the
proposed modeling, we were able to analyze a chain of 100 TMR components in little
over 1 second. Fig. 17(b) brings the memory consumption for chains of different sizes.
Fig. 17(c) depicts the relationship between the total number of states in the model
and the length of the chain. As evidenced by the results, the resource consumption
is small and grows linearly with the size of the chain. For example, a chain of 100
components is verified in less than 1 second and consumes less than 0.02 MB of
memory. This is achieved through our efficient modeling approach, which virtually
eliminates the problem of state explosion [132].
The second experiment consists in investigating the impact of the TMR configura-
tions on system reliability. The analyses are performed on networks of 10 components
(after applying TMR) connected in series, where we vary the failure rate of compo-
nents and voters. In this experiment, we consider a uniform failure distribution (i.e.
the triplicated version of each component have the same failure rate). Moreover, it is
assumed that all the components feature the same TMR configuration. The results,
depicted in Fig. 18, lead to the following observations: 1) when the failure rate of the
voter (1−Rv) is high and the failure rate of the component (1−Rm) is low (see Fig.
18 (c,d)), the best TMR configuration is the one which employs two voters. This is
mainly because that configuration reduces the impact of the failure of the voters by
taking into consideration the low failure rate of the components. 2) When the failure
rate of the voter is low and the failure rate of the components is high (see Fig. 18 (a)),
the best TMR configuration is one voter, as the reliability provided is very similar
to the other configurations but without the area and power overhead resultant from
voter redundancy. From Fig. 18 (a,b) we can conclude that when the components
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Figure 17: Results of Investigating the Proposed Methodology’s Scalability
have high failure rates, the performance of two and three voters configurations is
similar, and they outperform one voter configuration as the failure rate of the voter
increases.
We further investigate TMR chains, considering non-uniform failure distributions
(i.e., the triplicated components have different failure rates). To perform this analysis,
it is assumed that the triplicated components are physically separated, thus they may
be affected differently by environmental conditions (i.e. extreme heat, radiation, etc.).
As such, we randomly increase the failure rate of one component (referred to as critical
component) within each TMR.
Through the analysis of Fig. 19 (TMR3v) it is evidenced that the TMR with
three voters is the best choice for nearly all situations. This happens because all
components are “shielded” by the voters at all stages of the chain, thus the occurrence
of a component failure is always masked. Three-voter TMRs are, however, the most
costly option in terms of area and power. From the results of our analysis of TMRs of
two voters, depicted in Fig. 19 (TMR2v), it can be observed that the homogeneous
chain of two-voter TMRs is particularly sensitive to non-uniform failure conditions,
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(a) 1- Rm=10-2 (b) 1- Rm=10-3
(c) 1- Rm=10-4 (d) 1- Rm=10-5
Figure 18: TMR chain with uniform failure rates
especially if the critical component is the singled out one. This is due to the fact
that a failure in the singled out component feeds directly into the next singled out
component until it reaches the system outputs and cause the system failure. This
phenomenon can be seen in Fig. 16(a), where the failure of M12 carries over to M22,
and subsequently to M32, and so on. Our results demonstrate that this weakness can
be mitigated with the use of non-homogeneous chains of two-voter TMRs. As seen
in Fig. 16(b), the configuration of the voters is changed from stage to stage. A fault
originated in M12 propagates to M22 but it is masked by the voters V21 and V22.
This is evidenced by Fig. 19 (TMR2v2), where significant improvement can be seen
when compared to homogeneous chains.
Lastly, we perform analyses on the HSCOM subsystem of the HERMES Cubesat
Satellite, responsible for primary high speed communications [28] and on the solar
array system of the DFH-3 satellite. The fault tree of the HSCOM subsystem is shown
in Fig. 20. Due to the lack of exact component failure rates in the design specification,
all bottom events are assigned the same failure rate of 5.0× 10−3. Transfer in events
(X15 and X19) have probabilities of failure equal to 1 × 10−2 each. Subsequently, a
CCI is performed on the model and the results are reported in the CCM.
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Figure 19: Variation in the system failure rate due to non-uniform distribution
Fig. 21(a) presents a comparison of the impact of TMR (1 and 3 voters) on
the different components of the system. It can be observed that the most critical
component in the system is X16, so we further investigate it. X16 is the top event of
a sub FT composed by gates B and A. We will call the sub fault tree as BA. Upon
further inspection on BA, it was observed that the most critical component in BA is
X8. Thus a TMR is applied to X8. Fig. 21(b) contrasts the original system failure
rate (no TMR) with the updated failure rate after applying TMR to each component
in the system. To show the versatility of the approach, a similar set of experiments
is performed on the solar array FT of the DFH-3 satellite, shown in Fig. 15(a). The
solar array experiment follows the same steps described in the HSCOM experiment,
with the difference that we use the actual failure rates of the FT components, obtained
from [147]. A comparative result of the effectiveness of TMR on each component of
the solar array is presented in Fig. 22(a). The impact of applying TMR on each
component to the failure rate of the system is depicted in Fig. 22(b). It can be
observed through the analysis that the impact of TMR on a multi-level structure FT
is not straightforward, when compared to linear structures (chains of TMRs). This is
mainly because the impact is not only dependant on the failure rates of components
and voters, but also on the structure of the FT. This means that the same TMR



















Figure 20: Hermes Cubesat HSCOM Fault Tree
Through our analysis, it is also observable that within the same sub tree, tripli-
cating lower level events is more efficient, compared to higher level events. This can
also be seen in Fig. 21(b), where the impact of applying TMR on X8 or on X16 is
practically the same. This is very insightful, as the area and power overhead resulting
from triplicating X8 is much smaller than the overhead generated from triplicating
X16 (see Fig. 20).


























Figure 21: Hermes HSCOM Results
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Figure 22: Solar Array TMR Results
Throughout the experiments it is observed that although the implementation of
TMR usually impacts the system positively, the choice of the best TMR configuration
is heavily dependant on the characteristics of the system and on the environment
where the system is deployed. Fig. 18 shows that, in controlled environments (i.e.,
the triplicated versions of the component have the same failure rates), two-voters
TMR provides the best reliability. In unknown environments that might influence
the system in unpredictable ways (i.e., the triplicated versions of the component have
different failure rates), the three voters TMR configuration is always the best choice,
assuming that the failure rate of the voters is always smaller than the failure rate of
the components.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, an efficient probabilistic modeling and analysis of fault trees is pro-
posed. A new probabilistic approach for modeling fault trees was developed. These
model as used to construct the MDP model of system fault tree. Next, the efficient
PMC (i.e., PRISM) is utilized to perform the proposed exhaustive analysis. The
proposed technique is extended to perform a recursive probabilistic analysis of TMR
architectures. This technique is used to investigate the best TMR partitioning, config-
urations, and the impact of implementing TMR at the different levels of the system’s
FT. Our results demonstrate that the proposed methodology has great potential as
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it is more scalable, orders of magnitude faster, and it provides better quality results
when compared with contemporary techniques [33, 34]. For instance, the proposed
technique is able to analyze a chain of 140 TMR components in less than 1.5 seconds.
Also, our proposed methodology provides a more accurate system failure rate esti-
mation in the presence of TMRs in contrast to other techniques ([33, 34]) can only
investigate a subset of all possible fault configurations of large systems.
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Chapter 6
Article III: System-Level Analysis
of the Vulnerability of Processors
Exposed to Single-Event Upsets
via Probabilistic Model Checking
Authors: Marwan Ammar, Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, Yvon
Savaria
Abstract: Due to current technology scaling trends, digital designs are becoming
strongly susceptible to space radiation effects. These effects can cause unwanted
single event upsets (SEUs) in any state element. This paper presents a new sys-
tem level model of SEUs propagation through processors as a Continuous-Time
Markov Chain (CTMC). Moreover, probabilistic formal techniques (such as prob-
abilistic model checking) are utilized to exhaustively estimate the impact of SEUs on
the system behavior. The proposed CTMC model was analyzed for different SEU
injection scenarios and different bit-flip rates. Results demonstrate that the proposed
approach can provide an accurate estimation of different reliability metrics, such as
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), Mean Time to Recover (MTTR), and the probability
of failure for each SEU injection scenario in the system’s subcomponents. Further-
more, the proposed probabilistic system-level analysis was utilized to investigate the
optimal self-repair rate required in the system to obtain the desired level of reliability.
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Results demonstrate that in comparison with existing simulation techniques for fault
impact evaluation, the presented approach can provide consistent results while being
orders of magnitude faster in terms of CPU time.
Index Terms: Single event upsets (SEUs), system-level analysis, probabilistic model
checking (PMC), PRISM model checker, continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC),
mean time to failure (MTTF), mean time to recover (MTTR).
6.1 Introduction
With advances in technology, micro-electronic systems are becoming more vulnerable
to soft errors induced by Single Event Upsets (SEUs). An SEU is defined as a change
in the state of one or more memory elements inside a system [116]. This change
in state can often be harmlessly fixed if detected by the system. However, the non-
detection of such event may hinder the system in some cases, which may lead to critical
consequences in safety-critical applications, such as space missions and avionics.
The traditional and most direct approach to evaluate the SEU vulnerability of
a system (i.e., an application running in a processor) is through a process called
dynamic radiation ground testing [26, 134]. This method consists in exposing the
target system to a radiation flux and counting the number of errors observed. The
outcome is computed in the form of a parameter known as the dynamic cross-section
(σ), which is defined as the ratio between the number of errors observed at the output
of a Design Under Test (DUT), divided by the fluence of hitting particles [116]. A
problem with that metric is that any change in the application requires a new dynamic
test, thus resulting in an expensive and time-consuming method.
Alternative methods for SEU estimation have emerged, with the goal of reducing
the time and cost constraints associated with dynamic radiation ground testing. In
[117, 135], the authors introduce a method of injecting SEUs at random time intervals
through emulation, by making use of an interrupt routine to alter values within the
processor’s internal registers and memory. Fault injection through emulation is also
used in the direct memory access SEU emulation method [55], where a dedicated
hardware component, controlled externally, selects the time instant and the bit to be
altered in the memory. This approach is further explored in [56, 57], where the SEU
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injection is performed through probabilistic models of the system, with the goal of
estimating the system’s time to failure (TTF) and time to recover (TTR). However,
this technique still requires emulation in order to obtain certain system rates which the
model is built upon (i.e., coverage factor, error factor, and failure factor). Another
branch of SEU estimation techniques focus on fault injection through simulation,
which is usually done by injecting faults at logical or electrical levels [64, 83, 85].
The advantage of these techniques is the high level of control over the fault injection
scenarios, since the user has free access to the entirety of the system and the timing of
the injections is very accurate. However, emulation and simulation based techniques
have severe drawbacks. Disregarding the considerable time required to simulate or to
emulate a scenario of thousands of injected faults [17], both approaches are limited in
terms of accuracy. This problem arises due to the fact that these techniques are not
exhaustive, but rather reliant on input vectors [84]. In simulation-based verification,
the mind-set is to first to generate input vectors and then to derive reference outputs.
Simulating a vector can be seen as verification through input space sampling. This
means that unless all points are sampled, there exists a possibility that an error
escapes verification.
Recently, the use of formal based techniques to analyze soft errors at logical and
higher abstraction levels has been proposed, such as the work done in [23]. These
techniques provide new insights into the vulnerability of digital designs to SEUs. This
is mainly because they are exhaustive and not limited by the number of test vectors
as in simulation based techniques. In formal techniques, the user starts out by stating
what output behavior is desirable and then lets the formal checker prove or disprove
it. In other words, given a property, formal verification exhaustively searches all
possible input and state conditions for failures. However, at logical abstraction level,
these techniques suffer from state explosion (i.e., exponential growth in the number
of states of the model) [65]. Therefore, it is expected for these techniques to be more
efficient at higher abstraction levels, such as system-level.
In this paper, a new approach to compute an accurate estimate of a system’s
vulnerability to soft errors is introduced. The propagation of SEUs is modeled as
a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) based on probabilistic model proposed
in [57]. The analysis of the obtained model is performed using Probabilistic Model
Checking (PMC) [19]. PMC is a fully automatic and exhaustive technique that has
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been successfully employed in a large scope of application domains, such as commu-
nication and multimedia protocols, security and power management. The proposed
system-level approach focuses on modeling the system details related to the SEU prop-
agation path through the processor rather than its logical behavior. Subsequently,
the analysis performed consists in the probabilistic evaluation of the Mean Time to
Failure (MTTF), the Mean Time To Recover (MTTR), and the expected system
availability in different SEU injection scenarios. The obtained results are compared
with values reported in [56]. Additionally, the case study reported in [118] is also
modeled using the proposed approach. The analysis consists in the computation of
the contribution of each component of the system to a failure. The obtained results
demonstrate that comparing with existing simulation techniques, the proposed ap-
proach provides consistent results while being orders of magnitude faster. Moreover,
the approach is very versatile, allowing the execution of customizable tests, where the
user can stipulate the inputs and the expected outcome, and the model automatically
investigates the results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the steps taken
to generate the proposed Markov model of SEU propagation over time. Section 7.4
offers an overview of the adopted probabilistic modeling for the instruction cycle of
processors (fetch, decode, and execute), including the self-repair scenario. In Sec-
tion 6.4, the implementation of the proposed CTMC model in PRISM is introduced.
Section 10.2.6, explains the experiments and results obtained, and Section 10.2.7
concludes by summarizing the main contributions of this work and the results.
6.2 Markov Modeling of Self-Repair Systems
In this subsection, we utilize the model introduced in [9], where the behavior of a
fault-tolerant micro-electronic system subjected to the effects of ionizing radiation is
defined. This model is adapted from the one proposed in [57]. At a certain time t, a
system exposed to SEUs can operate in one of three states (F0, F1, and F2), as shown
in Fig. 23 [9]. The probability that the system is in state Fi at time t is denoted
by PFi(t). The system is said to be in state F0 when operating error-free. When
an SEU triggers an error which is promptly detected, the system moves to state F1.
The system remains in this state for the amount of time required to recover from the
error, usually through a reset signal that restarts the control unit and restores correct
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functionality. After being restored, the system moves back to state F0. In the case of
an error that is not detected within the time limit, the system moves to state F2. It
will remain in this state until the error is detected, at which point the system moves
to state F1, and finally back to state F0. As such, the probability distribution of
future states of a system exposed to SEUs depends only upon the present state and
not on the sequence of events that preceded it, which characterizes a Markov model.
The time interval in which the system stays in state F0 before the occurrence of an
error is known as time to failure (TTF). Similarly, the amount of time spent in state
F2 before eventually going back to state F0 is called time to recover (TTR). Since a
system in state F1 immediately detects the error and performs the restoration cycle,
the amount of time spent in that state is negligible when compared to the time spent
in other states, thus the time interval in which the system is in state F1 is ignored in






Figure 23: Time Progression of a Fault-Tolerant Micro-Electronic System Exposed
to SEUs [9]
Based on the discussion above, the probability distribution of PF0(t) and PF2(t) can
be obtained. Starting with PF0(0) = 1 and PF2(0) = 0 (i.e., no errors at t=0 ), the
probability of the system being at PF0 at time t + δt (see Eq. (1)) is given by the
addition of two mutually exclusive probabilities: 1) The system is in state F0 and
the SEU is detected. 2) The system is in F2 and the error is detected after the time
limit. The probability of the system being at PF2 at time t+ δt (see Eq. (2)) is given
by the addition of two mutually exclusive probabilities: 1) The system is in state
F2 and the error is not detected. 2) The system is in state F0 and the SEU is not
detected within the time limit. In Eq. (1) and (2), PD is the probability that the
SEU is detected, PND is the probability that the SEU is not detected, and δt is a
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time increment.
PF0(t+ δt) = PF0(t) · PD(δt) + PF2(t) · PD(δt) (1)
PF2(t+ δt) = PF2(t) · PND(δt) + PF0(t) · PND(δt) (2)
The probability of an error being detected by the system is given by Eq. (3),
where Ninj is the total number of SEUs injected, Ndet is the number of SEU that
can be detected by the system, and T is the amount of time in which the system is
exposed to SEUs.





Next in this paper, the concepts discussed here are used to formalize a self-repair
system as a Markov model, and to perform a study of the impact of SEU on the
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Figure 24: Proposed Probabilistic Model of SEU Propagation Through a Processor
Instruction Cycle.
6.3 Proposed Probabilistic Modeling of SEUs Prop-
agation in Processors
The execution of each instruction follows an instruction cycle composed of three
phases: the fetch and decode phases, which are handled by the control path, and
the execute phase, which is handled by the data path [37]. This instruction cycle
is carried by the micro-operations that are performed during each of the different
phases. This work considers a processor design that can access N bytes of memory.
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Each instruction is a word of length n bits, consisting of an operation code of length
nop, and an address of length nadr, where n = nop + nadr. This processor has a
programmer-accessible register, labelled accumulator (AC ), of size n. In addition to
AC, this processor has other registers needed to perform the internal operations fetch,
decode, and execute. The registers are the following:
 Data Register (DR): n-bit register which receives instructions and data from
memory.
 Address Register (AR): register of size nadr bits, which supplies an address to
memory.
 Program Counter (PC): register of size nadr bits, which contains the address of
the next instruction to be executed.
 Instruction Register (IR): register of size nop bits, which stores the opcode
portion of the instruction code fetched from memory.
Fetch 1 Fetch 2 Fetch 3 Decoding AND 1
JMP
ADD 1 ADD 2
AND 2





DR M AC AC^DR
DR M AC AC+DR
Figure 25: Instruction Cycle Example
Following is an explanation of the SEU propagation through the instruction cycle
after causing a bit-flip in one of these registers (PC, DR, AC, IR, and AR). To
illustrate the processor’s modeling process, a small processor is considered, which can
access 4 bytes of memory. Each instruction is a word consisting of a 2-bit operation
code and a 6-bit address. This example assumes registers of the following lengths:
DR: 8-bits; AC: 8-bits; AR: 6-bits; PC: 6-bits; IR: 2-bits. Three possible instruction
codes are considered, shown in Table 8. The instruction code 11 represents an invalid




This phase consists in obtaining an instruction from the memory and storing it in
the appropriate registers. First, the contents of the program counter are stored in
the address register (fetch 1 ). Next, the control unit reads the instruction from the
memory. The control unit asserts a READ signal which causes the memory to output
the requested data, which is stored in the DR, followed by incrementing the PC (fetch
2 ). Finally, the control unit copies the higher-order bits of the DR to the IR and
the lower-order bits of the DR to the AR (fetch 3 ). The SEU propagation in the
fetching phase is shown in Fig. 63(a). Starting from state S0, which represents an
error-free fetching, the following possible causes to originate an error in this phase
are considered:
 SEUs affecting the PC - This event may take place after the PC register is
updated, following the fetch 1 phase. An SEU-induced error in the PC register
can alter the address of the next instruction, which may result in wrong or
invalid operations. The transition from state S0 to state S1 (wrong or invalid
PC) represents the effect of SEU causing a bit-flip in the PC register. The rate
λpc indicates the probability of occurrence of an SEU-induced error in the PC
register, which will result in a faulty state (F1 ) with probability 1, since all
further operations will be performed on incorrect data.
 SEUs affecting the memory - This event may take place during the fetch 2
phase, resulting in an alteration in the data accessed from the memory and
stored in the DR register. The transition from state S0 to state S2 represents
the effect of SEU causing a bit-flip in the memory. The rate λm indicates the
probability of a bit-flip in the memory, which results in a faulty state (F1 ) with
probability 1.
 SEUs affecting the DR - This event may take place after the fetch 3 phase,
when the contents of DR are accessed in order to populate the IR and the AR
Table 8: Operations
Instruction Instruction Code Operation
ADD 00XXXXXX AC ← AC + M[XXXXXX]
AND 01XXXXXX AC ← AC ∧ M[XXXXXX]
JMP 10XXXXXX GOTO [XXXXXX]
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registers. The transition from state S0 to state S3 represents the effect of SEU
causing a bit-flip in the DR register. The rate λdr indicates the probability
of a bit-flip in the DR register, which can directly cause an alteration in the
operation to be performed, or an alteration on the data, resulting in a faulty
state (F1 ) with probability 1. The occurrence of SEUs in the DR register may
also lead to invalid values being stored in the IR and AR registers (i.e., an
invalid operation in the case of the IR, or an invalid or out-of-bounds address
in the case of the AR). These phenomena have a probability of detection, which
is represented by the transition from state F1 to state S0, with rate λinv.
The absence of SEU-induced errors during the fetch phase is represented by the
transition from state S0 to state S4, with probability λs2.
6.3.2 Decoding Phase
After fetching the instruction from the memory, the control unit must determine
which operation has to be performed. The value in the instruction register determines
which execute routine is invoked. The state diagram in Fig. 25 represents this as a
series of branches from the end of the fetch routine to the individual execute routines.
The SEU propagation in the decoding phase is shown in Fig. 63(b). The following
possibilities as causes of error in this phase are considered:
 SEU propagating from fetch: The error generated by an SEU during the fetch
phase will propagate to the decode phase. This is represented by the transi-
tion from state F1 (fetch error) to state F2 (decode error), with probability
λprop. This propagation may happen when the effects of an SEU result in the
occurrence of a valid yet erroneous instruction in the affected register.
 SEUs affecting the IR: The transition from state S4 to state S5, with probability
λir, represents the occurrence of SEUs causing bit-flips in the IR register. This
event may have two possible outcomes: 1) the bit-flip may alter the operation
stored in the IR register to an invalid operation. In this case, the transition
from state S5 to state S0 takes place, with probability λir inv. This signifies
an operation reset, after the system identifies the invalid operation stored in
the IR register; 2) the bit-flip may alter the operation stored in the IR register
to another valid operation. In this case, the transition from state S5 to faulty
state F2 takes place, with probability 1− λir inv.
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 SEUs affecting the AR: The transition from state S4 to state S6, with probabil-
ity λar, represents the occurrence of SEUs causing bit-flips in the AR register.
This event may also have two possible outcomes: 1) the bit-flip may alter the
value of the AR register to an invalid or out-of-bounds memory address. In this
case, the system is able to identify the error and the reset transition, from state
S6 to state S0, takes place with probability λar inv; 2) the bit-flip may alter
the value of AR to another valid memory address. In this case, the transition
from state S6 to state F2 takes place, with probability 1− λar inv.
The absence of SEU-induced errors during the decode phase is represented by the
transition from state S4 to state S7, with probability λs1.
6.3.3 Execution Phase
The last step of the instruction cycle is the execution of the decoded instruction,
performed by the data path. At this phase, the data and the operation have been
already fetched and decoded and are ready to be processed by the ALU. For multi-
operand execution such as the ADD and AND as shown in Fig. 25, first one of the
operands is fetched from the memory and must be stored in the AR (ADD1, AND1 ).
Then, the data path performs the logical operation between the content of the AR and
the content of the accumulator (AC). The result is stored in the AC, overwriting the
previous value (ADD2, AND2 ). Then, the execution phase terminates and the next
fetching phase begins. Alternatively, the single-operand executions such as JUMP
(JMP in Fig. 25) operation is much simpler. It is implemented by fetching the
address to which the processor must jump and copying it into the program counter.
The error propagation in the execution phase is shown in Fig. 63(c). The following
possibilities as causes of error in this phase are considered:
 SEU propagation from decode phase: It is considered that an SEU that was
not detected during the decoding phase will be processed during the execution
phase. This is represented by the transition from state F2 to state F3 (execution
error), with probability λprop2. This generally means that the wrong operation
was performed, or that the operation was performed on the wrong data. This
SEU may also be logically masked in the data path. This is represented by the
transition from state F2 to state S7 with probability 1− λprop2.
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 SEUs affecting the AC : The transition from state S7 to state S8, with probabil-
ity λac, represents the occurrence of SEU in the AC register. As with previous
registers, this event may have two possible outcomes. 1) the bit-flip in the AC
register results in the output of erroneous data, as shown in the transition from
state S8 to state F3, with probability λprop3. 2) this SEU may be logically
masked, which is represented by the transition from state S8 to state S7, with
probability 1− λprop3
The rate of a bit-flip due to SEUs in a register depends on the size of the register and
static cross-section of each bit. Therefore, the rates in Fig. 63 are different for each
register. It is also important to note that having an SEU at different registers has a
different impact on the system behavior. In other words, the fail states in Fig. 63 (F0,
F1, F2) will have different repercussions in different failure scenarios. For example,
the bit-flip in the PC will most probably lead to wrong operation and wrong data,
while a bit-flip in the DR register can only affect either the operator or the operand
of the instruction.
6.3.4 Self-Repair Routine
In this work, it is assumed that the processor under test is equipped with a self-
repair mechanism. The behavior of the self-repair routine of this processor can be
represented as the finite-state machine (FSM) shown in Fig. 26. From an error-
free operation state R0, the processor moves to state R1 after the occurrence of an
SEU. At that point, the processor performs a fault detection routine. If the error
is detected, then it will be fixed with probability λ repair. The processor moves to
state R0 (i.e., resuming error-free operation). From state R1, if the error could not
be fixed within a certain time limit, the processor moves to state R2. The system
eventually fixes this type of errors at the output by invoking a reset routine, which
returns the system to state R0.
6.4 Proposed Formal Modeling and Analysis in
PRISM
The modeling is done by generating different probabilistic automata (PA) to describe







Figure 26: FSM of the Self-Repair Routine [9]
unit. The processor’s CTMC model is obtained by the parallel composition of all the
PAs. The state transition probabilities are obtained by incorporating equations (1),
(2), and (3) into the CTMC model. The propagation of SEUs through the processor
is modeled as a CTMC, expressed in Definition 1.
Definition 1: A stochastic process {X(t) : t ≥ 0} with discrete state space
S is called a continuous-time Markov chain if for all t ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ S,
P (X(s+ t) = j|X(s) = i, {X(u) : 0 ≤ u < s}) = P (X(s+ t) = j|X(s) = i) = Pij(t),
where Pij(t) is the probability that the chain will be in state j, t time units from now,
given it is in state i now.
The analysis of the processor’s CTMC is done in PRISM (Probabilistic Symbolic
Model Checker) [91], a well established tool for formal modeling and verification of
stochastic systems. A PRISM model is formed by basic constructs called modules,
each designed to express a specific behavior, much like sub-components of a system.
The state of each module is given by a set of finite ranged variables. The global state
of the model is determined by the evaluation of the values of the module variables.
Each module is composed of a set of commands, expressed in the format [<act>]
<guard> → <rate>: <action>, where:
 act is an action label used for synchronization of the different modules of the
system;
 guard is a predicate over the operations performed in the system’s modules;
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 action is a set of n updates that will translate into operations being executed
in the modules.
 rate is the probability of occurrence of an action;
The commands are interpreted in a way that if the guard is satisfied, then the module
is allowed to perform the corresponding transition with the associated rate. PRISM
also allows the use of Markov reward structures. Reward structures are a way of
extending a Markov chain by adding a reward rate to each state. This mechanism
allows the modeling of variables that record the rewards accumulated with time. In
this paper, the analysis of the system is performed by verifying a set of Continuous
Stochastic Logic (CSL [19]) properties over the generated CTMC model. These prop-
erties can be used to obtain the probabilities of reaching a certain state in the model,
as in (12), or to evaluate the expected value of a variable over a certain amount of
time through reward structures, as in (5).
P=?[F(bit n = seu & out = seu)]] (4)
Which is interpreted as: “what is the probability of eventually having a SEU in bit n
that will eventually propagate to the output?”.
R{“ctl detected”} =? [(C < T )]] (5)
Which is interpreted as: “what are the accumulated rewards gained from reaching a
state where an error has been detected in the control path during time T?”.
6.5 Experimental Analysis
In this section, the results of the analysis of a general accumulator-architecture proces-
sor at the system level are presented and discussed. The analysis has been performed
on PRISM 4.3.1, running on a machine with an Intel Core I5-4200U CPU and 8 GB of
RAM. In this work, the experiments were performed under the following assumptions:
 The considered analyses of SEUs occur in the PC, DR, AR, IR, and AC regis-
ters. Each register is 32-bit wide, and all bits from the registers have the same
probability of being flipped. The processor has other special purpose registers,
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such as the Stack Pointer (SP), Global Pointer (GP), Frame Pointer (FP), Re-
turn Register (RA), and Zero (always has the value 0). These special purpose
registers are not considered in this analysis.
 At the system level, the exact flip rate of a bit due to SEUs is not obtainable
because the hardware implementation of the system is not yet available. There-
fore, it is assumed that the target system has a static cross-section per bit of
6.7× 10−15cm2/bit.
 The rate at which the processor detects and recovers from errors depends on the
adapted repair technique. Therefore, the repair rates used are an estimation.
The goal of the first experiment is to measure the impact of bit-flip injections on
the different registers of the system. This is done to obtain the average expected time
until failure, defined as Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), or the time from the injection
of the SEU until the system reaches a fail state. For this purpose, SEUs are injected
in each register separately in order to evaluate the MTTF. The results are shown in
Fig. 27, where Invalid Operation indicates the MTTF of an error that will lead to an
invalid operand. Valid but Wrong Operation is the MTTF of an error that generates
a wrong but valid operator (i.e., change from addition to jump). Lastly, Wrong Data
indicates the MTTF of an error that will lead to a wrong operand. It is important
to note that higher values of MTTF contribute positively to the system’s reliability,
since this means that the system stays in a non-faulty state for a longer period of
time before an error occurs.
It can be observed that the expected MTTF varies for different registers. For
example, the MTTF of all the SEU injection scenarios in the DR is less than the
MTTF of the corresponding injection scenarios in the PC. Moreover, it is noticeable
that bit-flips affecting the operator of an instruction always result in lower MTTF
compared to bit-flips that cause errors on the operands. This indicates that bit-flips
propagating through the control path are more critical. This is mainly due to the
fact that bit-flips that alter any of the bits dedicated to the identification of the
operator will often result in invalid or wrong operators. If the operator is invalid, the
system will detect the error immediately and it will reset the instruction, resulting in
a low MTTF. If the operator is altered to a valid but wrong operation, it is assumed
that the system will immediately enter a fail state, also resulting in low MTTF, but
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the wrong operation is still carried out by the system. However, if an SEU alters
one of the operands, it is not yet considered as a failure. This is because such SEU
can be logically masked in the data path as explained in the execution phase of the
instruction cycle, in Section 6.3.3. Therefore, such SEU will not be detected until the
wrong output is generated.
PC DR AR IR AC
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Wrong Data
Figure 27: Mean Time to Failure
PC DR AR IR AC






















Valid but wrong operation
Wrong Data
Figure 28: Mean Time to Recover
In the second experiment, the starting assumption is that the processor has failed
(i.e., a bit-flip has been detected) and an analysis of the average time needed to re-
sume the correct operation is performed. This is defined as Mean Time To Recover
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(MTTR). From this definition, it can be concluded that lower values of MTTR con-
tribute positively to the system’s reliability, since this means that the system spends
less time in a non-functional state. From the results in Fig. 28, it is observed that the
location where the bit-flip occurs has a significant impact on the MTTR. The MTTR
value for an SEU inducing an Invalid Operation is low, since the operation reset is
triggered immediately after the system detects the presence of the invalid operator.
It can be observed that the MTTR value for an SEU inducing a Wrong Data error
is also low. This is caused due to the fact that the wrong data error is not identified
by the system during the instruction cycle. This error is identified after the result is
generated. At that point, the system determines that the result is wrong and imme-
diately performs a reset operation. It is interesting to note that the Valid but Wrong
Operation error has the highest MTTR observed in the experiments. This can be
explained by the fact that from the moment at which the wrong but valid operator is
generated, the system is considered to be faulty. In other words, the operation has to
be completed and the result has to be generated before the system is able to identify
the error and perform a reset. Therefore, it can be concluded that SEUs inducing
Valid but Wrong Operation errors are the most critical when considering MTTR.
Through the results obtained in the two previous experiments, it is possible to com-
pute the limit of the availability function of the system as time tends to infinity,
defined as the steady state availability (SSA). The SSA is given by MTTF
MTTF+MTTR
and
it is automatically computed for each SEU injection scenario, as shown in Fig. 29.
It is important to note that a higher SSA effectively means a safer system over time.
A safer system is one with the higher MTTF (i.e., the system operates for a longer
period) and lower MTTR (i.e., the system spends less time in a non-functional state).
Thus, it can be concluded from the results that SEUs which induce the generation of
valid but wrong operators are the most critical ones, since these are the SEUs that
lead to the lowest SSA values. It can also be observed that SEUs that affect data bits
are relatively the least harmful to the system, since a wrong operand can still produce
a correct result due to the masking effects. This is evidenced by the fact that Wrong
Data has the highest SSA across all different registers. The Invalid Operation errors
can be considered to be of average criticality, since despite having a low MTTF, they
also have a low MTTR.
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Figure 29: Steady State Availability
The premise of the fourth experiment is to take advantage of the proposed proba-
bilistic system-level analysis to obtain the required self-repair rate of the system for
different SEU-induced bit-flip rates. The parameters of this experiment are:
1) The failure rate of the system due to SEUs should be kept below a certain thresh-
old. In this experiment, this threshold is considered to be equal to 1.5× 10−16.
2) Each register has an SEU-induced bit-flip rate that increases over time, between
the values of 2.0× 10−15 and 7.0× 10−15.
In this experiment, for each bit-flip rate due to SEUs, an investigation of the re-
quired self-repair rate in each of the analyzed registers in order to keep the system’s
reliability above threshold is performed. The results of this experiment can be ob-
served in Fig. 30, where each line shows the relation between the SEU bit-flip rate
in a register and the required self-repair probability. While these results may seem
trivial at first (a higher bit-flip rate requires a higher self-repair probability), the
experiment succeeds in showing one of the strong points in the proposed approach.
For any given radiation scenario stipulated by a designer, the proposed model is ca-
pable of giving the optimal repair rate required for the system to remain within the
predefined threshold of reliability.
In order to estimate the accuracy of the results provided by the proposed model, an
additional experiment has been performed. This experiment compares data obtained
from the work in [57] with data obtained from the proposed model, under the same
conditions. The experiment is summarized in Table 9. For each test scenario (Sc.1,
Sc.2, Sc.3), the rates for errors detected (PD), errors not detected (PND), and errors
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Figure 30: Vulnerability of Different Registers
detected at the output (Ndet) are taken from [57] and used to build a custom test
environment, as shown previously in Section 6.2, through Equations (1), (2), and (3).
In this experiment, it is assumed that all SEU injections occur in the PC register. In
[57], for each scenario, two values are given for the MTTF and for the MTTR. The
first value is obtained through emulation testing, shown in Table 9 under Emulation.
The second value, obtained through simulation at RTL-level, is shown in the table
under Simulation. The results obtained by the model proposed in this paper are
reported in the table under Proposed Technique. From the table, it can be seen that
the results obtained when injecting SEUs in the PC register with the proposed system-
level model are very consistent with those obtained with the RTL model introduced
in [57]. For instance, in Sc.1 the MTTF and MTTR reported in [57] differ from our
results by 1.48% and 1.61% respectively. Similarly, the differences obtained in Sc.2
are of 1.89% and 2.01% for the MTTF and the MTTR, respectively. Finally, the
differences obtained in Sc.3 are of 2.21% and 2.46% for the MTTF and the MTTR,
respectively. This is remarkable as, in our case, faults are injected at each bit of the
PC register, whereas in [57], faults are injected as bitflips in memory. Thus the two
experiments are not equivalent and differences should not be interpreted as modeling
errors. Note also that SEUs injected in other registers with our method lead to
other MTTR and MTTF values for which no comparable results are available in [57].
Furthermore, it is not clear that injecting faults in memory could reflect the MTTR
and MTTF that we compute (see Fig. 28, 27, 29, and 30). This is not surprising as
our method has a much better controllability and observability of the internals of our
79
model that methods such as [57].
Table 9: MTTR and MTTF in Different Techniques




TechniqueEmulation Simulation Emulation Simulation
Sc. 1 77.8 77.3 76.7 105.8 106.8 104.1
Sc. 2 64.5 64.7 63.3 82.9 83.7 81.3
Sc. 3 64.5 64.4 63.0 62.8 63.9 61.2
Table 10: AVR ATmega103 Analysis Comparison











22.2% 24.5% 20.3% 18.7% 14.3% - 3.2 Seconds
[118] 23.8% 26% 19.85% 17.16% 13.41% 10.21% 4 hours
The final experiment conducted seeks to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed
approach when compared to existing fault injection through simulation techniques.
Fault injection through simulation requires huge computational power and time and
it is a common occurrence for such techniques to take several days to conclude the
analysis, depending on the parameters and the complexity of the analyses. Our work
tries to provide an answer to this problem, by introducing a very fast and resource-
friendly approach to fault-injection experiments. In addition to the proposed system
level probabilistic abstraction, this improvement in processing time is possible thanks
to two main factors: 1) The number of fault injection scenarios required to estimate
the system vulnerability to SEUs is reduced: in large systems, many faults injected
at different bits may explore the same propagation paths. Traditionally, the faults
are injected into the system and the results are monitored. In other words, the design
is treated as a black box [17]. However, the proposed methodology grants us a higher
level of control over the fault injections. Thus, all redundant fault propagation paths
can be reduced to optimize the number of cycles required to analyze all faults in
the system. 2) The time required to analyze each injection scenario is reduced as
the proposed probabilistic model is heavily optimized for state-space reduction. This
is achieved by analyzing the fault propagation paths originating from each injection
scenario and deactivate nodes that have no impact on the analysis. For example,
during the analysis of faults injected at the Decode Cycle, the states of the components
that are part of the Fetch Cycle have no impact on the outcome. This results in a
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technique that is several orders of magnitude faster than fault injection approaches
based on simulations. The work in [118] presents a technique for reducing CPU time
to perform simulation-based fault-injection experiments in complex System on Chips
(SoCs). The goal of this final experiment is to draw a direct comparison with the
results and analysis time required by the technique introduced in [118]. This was
done by applying the concepts of the proposed technique to model and analyze the
core of the AVR microcontroller ATmega103 [3], and comparing the data obtained
from the work in [118] with data obtained from the proposed model, under the same
conditions. In this experiment, we have injected faults at different points during
the ATmega103’s instruction cycle in order to reproduce the injection scenarios used
in [118], and to estimated the contribution of different subcomponents to produce
a failure in the microcontroller. The results in Table 16 show that the proposed
technique provides consistent results while being orders of magnitude faster.
6.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents a novel approach for dependability estimation of fault tolerant
systems exposed to SEUs, based on probabilistic model checking. This approach
seeks to overcome the limitations of emulation and simulation-based techniques, by
providing a fast and exhaustive analysis of the effects of soft-errors in the system.
The experimental evaluation conducted is able to accurately quantify the impact of
SEUs on the different registers considered and through the different paths of error-
propagation in each SEU injection scenario. The obtained results are used to provide
an estimate of a processor mean time to failure and mean time to recover values. Then,
these values are used to compute an estimation of the steady-state availability of the
system, or the limit of the system’s availability over time. Finally, a dynamic test
scenario is presented, where the technique is able to estimate the required self repair
capabilities of the system in order to maintain its failure rate under a predetermined
threshold. Future work may analyze more complex processors, as well as different
architectures and different types of transient errors.
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Chapter 7
Article IV: Reliability Analysis of
the SPARC V8 Architecture via
Fault Trees and UPPAL-SMC
Authors: Marwan Ammar, Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, Yvon
Savaria
Abstract: This paper proposes a system-level dynamic fault tree approach to model,
analyze, and estimate the vulnerability to soft-faults of the 7-stage pipelined SPARC
V8 integer unit. A preliminary analysis of the architecture is used to derive a dynamic
fault tree diagram which is modeled as a priced-timed automaton. The assessment
of the architecture’s vulnerability to radiation effects is obtained through fault tree
analysis, showing consistent results with radiation and simulation tests.
7.1 Introduction
The cost and the complexity involved in the development of safety-critical systems are
a prime motivator to the use of reliability assessment techniques as early in the design
cycle as possible. Existing techniques often lack the capacity to perform a comprehen-
sive and exhaustive analysis on complex architectures exposed to Single Event Upsets
(SEUs), leading to the necessity of conducting expensive ground tests that are not
able to fully characterize the system’s vulnerabilities. An SEU is characterized by an
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unforeseen change of state in one or more elements within the system memory. That
change of state is known as a soft-fault, and it can often be detected and corrected
by safety measures designed in the system. However, failing to detect the presence
of soft-faults may have catastrophic consequences, especially in environments where
safety is paramount.
In recent years, as the demand for fast, flexible and reliable techniques have in-
creased, many alternative methods for soft-fault estimation have emerged. Among
the most popular techniques in the literature is the fault tree analysis (FTA). The
FTA method is widely used for risk assessment, mainly in the area of avionics, nuclear
and chemical industries [138]. Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) [49, 138] are an extension
of static fault trees that cater to complex functional dependencies between system
components, such as priority, order of occurrence, triggering, and spare component
management. Recent literature such as the work in [120] propose extensions to the
conventional boolean FTA in order to take sequence dependencies into account for
qualitative and probabilistic analyses without state-space transformations. This al-
lows for modelling of event sequences at all levels within a fault tree. The analysis
of uncertainty over time is the focus in [10], in which a FTA technique has been in-
troduced to accurately model the effects of SEUs in non-deterministic environments,
with the use of probabilistic model-checking and Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).
This paper introduces a new DFT approach to compute an accurate estimation of
a system’s vulnerability to soft-faults, using the 32-bit SPARC V8 integer pipeline as
a case-study. The fault propagation paths in the targeted architecture are obtained
from the SPARC V8 architecture manual [74] by applying the technique introduced
in [11]. Subsequently, the fault propagation paths have been combined in order to
obtain a representative FT of the SPARC V8 integer pipeline, through the use of the
Behaviour-Based Method [112]. Next, a new modeling of FT gates is proposed, using
the Priced-Timed Automata theory. Finally, a fully automatic FTA is performed
with the use of UPPAAL-SMC model checking. The analysis performed consists in
the estimation of the probability of each type of Trap Exception (TE) to occur in the
targeted architecture, as well as the impact of individual registers to the overall relia-
bility of the processor, and the probability of failures over time. The obtained results
are compared with radiation and simulation tests, showing remarkable consistency
with radiation and simulation tests.
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7.2 Existing Fault Analysis of SPARC V8
Extensive literature exists on the verification of the SPARC V8 architecture, which is
mainly performed through simulation and radiation testing. Radiation testing, such
as the work in [127] are very important in characterizing this architecture’s vulnerabil-
ity when exposed to total ionizing dose. In [29] the authors use software handlers that
enable the classification of the types of crashes, and the measured crash cross-sections
are compared with those predicted by fault injection simulation. This demonstrates
that the data extracted from radiation tests may be used to conduct predictability
experiments at a higher-level. However, these techniques are extremely costly and
rather limited in their coverage, since it is virtually impossible to test or simulate for
all possible scenarios. On the other hand, regular system-level approaches (such as
FTs) are often bound to simplistic analyses due to a lack the expressiveness resultant
from the high-levels of abstraction employed. To address these shortcomings, we pro-
pose a new time-enhanced modeling approach to FT gates. The proposed modeling
enhances each of the gates with multiple clocks that may keep track of the duration of
each fault individually, as well as global clocks that enable the analysis of the impacts
of faults over time.
7.3 Modeling the SPARC V8 Pipeline as DFT
In order to conduct the proposed analysis, we must first generate a fault tree of
the SPARC V8 integer pipeline. We have adopted an analytical approach for the
generation of fault trees for complex systems, known as the Behaviour-Based Method
[112] for the FT generation. This approach considers faults as behaviours, and fault-
tree gates as operations on those behaviours. The behavioural patterns of the system
under the effects of SEUs have been obtained by applying the method previously
introduced in [11]. By applying these techniques to the SPARC V8 7-stage pipeline,
and based on the structural information available in the SPARC V8 architecture
manual [45, 74], the fault tree of the integer pipeline is constructed, as shown in Fig.
31. The fault tree is divided into 7 levels, each representing a stage of the pipeline.
A more detailed explanation of how the FT was obtained, as well as the reasoning
for the FT gates used is given in the following subsections.
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7.3.1 General Considerations and Assumptions
Before discussing how the FT mapping has been done, it is important to present some
of the general considerations and assumptions used in this work. Firstly, it is assumed
that the outputs of the fault tree gates are also susceptible to soft-faults. For example,
the probability of failure (λ) of “inst” is given by (λ iCache OR λ PC OR λ inst).
Secondly, we assume that the events in the fault tree (circles and rectangles) do not
represent components but rather the occurrence of a soft-fault on the component
[112]. For example, the element Reg. File means that a soft-fault has occurred in
the component register file. Therefore, each event in the fault tree has a probability
of failing due to soft-faults. Such probability is estimated through the equation:
σdevice = σff × Nff × (1 − α), where σcomponent is the cross section of the device,
σff is the intrinsic cross section of the flip-flop mapped on the design, Nff is the
number of flip-flops, and α is the masking of the device [29]. Unlike conventional
logic gates, the inputs and outputs of FT gates are probabilities related to the set
operations of Boolean logic. For example, the AND gate represents the assumption
of the combination of independent events (i.e., the intersection of the input event
sets). On the other hand, the OR gate represents the assumption that the inputs
are mutually exclusive events (i.e., the union of the input event sets) [138]. An
important consideration is that some FT behavior has been slightly altered. For
example, the register inst connects directly to three other registers (i.e., imm, rfa, or
rd) through different transitions. Based on which bit of register inst is affected by
the SEU, a different fault propagation path may take place. This decision is taken
probabilistically.
7.3.2 System Level Fault Abstraction
This subsection details how each of the SPARC V8 pipeline stages have been mapped
into a FT. This mapping has been based on extensive research on fault injection and
propagation experiments in the literature, as well as in technical reports and in the
SPARC V8 architecture manual.
Instruction Fetch (FE): In this stage, the PC register is read and the instruction
is fetched from the instruction cache (iCache). Therefore, in this stage, a soft-fault
may originate from the PC or from the iCache. This relationship is represented in the





















Figure 31: DFT of the 7-stage integer pipeline of the SPARC V8
and PC. Additionally, Soft-faults in the nPC components may be propagated to the
EX stage of the pipeline.
Decode (DE): In this stage, the instruction (inst) is decoded. A soft-fault that
occurs in the inst register can non-deterministically propagate the error to one of three
registers: imm, rfa, or rd. Each of these registers will, in turn, activate a different
fault propagation path. Register imm may propagate to the Execute stage. Register
rd may propagate to the RA stage and register rfa can be non-deterministically
propagated to adr 1 or to adr 2.
Register Access (RA): During the register access stage, operands are read from
the register file or from internal data bypasses. In our model, a soft-fault at this stage
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(either direct or propagated) may firstly affect the registers adr 1 or adr 2. These
registers, along with the rd register from the DE stage, are inputs to the OR gate
G2. A soft-fault in the inputs of gate G2 may propagate to the Reg. File component.
It is important to note that the Reg. File component may propagate the soft-fault
to either dt 1 or dt 2. According to [74], a soft-fault in adr 1 may only propagate
to dt 1. Similarly, a soft-fault in adr 2 may only propagate to dt 2. Therefore, the
Reg. File component and its children are considered special cases, deviating from
the previously mentioned general assumption since the choice of propagation path is
always deterministic.
Execute (EX): During this pipeline stage, the logical and shift operations are per-
formed. For memory operations (such as JMPL), the address is generated. In this
stage, soft-faults originated from the imm, dt 2, or branch addr. may propagate to
component op 1 through the OR gate G3. Similarly, soft-faults originated from the
dt 1 or branch addr. may propagate to component op 2 through the OR gate G4.
Furthermore, soft-faults in op 1, op 2, or pc may propagate to the result register.
Memory Access(MA): Data cache is read or written in the memory at this stage.
In the proposed FT, an error in this stage may arise either from a soft-fault in the
result or in the branch addr. registers. This is modeled with OR gate G6, which may
propagate the soft-fault from either of those registers.
Exception (XC): In this pipeline stage, traps and interrupts are resolved. In the
proposed FT, OR gate G7 may propagate soft-faults coming from the d cache or from
the result. At this level of the FT, our model computes the probabilities of each of the
different traps, based on the probability of soft-faults in the instructions performed
and the paths taken.
Write-Back (WB): The result of any ALU, logical, shift, or cache operations are
written back to the register file. The value of the xc result register is generated during
this pipeline stage.
7.3.3 PTA Model Composition
The modeling formalism of UPPAAL-SMC is based on a stochastic interpretation
and extension of the Timed Automata (TA) formalism used in the classical model
checking version of UPPAAL. For individual TA components, the stochastic inter-
pretation replaces the non-deterministic choices between multiple enabled transitions
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by probabilistic choices. Similarly, the nondeterministic choices of time delays are
refined by probability distributions, which at the component level are given either
uniform distributions in cases with time-bounded delays or exponential distributions
(with user-defined rates) in cases of unbounded delays. These structures are defined
as Priced-Timed Automata (PTA).
In order to accurately model the fault dependencies in the proposed DFT, our
approach focuses on the formalization and modeling of the probabilistic behavior of
FT gates and events over time. To achieve this, we define each FT gate as a PTA
model, where a state (l, ν) ∈ L × Rχ≥0 such that ν |= inv(l). In any state (l, ν),
there is a nondeterministic choice of either making a discrete transition or letting
time pass. A discrete transition can be made according to any (l, g, p) ∈ P , with
current state l being enabled and zone g is satisfied by the current clock valuation ν.
The probability of moving to location l′ and resetting all clocks in X to 0 is given by
p(X, l′). The option of letting time pass is available only if the invariant condition
inv(l) is satisfied while time elapses. The complete model of the desired FT can be
obtained by synchronizing the inputs and outputs of the required FT gates, therefore
composing the full FT diagram. As an example, Fig. 32 shows the PTA of a possible
configuration of the OR gate with two inputs. In the case of the x input, it may fail
at any time with probability px. At which point, the variable x becomes 1. The fault
in x then propagates to the output of the gate, setting out to 1. The same logic also
applies to the y input.
Figure 32: Sample of an OR Gate PTA
7.4 Stochastic Soft-fault Analysis with UPPAAL
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our analysis of the fault tree
of the SPARC V8 pipeline (Fig. 31). For this analysis, the proposed FT has been
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modeled in Uppaal-SMC, where a PTA model of each of the FT gates has been
generated. The model of the FT is then obtained through the parallel composition
of all the gate models. The proposed PTA models in Uppaal rely heavily on two
aspects: 1) As previously mentioned, the probabilities used for the failure rates in the
model are derived from the cross-section values reported in [29]; 2) The proposed DFT
models are constructed specifically for the verification of a microchip. This means
that the PTAs of each gate of the FT have certain configurations that accommodate
the particularities of such system. For example, exit rates in the models are set to
1. This forces the tool to evaluate each state at every unit of time (clock-cycle).
Furthermore, each register has an internal clock that tracks the amount of time that
the soft-fault is active, as well as a global clock that estimates the average propagation
times in the FT. This feature is extremely valuable for the modeling of soft-faults,
since it allows the model-checker to verify the model with different time parameters
in each verification instance. For example, the expected propagation time of a fault
greatly impacts its probability to cause a failure in the system.
Figure 33: Probability of Trap Exceptions in different approaches. Simulation and
radiation test results are reproduced from [29]
This experiment has the objective to determine the probability of an SEU to
rise a trap exception in the pipeline of the processor. Moreover, the proposed anal-
ysis can identify the type of trap exception that has occurred. With the FT pro-
posed in Fig. 31 and following the behavior detailed in the SPARC V8 manual [74],
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the proposed model is able to estimate the probability of occurrence of the follow-
ing trap exceptions: instruction access exception, data store error, illegal instruction,
data access exception, and mem address not aligned. All other types of trap excep-
tion are classified under Others. The probabilities used in the proposed analysis are
derived from cross-section metrics published in [29]. The analysis has been evaluated
over 3800 iterations, with a confidence level of 95%. The results show that approx-
imately 41% of all injected faults have been captured as trap exceptions. Fig. 48
shows a break down of each of the identified errors. For validation, the obtained
results (shown under Proposed FTA) are compared with the results reported in [29]
(shown under Radiation Test and Simulation). It can be observed that the results
estimated by the proposed analysis show remarkable similarity with the values ob-
tained by the of the Radiation Test and Simulation techniques. This shows that the
proposed analysis can be a viable option for early analysis of microprocessor designs,
as it is an inexpensive, fast, and highly customizable alternative to other adopted
methods.










The proposed FTA can be customized to evaluate other metrics, such as the esti-
mated time before a failure, the failure rate over time, and the impact of soft-errors
on different components. As an example, Table 16 shows the probability of trap ex-
ceptions over time, the probability of detected errors over time, and the probability of
undetected errors over time. Although relatively small, the probability of undetected
errors in the system may represent a serious issue in certain conditions, where the
system is expected to operate without maintenance. Our analysis shows that the
biggest contributors to the occurrence of undetected errors are the nPC register (27.2
% of cases), the rfa register (22.3 % of cases), and the d cache (19.3 % of cases). The
access to this kind of information early in the development cycle means that possible
points of vulnerability are easier to detect and quicker to fix, resulting in increased
productivity at lower costs.
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7.5 Conclusion and Future Work
Vulnerability to soft-errors is a major concern for micro-electronic systems exposed to
radiation. This paper proposes a probabilistic verification approach for vulnerability
estimation of the SPARC V8 architecture, when it is exposed to soft-errors. This
approach seeks to overcome the limitations of emulation and simulation-based tech-
niques, by performing fault tree analysis through stochastic model checking, which
provides an accurate and exhaustive estimation of the effects of soft-errors in the sys-
tem. The modeling experiments that were conducted produced results that are very
consistent with previously reported radiation ground testing. The proposed approach
is also able to accurately estimate metrics such as the impact of different bit flips on
the system’s dependability measurement, and availability over time. Future work will
seek to expand the analysis domain by integrating multiple layers of abstraction in
order to produce even more accurate results.
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Chapter 8
Article V: Towards an Accurate
Probabilistic Modeling and
Statistical Analysis of Temporal
Faults via Temporal Dynamic
Fault-Trees (TDFTs)
Authors: Marwan Ammar, Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, Yvon
Savaria
Abstract: Fault Tree (FT) is a standardized notation for representing relationships
between a system’s reliability and the faults and/or the events associated with it.
However, the existing FT fault models are only capable of portraying permanent
events in the system. This is a major hindrance since these models fail to reflect
accurately the other classes of faults, such as soft-faults, which are often temporary
events that usually disappear after the source of the interference is no longer present.
This paper proposes a new fault tree modeling paradigm, to capture the impact of
temporal events in systems, called Temporal Dynamic Fault Trees (TDFTs). TDFTs
are utilized to model the characteristics and dependencies between different temporal
events, soft-faults, and permanent faults. These features are integrated to the pro-
posed probabilistic models of the temporal gates, which are modeled as Priced-Timed
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Automata (PTA). This paper also proposes a new FT analysis methodology, based on
Statistical Model Checking (SMC), designed to circumvent the state-explosion prob-
lem that is inherent to other model-checking approaches. The proposed analysis is
able to evaluate the impact of temporal faults in systems, as well as to estimate
the reliability and availability of the system over extended periods of time. The ex-
periments reported in this paper demonstrate the versatility and scalability of the
proposed approach. For instance, the results display the impact that temporal events
may have in a digital system. Our observations indicate that while regular soft-fault
analyses tend to underestimate metrics such as system reliability, TDFT analysis
shows remarkable consistency with radiation testing, with differences of under 2%, in
the conducted analysis.
Index Terms: Fault Tree, Temporal Events, Radiation effects, Single-Event Ef-
fects, Statistical Model-Checking, Formal verification, System-Level Analysis, Relia-
bility, Availability
8.1 Introduction
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a prominent fault diagnosis technique which has gained
widespread acceptance for quantitative safety analysis. A fault tree consists of a
diagram which represents the failure of the top level event (TLE) according to the
failure of basic events based on the relationships between them. The objective of
FTA is to provide insightful information to designers regarding the reliability of their
systems by identifying the ways in which the system is most likely to fail and thus
showing the most efficient ways to make the system safer. In the literature, FTs are
often classified as either static or dynamic, based on the dependency relationships
between their respective components and events. Examples of such dependencies can
be event priority, sequence, spare behavior, etc. With the introduction of dynamic
gates [30, 137, 143], the relationship between the events and components of a fault
tree have changed into a dynamic one, in which the outcome becomes dependent on
the order and the number of occurrences of basic events. Further development into
dynamic gates has led to the development of fault trees with temporal requirements
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[142, 144, 146]. These fault trees extend the dynamic gates to include tighter se-
quence requirements for the events. However, the inclusion of temporal constrains in
these approaches greatly limits the analysis process. Traditionally, FTA is performed
through simulation techniques [119], with tools based on techniques such as Monte-
Carlo simulation, time-sequential simulation, and discrete event simulation [52, 113].
Analysis of large systems using these techniques can often be overwhelming for the
tool since simulation-based analysis relies on input space sampling. This means that
unless all possible points are sampled, there exists a possibility that an error is not
detected by the analysis.
In recent years, many formal-based approaches for the analysis of dynamic fault
trees have emerged [13, 47, 119, 139]. These approaches (detailed in Section 8.2)
solve most of the limitations of simulation techniques, achieving fast and efficient
FTA. However, current FTA approaches are not suitable for safety-critical analysis,
since current FT modeling techniques cannot capture sequences of actions (such as
how many times has event 1 occurred before event 2) and state history. Moreover, the
binary representation (working or failed state) of FTs is not adequate for systems with
complex state-spaces. For example, conventional fault tree events start as inactive and
may become active according to a probability rate. Once an event becomes active,
it will remain active throughout the rest of the analysis. This behavior makes it
impossible to represent the occurrence of transient faults (i.e., faults that may appear
or disappear from the system due to the effects of external sources of interference,
such as radiation and heat) with existing fault-tree gates. This is due to the absence
of suitable fine-grain management of time in conventional fault-tree structures [104].
This paper proposes the modeling of a new type of dynamic fault trees with strict
behavioral and temporal requirements, hence referred to as Temporal Dynamic Fault
Trees (TDFTs). TDFTs are primarily targeted towards the analysis of temporal
events, such as radiation effects and heat. However, the TDFT gates are flexible
enough to be configured for the analysis of most FT systems. The work in this paper
is distinct from the literature in the following ways: 1) The proposed TDFTs are
fault trees that capture temporal events, state history and sequences of actions. We
present and explain the models of each TDFT gate, formulated as Priced-Timed Au-
tomata (PTA). Thereafter, the complete model of the fault tree is obtained through
the parallel composition and synchronization of the PTAs of all the required gates.
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2) Each of the gates in the fault tree is extended with a unique clock which, along
with a global system clock, enables precise time tracking and management. This
allows the proposed model to accurately represent temporal faults, which are only
active for a certain amount of time [103]. It also enables the verification of other
temporal properties, such as the time required for a specific event to manifest itself
in the system. 3) An analysis methodology is introduced, utilizing FT modularity
and sequential hypothesis testing in order to decrease time and resource requirements
while maintaining a high confidence level for the results. This is combined with Sta-
tistical Model-Checking (SMC), which provides statistical evidence for the satisfaction
or violation of the specification.
The aforementioned distinctions are demonstrated through a comparative study,
derived from verifying the estimated system reliability obtained with conventional
FTs versus the new TDFT model. The proposed TDFT analysis is experimentally
evaluated on different scenarios in order to assess its impact on the different types of
fault tree gates and to demonstrate its versatility. Finally, the proposed methodol-
ogy is used to analyze the 7-stage integer pipeline of a Leon-3 microprocessor. The
obtained results are compared with radiation and simulation tests from the litera-
ture [29]. Our results demonstrate that regular FTA methods are inadequate for the
analysis of systems that are exposed to temporal faults. The rest of this paper is
structured as follows: In Section 8.2, some of the most relevant related works are
briefly discussed. In Section 8.3, we explain a few preliminary concepts that are key
to the development of this work. Section 8.4 introduces the proposed modeling of
the TDFT gates, and the SMC-based analysis methodology. In Section 8.5, several
experiments are presented. These experiments have the goal of demonstrating the
main differences and advantages introduced by the proposed methodology. Finally,
in Section 8.6, we draw some conclusions and discuss future works.
8.2 Related Works
FTA is an extremely important field of research. Being the focus of many groups
during the past decade, FTA has evolved into one of the de facto techniques for
early analysis of critical systems. Walker and Papadopoulos [144] first suggested ex-
tending static FTs with Priority-AND, Priority-OR, and Simultaneous-AND gates.
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These gates enable a fault tree to enforce temporal dependencies between events. The
works in [13, 139] present very robust formal approaches to DFT analysis, based on
Input/Output-Interactive Markov Chains (I/O-IMCs) and stochastic model checking.
The work in those papers apply modularization approaches and compositional aggre-
gation techniques, along with heavy reduction algorithms, to formally analyze DFTs
with model checking. These techniques are built around the Galileo formalism [128],
which greatly limits the expressiveness of the analyzed models. For example, neither
approach is able to handle self-repairable systems or any dependencies between gates
or events that have not been pre-programmed in the tools.
In recent years, several techniques have been proposed to extend DFTs in ways
to offer more flexible temporal dependencies between its faults and events. In [120],
the author proposes an extension of the conventional boolean FTA in order to take
sequence dependencies into account for qualitative and probabilistic analyses without
state-space transformations. This allows modeling of sequences of events in all levels
of the fault tree. The analysis of uncertainty over time is the focus in [81]. This
work uses the Pandora tool and fuzzy logic in order to predict and capture different
sequences of dependent dynamic events over time. The authors use their method
to combine probabilistic data and fuzzy set theory with Pandora TFTs to enable
dynamic analysis of complex systems with limited or absent exact quantitative data.
Peng et al. [109] use a timed FT extension method applied to a railway maintenance
system in order to identify which faults are likely to occur first and, therefore, must
be eliminated more urgently. This method can estimate the time required for railway
maintenance and thereby improve maintenance efficiency, and reduce risks.
All these techniques have in common the attempt to introduce new dependencies
between the different components and events of dynamic fault trees. However, they
lack the expressiveness required for a robust analysis of the impact of failures over time
in a dynamic environment. The work presented in this paper further augments fault
trees, by combining and extending dynamic, repairable and temporal fault trees. The
proposed fault tree models are able to capture the randomness of fault testing, where
a significant event (i.e., radiation) may occur non-deterministically. Furthermore, this




8.3.1 The UPPAAL Formalism
UPPAAL is a toolbox for verification of real-time systems, represented by a network
of timed automata, extended with integer variables, structured data types, and chan-
nel synchronization. For the efficient analysis of probabilistic performance properties,
UPPAAL-SMC proposes to work with Statistical Model Checking (SMC). SMC works
by monitoring some simulations of the system, and then use statistical results (in-
cluding sequential hypothesis testing or Monte Carlo simulations) to decide whether
the system satisfies some property with a sufficient degree of confidence. The mod-
eling formalism of UPPAAL-SMC is based on a stochastic interpretation and an
extension of the Timed Automata (TA) formalism used in the classical model check-
ing version of UPPAAL. For individual TA components, the stochastic interpretation
replaces the non-deterministic choices between multiple transitions enabled by proba-
bilistic choices (that may or may not be user-defined). Similarly, the nondeterministic
choices of time delays are refined by probability distributions, which at the compo-
nent level are given either uniform distributions in cases with time-bounded delays
or exponential distributions in cases of unbounded delays [46].
An illustrative example of the UPPAAL formalism is given by the PTA in Fig.
34. In this example and through the rest of this paper, the weight annotations
on locations and edges are ignored and defaulted to ”1”. For Fig. 34, the delay
distribution determined by the upper and lower paths to the END state is given by
sums of uniform distributions, where X ≥ 2 (green label) is the guard of the transition
(i.e., minimum time), and X ≤ 4 (purple label) is the invariant distribution (i.e.,
maximum time delay) of the transition. The stochastic choice that determines which
path will be taken is represented by a forked transition, where each path is weighted





update may be performed during each transition (blue labels). Therefore, the END
location in the example is reachable within the interval X = [4, 12].
8.3.2 Fault Tree Analysis
The fault tree analysis (FTA) method is a widely used method for risk assessment,
mainly in the area of avionics, nuclear and chemical industries [137]. FTA follows
97
Figure 34: Illustrative Example of the UPPAAL Formalism. Reproduced from [46].
a deductive approach, which means that it starts from an undesirable general event
in order to find what circumstances may lead to that event. In the context of FTA,
the general event is known as the top event, from which the fault tree branches out
vertically. The top event is defined as the failing point of a system in operating
conditions, whether those conditions are considered normal or abnormal. Bottom
events are occurrences that may lead to a component failure. As such, fault tree
models are characterized as graphical representations of system failures, in terms of
the system’s components. Standard fault tree models are defined as combinatorial
models, composed by static gates (mainly AND and OR gates) and basic events.
Combinatorial models can only handle combinations of events and not the order of
occurrence of such events, thus are not able to represent complex systems adequately.
Dynamic fault trees (DFTs) extend standard fault trees to allow the representation
of more complex relationships between basic events, such as functional dependencies,
priority, and order of occurrence.
8.4 Proposed TDFT Modeling and Analysis Method-
ology
A constant among existing FTA techniques is that the failure of a basic event cannot
be reverted (i.e., when a basic event changes from the normal state to the fail state,
it will remain in the fail state forever) [39]. However, it has been noted in the liter-
ature that basic events (i.e., events that may lead to the failure of a component) are
not always permanent. This fact may heavily impact the results of fault analyses,
especially in systems exposed to nondeterministic environmental interferences, such
as radiation, heat, and cosmic rays [5, 80, 84]. In a previous work related to mal-
function in pacemakers exposed to ionizing radiation [21], we have demonstrated that
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these radiation-induced malfunctions vary from a simple temporary abnormality to
complete system malfunction. The analyses in [21] have indicated that a simple tem-
porary bit-flip (which, according to technical reports, is a common occurrence) may
cause the pacemaker to behave erroneously and even endanger the life of a patient,
in some cases.
The approach proposed in this paper overcomes this FTA limitation by introducing
the sensitivity to Temporal Basic Events (TBE) to the fault tree gates (i.e, events
that may appear for a limited amount of time and then disappear if certain conditions
are met). This enables a more accurate representation of the environmental hazards
that the system may be exposed to, as well as for the tracking of faults which may
only manifest after thousands of cycles. Moreover, the proposed models are capable of
estimating the probability of fault occurrence in systems exposed to temporal events
of varying duration.
In order to accurately model the fault dependencies in FTs, our approach focuses on
the formalization and modeling of the probabilistic behavior of FT gates and events
over time. In this section, we show the modeling of temporal FT gates. The general
probabilistic model (automaton) of a FT gate is expressed in Definition 1, adapted
from [87].
Definition 1. Given a TDFT gate with a set of inputs Y and an output Z, connected
through a certain logic (such as AND). The priced-timed automaton (PTA) of this
gate can be formally defined by a tuple A = (L,L0, χ, Act, P,L), where:
 L is a finite number of states.
 L0 is the initial state.
 χ is a finite set of clocks.
 Act is a finite set of actions over L.
 inv: L→ ζ(Y ) is an invariant condition.
 P is a probabilistic transition function L× ζ(Y )×Dist(2Y × L).
 L : L → 2AP is a labeling function assigning atomic propositions to different
states.
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In the PTA defined above, a state (l, ν) ∈ L × Rχ≥0 is characterized such that ν |=
inv(l). In any state (l, ν), there is a nondeterministic choice of either making a
discrete transition or letting time pass. A discrete transition can be made according
to any (l, g, p) ∈ P , with current state l being enabled and zone g is satisfied by the
current clock valuation ν. The probability of moving to location l′ and resetting all
clocks in Y to 0 is given by p(Y, l′). The option of letting time pass is available only if
the invariant condition inv(l) is satisfied while time elapses. Based on this definition,
following we explain in detail the proposed models for each TDFT gate.
8.4.1 Proposed Probabilistic Model of the Temporal AND
Gate
The probabilistic AND gate can be modeled as a temporal gate because of the tight
dependency between the output and the inputs. As stated previously, the output
is only generated if all inputs occur. However, in the case of temporal faults, input
events need to happen at the same time to cause the top level fault. For example,
let us imagine a component that fails in the presence of external heat (event x ) AND
radiation (event y). Let us assume a scenario where external heat is applied to the
component for a certain amount of time, after which the heat source is dissipated. Let
us also assume that the component has time to return to its regular temperature before
it is affected by external radiation. In this case, since both events have happened at






Figure 35: Possible Time Window of a TAND output
In the proposed Temporal AND gate (TAND), each of the basic events connected
to the gate (X and Y in this example) is tied to two attributes: the probability of
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the event occurring and the duration of the event. The derivation of the TAND rule
is the following:
 Duration of the Event: It is assumed that the time duration of a basic event
is a random variable d selected from an interval [0, ..., N ], where N ∈ R ≥ 0 .
After an amount of time equal to d has passed, the basic event ceases to exist in
the system. The basic event may re-occur according to the specified probability
rate, in which case the duration of the event may be different.
 Temporal Condition: As is the case with regular AND gates, the output Z
occurs only if all the inputs (X and Y ) occur. However, in the TAND gate, the
output is only generated when the duration of both inputs intersect. In other
words, both inputs must be active at the same time. As illustrated in Fig. 35,
the time interval in which the output of the TAND gate may be generated is
given by:
Z = [d(X)min, d(X)max]
⋂
[d(Y )min, d(Y )max] (6)
Where [d(X)min, d(X)max] and [d(Y )min, d(Y )max] are the intervals in which events X
and Y are active.
Figure 36: Example of a 2-Input Leaf TAND Gate
Fig. 36 shows a possible configuration of a Leaf TAND gate with two inputs.
A leaf gate (or bottom gate) is any gate that has only basic events as inputs. An
example of the possible flow of a Leaf TAND gate with two inputs is as follows: State
S0 signifies the absence of faults. From there, the model can transition through two







Figure 37: Example of a Simple Fault tree
that event y occurs, with probability py. In this case, the automaton moves to state
S2 and an update is performed by the function fail y(), which resets the clock ty,
determines the type of the event ky (ky == 0 signifies permanent fault, and ky == 1
signifies temporal fault) and the maximum duration dy (in time units) of the event.
At this point, the automaton may return to state S0, if ky == 1 and ty > dy, or it
may proceed to state S3, with probability px. If event x happens, the update fail x()
resets clock tx and sets the value of kx, moving the automaton to state S3. In this
scenario, state S3 may transition back to state S2, if tx > dx and kx == 1, or it
may transition to state S4, broadcasting the output to the next gate. The same flow
applies to the top path of the automaton, when event x occurs first.
Figure 38: Example of a 2-Input Variant TAND Gate
To demonstrate how a FT is constructed with the proposed automata, a simple
example is given. Let us consider the FT shown in Fig. 37. This FT has instances of
two possible configurations of the 2-Input TAND gate. Gate G2 is a leaf TAND gate,
since all of its inputs (x and y) are basic events. The automaton of this gate flows
as described above (Fig. 36), producing output z. Let us now consider the gate G1
from Fig. 37. Gate G1 is a variant of the leaf TAND gate, employed in cases where
one of the inputs of the gate is also the output of another gate. The PTA of gate
G1 is shown in Fig. 38. Although gate G1 receives two inputs, w and z, the input z
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is not an event, but rather the output of gate G2. Therefore, gate G1 only receives
one basic event as input (event w). The flow of this automaton is the following: if w
== 0 (i.e., event w is inactive), then w may happen with probability pw. If event w
happens, an update is performed by the function fail w(), which resets the clock tw,
determines the type kw and the maximum duration dw of event w. The transition
takes the system to state S1. In state S1, the automaton will wait for event z, which
can be received through a synchronization channel (channel a, in this example). If
the system is in state S1 and event z occurs (i.e., w == 1 and z == 1 ), then a
transition to state S2 takes place. Alternatively, if the system is in state S1 and the
conditions kw == 1 (i.e., temporal fault) and tw > dw (i.e., duration of the fault
has expired) are met, then the automaton goes back to state S0. When state S2 is
reached, the output of the gate is produced and communicated to the next level of
the FT via synchronization.
For conciseness, the discussions for the other gates will focus on the leaf variant,
since it displays the full functionality of the gate and any required variants can be
derived from the leaf automaton. It must also be noted that all behavioral patterns
in the proposed timed automata are enforced with the use of variables, either through
guards, updates, synchronization, or declarations, as exemplified above. Therefore,
our use of invariants in the models has the sole goal of allowing the automaton to
stay in any state indefinitely (i.e., invariant set to 1). This is important, since the
propagation delay of the different inputs and gates throughout the fault tree is un-
known, especially when temporal and permanent faults coexist in the same fault tree.
Our experiments have shown that wrong results and often verification errors are gen-
erated when the automata are not allowed to hold a state indefinitely. Similarly, our
experiments have shown that the presence of exponential exit rates is required in
states where a clock is manipulated. Our results have suggested that different values
of exponential exit rates have little impact on the verification, as long as the value
is consistent across all states. For this reason, we have adopted the policy of setting
the value of the exponential exit rate to 1 in all states where it is required.
8.4.2 Proposed Probabilistic Model of the Temporal OR Gate
The OR gate is modeled as a temporal gate to better represent the propagation
delay that exists in real systems. The concept of the proposed leaf Temporal OR
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Figure 39: Example of a 2-Input Leaf TOR Gate
(TOR), shown in Fig. 39, is relatively simple, compared with other temporal gates:
assuming two temporal events ( x and y ) connected to a TOR gate, where each
event has a given probability of failure, the occurrence of either event can generate an
output in the gate. However, due to the propagation delay of the modeled component
(represented in Fig. 39 by the variables mx and my), the output is not generated
immediately. Therefore, the output is only generated if the duration of the fault is
longer than the propagation delay, but smaller than the maximum duration of the
fault (variables dx and dy). The output of the gate is communicated to the next
layer of the FT through a synchronization channel. The derivation of the TOR gate
follows the same rules as the TAND gate with regards to the duration of the events.
The temporal condition for this gate is given by the equation:
Z = [(d(X)min, d(X)max] | [d(Y )min, d(Y )max] (7)
8.4.3 Proposed Probabilistic Model of the Temporal FDEP
gate
The Functional Dependency (FDEP) gate is a dynamic gate composed of a trigger
input event and one or more dependent basic events. If the trigger event occurs, the
dependent events automatically become unavailable. While the trigger event is not
in a failed state, the dependent events behave like regular events (i.e., the dependent
events may fail independently from the trigger event). The FDEP gate does not have
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Figure 40: Example of a TFDEP Gate
a direct output, however, a functional dependency may be attached to any other
gate in the fault tree, altering its behavior. The behavior of the probabilistic FDEP
assumes that a dependent event y (such as the output of a gate) may happen with
probability py. However, if the trigger event x occurs, with probability px, then event
y is forced to happen as well.
The main issue with the regular modeling of the FDEP gate is that the temporary
occurrence of the trigger event compromises the system permanently. Let us take the
example of another electrical component. Let us consider the absence of electricity to
power up the component as the trigger event and the failure of the component as the
dependent event. It may be the case that an external interference causes the trigger
event to occur, and therefore causes the component to cease function. However, it may
also be the case that the trigger event disappears after a certain amount of time (i.e.,
the power is restored). In this scenario, the system may still function. The proposed
Temporal FDEP (TFDEP) gate (Fig. 40), models the behavior of a temporal trigger
event x. From state S0, event x may occur with probability px, moving the automaton
to State S1. From state S1, the automaton may go back to state S0 if tx > dx and
kx == 1. In this case, event x has no observable effect in the FT. Alternatively, from
state S1, the automaton may transition to state S2. This transition sends a message
(a! ) which immediately causes all other events that are associated to the TFDEP
gate to fail. Furthermore, from state S2, if the conditions tx > dx and kx == 1
are satisfied, the automaton may move back to state S0. When this transition takes
place, another message is sent (b!), which may override the effects of the first message
(a!). The temporal condition of an TFDEP dependency relationship is given by the
equation:
Z = [d(X)min, d(X)max] | [d(Y )min, d(Y )max]
⋂
[d(W )min, d(W )max] (8)
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Where x is the trigger event, and y and w are two dependent events.
Figure 41: Example of a 2-Input Leaf TPAND Gate
8.4.4 Proposed Probabilistic Model of the Temporal PAND
gate
As with the other FT gates, the PAND gate logic may also be susceptible to tem-
porary faults. To illustrate this, let us consider the case of a backup system with
two components in a standby configuration, with component A being the primary
component and component B in standby. If component A fails, then the electrical
switch (which can also fail) activates component B. Thus, the system will fail if com-
ponent A fails and the switch fails, or if component A fails then component B fails
subsequently. In this scenario, the events must occur in the specified order. However,
it is possible for the switch or component B to fail without causing a system failure,
if component A never fails. Moreover, it is possible that the electrical switch fails to
switch due to a temporary fault. In this case, the switching action might take place
immediately after the temporary fault exits the system.
In the proposed leaf variant of a Temporal PAND (TPAND) gate with two inputs
(Fig. 41), starting from state S0 and assuming temporary event x is the primary
event, a failure only happens if event x fails before event y. The failure of event
x moves the automaton to state S1. From state S1, event x may disappear from
the system, returning to state S0, or event y can happen, with probability py. The
occurrence of event y transitions the automaton to state S3, where event y may
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Figure 42: Example of a 2-of-3 Leaf TComb Gate
disappear (returning to state S1 ) or the output may be generated, which transitions
the model to state S5. If event y happens first, the model moves to state S2. From
state S2, event y may disappear, which causes a return to state S0, or event x may
occur, which causes a transition to state S4. Finally, from state S4, if event y expires,
the automaton moves to state S1. Alternatively, if event x expires, the automaton
moves back to state S2. As with the other gates, the output of the TPAND is
communicated to the next gate via synchronization message (message a!, for example).
The temporal condition for the output of the TPAND gate is given by the equation:
Z = [d(X)min, d(X)max]
⋂
[d(Y )min, d(Y )max]⇐⇒ d(X)min ≤ d(Y )min (9)
8.4.5 Proposed Probabilistic Model of the Temporal COMB
Gate
The Combinational gate (COMB) is a special case of the AND gate. A COMB gate
is composed by three or more inputs and one output. The output occurs if M-of-N
inputs occur. In other words, the combination gate allows the designer to specify the
number of failures within a group of inputs that is required for the top level event to
occur. By observing the examples given in the previous gates, especially the TAND
and TPAND gates, it becomes clear how the combinational gate can be augmented
into Temporal Combinational (TCOMB) gate. A possible configuration of a leaf 2-
of-3 model of the TCOMB gate is illustrated in Fig. 42. As usual, state S0 of the

















































Figure 43: Main Steps of the Proposed Methodology
representing the probabilities of failure of the three inputs of the gates. Let us take
event x as an example. From S0, event x may happen with probability px. This
transition triggers the function fail x(). This function is responsible for a plethora
of variable updates. If the variable count is equal to zero, which is the case since
this is the first transition in the model, function fail x() will set the clock associated
to state S1 (clk1 ) to zero, the variable d 1 will be set to the maximum duration of
event x, and variable k1 will be set to the value of kx. Finally, function fail x()
will increment the variable count and set variable x to 1. After all these updates,
the automaton is in state S1. From this state, event x may expire if the conditions
clk1 > d1 and k1 == 1 are met. In this case, the function timeout() takes place. If
function timeout() occurs from state S1 (i.e., count == 1 ), all variables are reset,
returning the automaton to state S0. Alternatively, from state S1, maintaining the
assumption that event x has already occurred, event y can happen, with probability
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py, or event z can happen, with probability pz. Let us assume that event z takes
place. In this case, the automaton calls the update function fail z(). Since variable
count is equal to one, the update function will set the clock clk2 to zero, the variable
d 2 will be set to the value of dz, and the value of k2 will be set to the value of kz.
The function also increments the variable count and sets variable z to one. With
the automaton in state S2 and variable count equal to 2, the transition to state S3
may happen, broadcasting the output through channel a, in this example. However,
from state S2, if the conditions clk2 > d 2 and k2 == 1 are met, the automaton may
transition back to state S1, which triggers the update function timeout(). If timeout()
is called from state S2 (i.e., count == 2 ), the most recent event is reset (in the case
of this example, z ), and the variable count is decremented.
The temporal condition used for the output of the TCOMB gate is a variant of the























































(c) TFDEP Vs. FDEP Gate
Figure 44: Comparison of the Estimated Unreliability Over Time of TDFTs and
DFTs
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8.4.6 Proposed Analysis Methodology
This subsection introduces the proposed analysis methodology. The flow chart of the
proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 43. We start from a system-level specification
model, in which a system is composed of interconnected components. This specifica-
tion model must be provided by the designer in a general-purpose modeling language,
such as SysML [61]. The failure rate of each component is characterized from the sys-
tem specification. From the SysML model, a fault tree of the system is obtained using
an automatic synthesis tool, such as the one proposed in [99]. Subsequently, a formal
PTA model of the system’s FT is obtained through the parallel composition of the
PTA models of the TDFT gates. These gate models exist in a UPPAAL gate library
(shown as Models lib. in Fig. 43) that can be imported into any statistical model-
checking tool with support to UPPAAL’s XML format. The next step is to evaluate if
the reliability of the system under analysis is within the acceptable threshold defined
by the specification. This evaluation is performed in UPPAAL-SMC by using Wald’s
sequential hypothesis testing [141]. This test computes a proportion r among n runs
that satisfy the defined property. Given two possible hypothesis, a and b, the value
of r will eventually cross log(β ÷ (1 − α)) or log((1 − β) ÷ α) with probability 1,
where α and β are the probabilities of accepting hypothesis a or b, respectively [46].
The properties generated for the hypothesis testing and for the model checking steps
are in the form of full weighted Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL) queries. An
example of such query is given below:
Pr[bound;N ](max : expr) (10)
where bound defines the constraint on the number of runs. N gives the number of
runs explicitly, and expr is the expression to evaluate. It is worth noting that these
properties are analyzed for a certain confidence interval, which controls the number
of iterations processed by the tool. If the probability of failure in the system is within
the allowed threshold, no further analysis is conducted. However, if the probability
of failure is above the allowed threshold, the proposed methodology moves into the
refinement evaluation step. The goal of this step is to identify if there exists a certain
configuration of the fault tree under analysis that satisfies the evaluated query. To
this end, first, the critical path of the TDFT is identified (i.e., the sub-tree that has
the highest probability of failure). Then, the leaf gates of the critical path are tested
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with different instances of temporal events with different durations. For example, a
gate that has only permanent faults may be changed so that one or more of its events
may become temporal. Thereafter, these temporal events may be tested over different
duration intervals.This analysis can generate a very a detailed quantitative report,
that has the objective of showing the system designers of the exact vulnerabilities of
the system, and which parameters have a greater impact to the system’s criticality.
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Figure 45: Modular FT Analysis of the Binary Hypercube Architecture
8.5 Experimental Results
In this section, the results of the analyses of the failure probabilities of different fault
tree gates and systems with and without the presence of temporal faults are presented
and discussed. Furthermore, different experiments are presented, with the purpose of
demonstrating a different aspect of the proposed TDFT methodology. The analyses
have been performed on UPPAAL-SMC version 4.1.19, running on a machine with
an AMD Ryzen 1800X CPU and 32 GB of RAM.
8.5.1 Unreliability Evaluation Over Time
It is important to illustrate the behavioral difference between a TDFT gate and a
regular FT gate. This experiment evaluates the probability of failure of a single TDFT
gate due to temporal faults and the progression of this failure over time compared with
a regular FT gate. Fig. 44 illustrates the behavior of different TDFT gates and their
corresponding regular gates. The failure rate of all basic events in this experiment
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is assumed to be equal to 0.1. Fig. 44(a) shows the results obtained from the AND
gate and from the TAND gate. Fig. 44(b) shows the unreliability progression of
the PAND and TPAND gates. Finally, Fig. 44(c) shows the results obtained by
computing the unreliability of the FDEP and TFDEP gates, connected to a regular
AND gate through a trigger relationship. It can be observed that the unreliability
probabilities obtained with the regular FT gates are greatly overestimated. This
happens because, as discussed previously, basic events that occur in a regular gate
are permanent. However, basic events occurring in a temporal gate may have a limited
duration, in which case a failure is only triggered if the required events happen during
the same time window.
8.5.2 Scalability of the Proposed TDFT Analysis
One of the major weaknesses of regular FTA methods based on model-checking is
the size limitation that is imposed on the analysis. For example, probabilistic model
checking of FTs over time is very demanding and often cannot be handled by model-
checking tools such as PRISM, MRMC and Storm. The proposed TDFT method
circumvents this limitation in two distinct ways: 1) As previously mentioned (Fig.
43), the proposed TDFT analysis takes advantage of a technique called Statistical
Hypothesis Testing (SHT) [141]. SHT is a method of statistical inference where two
statistical data sets are compared, or a data set obtained by sampling is compared
against a synthetic data set from an idealized model. In other words, the model may
be evaluated against a query (i.e., is the estimated availability of component x > 0.9
? ). The outcome of this evaluation is either true or false. This method may be
used to guide the analysis process by minimizing the expected resource consumption.
2) Unlike most model-checking techniques, the proposed TDFT methodology applies
full FT modularity without the need to partition the original model into its sub-trees.
This can be done by simply editing a command line, responsible for instantiating the
models, in the UPPAAL system declarations.
The main objective of the second experiment is to demonstrate the applicability of
the proposed approach on large systems. This experiment is also used to showcase the
discrepancy between the results obtained with the proposed TDFTs against regular
probabilistic FTA analysis, in scenarios where temporal faults are considered. The
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Table 12: Estimated Availability of Component T1 After 100 Seconds. Failure rate





X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 T1
Regular
FTA
n/a 0.0135 0.0001 0.833 0.0001 0.9023 0.0135 0.9652
TDFT
G4 0.9328 0.0001 0.997 0.0135 0.9994 0.0135 0.99997
G7 0.0135 0.0001 0.833 0.933 0.9896 0.0135 0.99893
G9 0.0135 0.0001 0.833 0.0135 0.902 0.932 0.998
fault trees used in this experiment can be seen in Fig. 45. Fig. 45(a) shows a top-
level fault tree model that is adapted from the case study developed in Dugan et al.
[50]. Components T1 (Fig. 45(b)) and T2 (Fig. 45(c)) are external events to the
top-level FT. This experiment is conducted in three separate steps. In each step,
two different models of the fault trees are built. The first model (DFT model) uses
regular probabilistic FT gates, while the second model (proposed TDFT model) uses
the temporal gates proposed in this paper. Both FT models are analyzed separately.
In the case of the TDFT model, whenever an event is triggered in a temporal gate,
a random choice is made to determine if the event is permanent or temporal. This is
done to test the scalability of the models, as temporal events are more complex to be
resolved. In the case of the DFT model, all events are considered permanent upon
occurrence. It is worth mentioning that for the purposes of this paper, the results of
the different iterations of the hypothesis analyses are omitted, for clarity.
Table 13: Estimated Availability of Component T2 After 100 Seconds. Failure rate








n/a 0.088 0.534 0.885
TDFT
G1 0.9986 0.534 0.99934
G2 0.0879 0.9964 0.9973
The first step in this experiment is the analysis of component T1. The extended
FT of component T1 is shown in Fig. 45(b). To illustrate the impact that temporal
events may have in the analysis, this goal of this experiment is to consider a single
temporal gate in the FT and to compute the impact of that temporal gate on the
estimated availability of the system. Table 12 shows the estimated availability at the
different system components when the events of gates G4, G7, or G9 are considered
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Table 14: Estimated Availability of the Binary Hypercube System After 100 Seconds.




P Q K R TLE
DFTCalc n/a 0.998 0.9993 0.996 0.99994 0.851
Regular
FTA
n/a 0.998 0.9994 0.996 0.99993 0.862
TDFT
G11 0.99992 0.99996 0.996 0.99993 0.9984
G12 0.99996 0.99995 0.996 0.99993 0.9986
G13 0.998 0.9994 0.99998 0.99996 0.991
G14 0.998 0.9994 0.996 0.9999991 0.9985
temporal. In this experiment, it is assumed that the failure rate of the basic events (X1
- X8 ) is 0.05, the duration of temporal basic events is 3 seconds, and the estimated
availability is computed over a period of 100 seconds. For example, let us consider the
cases where gates G4 or G7 are temporal. It can be seen in Fig. 45(b) that gate G4
impacts the results of components X9, X11, X13, and T1. On the other hand, gate
G7 impacts components X12, X13, and T1. For each case, the results in the table
quantify the impact of these gates on each of the components, compared to analyses
that only consider permanent events. For example, if we were to classify the system
in the terms of the Five Nines standard [110], and assuming that the input events of
gate G4 are temporal, a regular FTA would classify this system (availability of T1 )
as One Nine (1N), whereas the TDFT analysis would rightfully classify it as Four
Nines (4N). This means that in this hypothetical scenario, the regular FTA would
greatly underestimate the availability rating of this system. This, in turn, would mean
that the design team would have to spend more resources than necessary in order to
increase the rating of the system to the Five Nines (5N) standard (i.e., availability
= 0.999995, or the system is available for 99.999% of the time).
Next, we perform a similar analysis on the extended FT of component T2, shown
in Fig. 45(c). For this experiment, the assumptions used for component T1 also
apply. The results are presented in Table 13, for the regular and temporal analyses.
A different analysis is performed for each of the lower-level gates to assess the impact
of temporal events on those gates as well as their impact on the top event. In the last
step of this experiment, we utilize the partial results in Tables 12 and 13 to analyze
the fault tree of the Hypercube system (in Fig. 45(a)). The failure rates for the basic
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events of this fault tree (A - J ) are assumed to be equal to the failure rate of T1.
Table 14 shows an estimation of the availability of the different components of T1,
after 100 seconds. In the table, Regular FTA shows the results obtained with regular
FT analysis. For comparison and validation, the row DFTCalc of the table shows the
results obtained through FTA using the DFTCalc tool [13], which is a well-known
tool for dynamic fault tree analysis. In the TDFT analysis rows, we report the results
obtained with the proposed TDFT models, with both temporal and permanent faults
considered. Similarly to the previous steps of the analysis, each of the lower-level gates
was analyzed individually to evaluate the effect of temporal events, as well as their
impact to the top-level event. The results shown, for Regular FTA and DFTCalc,
demonstrate a near parity between the values obtained. However, the table also
shows that the presence of even a single source of temporal faults may drastically
alter the estimated results of the analysis. This demonstrates the importance of the
proposed methodology in environments where temporal faults may occur, since this
difference cannot be detected with regular FTA. It is noticeable that the type and
location of the temporal gate may drastically change the results obtained at the TLE.
For example, gate G11 directly impacts the outcome of gates G12, G14 and G16.
In other words, increasing or decreasing the availability rating associated to gate
G11 has direct effects on the outputs of all other gates that G11 is connected to.
Therefore, as seen in Table 14, the effects of a single gate may ripple through the FT
generating significant differences in the estimated results.
Table 15: Estimated Reliability of the Pressure Chamber System After 100 Seconds.
(Fault=X in the table refers to the time duration of the fault, with X being units of
time.)
(1 - Probability of Explosion)
Fault=1 Fault=3 Fault=5 Fault=7 Fault=10
Proposed
TDFT
0.99997 0.9975 0.9911 0.9827 0.9635
TFT 0 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Regular
FTA





























Figure 46: Temporal Fault Tree of the Pressure Chamber Case-Study
8.5.3 Comparison between TDFTs and Temporal Fault Trees
(TFTs)
As previously discussed in Section 8.2, other techniques have tried to integrate tem-
poral constraints to fault tree analysis. One of the most expressive techniques in the
literature is the Temporal Fault Trees (TFTs) formalism, introduced in [108]. The
analysis in [108] assigns time constraints to the propagation of the bottom events of
the tree. The examples of such time constraints, shown in Fig. 46, are Forpast and
Within. Forpast indicates that the event must be active for a minimum amount
of time before propagating (e.g., Forpast 3 indicates that the bottom event must be
active for 3 units of time before propagating in the system). Similarly, Within in-
dicates that the bottom event must occur within a certain time-frame (e.g, Within
3 signifies that the event must happen before 3 time units have passed, in order to
propagate in the system). In this subsection, we present a direct comparison between
the TDFT and TFT techniques, by adapting the Pressure Chamber fault tree (Fig.
46) from [108] and comparing the obtained results. The system depicted in the figure
shows a series of events and conditions that may lead to an explosion in the system.
Starting from the bottom-most events, the failure of the pressure sensor for over 3
116
units of time together with the absence of an open valve command within the same 3
time units, generates an error where the computer was supposed to open the pressure
valve but fails to do so (gate G1 ). Alternatively, the system may experience a valve
sensor failure, which, if it lasts more than 3 time units, generates a valve failure. If
the valve fails or if the computer fails to open the valve, an error is generated, since
the valve did not open to release the building pressure (gate G2 ). If the valve cannot
be opened and the system experiences high pressure in the chamber for over 3 time
units, an explosion occurs (gate G3 ).
For the TDFT analysis, the conditions Forpast and Within have been modeled
with leaf TOR gates, where the conditions Forpast and Within are enforced by ad-
justing the guards of the output transition of the TOR gate. Gates G1, G2 and G3
are regular TDFT gates. The comparison of the results of the TFT analysis with
the proposed TDFT analysis are presented in Table 15. From the table, it can be
seen that while the TFT technique is definitely an improvement over regular FTA,
the results obtained by the former are rather limited. In the example (Fig. 46), the
expected duration of the fault events is 3 seconds. Therefore, if the duration of the
faults is less than 3 seconds, the probability of failure is equal to zero. Furthermore, if
the duration of the faults is equal or greater than 3 seconds, the probability of failure
is always the same. Based on this fact. The table shows that unlike other approaches,
the results provided by the TDFT analysis can provide a distinct estimation for each
considered fault duration.
8.5.4 Failure Estimation of the SPARC V8 Architecture with
TDFTs
Having established the differences between the proposed TDFT analysis and the regu-
lar probabilistic FTA in the previous experiments, the final experiment demonstrates
the importance of the proposed approach to fault analysis. This is done by analyzing
the fault tree of the integer pipeline of the Leon-3 processor and comparing the ob-
tained results to radiation testing and simulation. In order to obtain the FT of the
Leon-3 integer pipeline, we have adopted an analytical approach for the generation of
fault trees for complex systems, known as the Behaviour-Based Method [112]. This
approach considers faults as behaviours, and fault-tree gates as operations on those







































Figure 47: DFT of the 7-stage Integer Pipeline of the SPARC-V8 Architecture
the structural information available in the SPARC V8 architecture manual [45, 74],
the fault tree of the integer pipeline is constructed, as shown in Fig. 47. The fault
tree is divided into 7 levels, each representing a stage of the pipeline. For this exper-
iment, the probabilities used for the failure rates in the model are derived from the
cross-section values reported in [29].
The goals of this experiment are first to determine the probability of a crash
error in the processor pipeline, which raises a trap exception. Secondly, to determine
the probability of each type of trap error generated over a period of time. To this
end, the probabilities of soft-error events utilized in our model are derived from the
cross-section values obtained through the radiation bombardment of a LEON3 design
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Figure 48: Probability of Trap Exceptions in different approaches. Simulation and
radiation test results are reproduced from [29]
conducted and published in [29]. Furthermore, the work in [29] also contains a fault-
injection simulation experiment. These results have been used in this paper for set-up
and validation purposes.
In this analysis, the proposed FT model has been evaluated through over 3800
iterations, reaching a confidence level of 95%. The confidence level can be further
increased if more iterations are considered. Each iteration computes the estimated
probability of system failure, assuming multiple soft-errors may happen at any given
time. Through our results, we estimate that approximately 41% of all errors orig-
inating from soft-faults were captured as trap exceptions. Based on the modeled
fault tree, and following the functionality described in the SPARC-V8 manual [74],
the proposed model is able to estimate the probability of occurrence of the following
types of trap exceptions in the SPARC-V8 pipeline:
 instruction access exception: A blocking error exception causes the instruc-
tion to be unavailable.
 data store error: An error exception that occurs during a data store to mem-
ory.
 illegal instruction: An attempt to execute an instruction with an invalid
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 data access exception: An error exception that occurs on a load/store data
access.
 mem address not aligned: A load/store operation that generates an im-
proper memory address, according to the instruction.
 Others: All other types of trap exceptions.
Out of the 41% of soft-faults captured as trap exceptions, Fig. 48 shows the
probability of each exception type to occur. In order to validate the proposed model,
we have compared the obtained probabilities (Proposed FTA) to the ones reported in
[29] (Radiation Test and Simulation). It can be seen that the values obtained with
the proposed FTA are consistent with the values of the radiation test.
The proposed analysis can also be used to assess other metrics, such as the estimated
time before a failure, the failure rate over time, and the impact of soft-errors on
different components to the vulnerability of the system. Table 16 shows an estimation
of the probability of trap exceptions over time, the probability of detected errors over
time, and the probability of undetected errors over time. Although relatively small,
the probability of undetected errors in the system may represent a serious issue in
certain conditions, where the system is expected to operate without maintenance.
Our analysis shows that the biggest contributors to the occurrence of undetected
errors are the nPC register (22.5 % of cases), the rfa register (19.7 % of cases), and
the d cache (17.3 % of cases).
8.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a new modeling and analysis approach to accurately compute
the availability of systems exposed to temporal faults. Regular probabilistic fault
tree models calculate the probability of failure under the assumption that every fault
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is permanent. However, in the real world, sources of interference (such as heat and
radiation) can be intermittent. Therefore, their impact on the behavior of digital
circuits (especially self-repair systems) may be only temporary. TDFTs are intro-
duced to capture such phenomena, providing an unprecedented level of precision and
customization to fault tree analysis of soft-faults. The results presented in this paper
illustrate the versatility of the proposed methodology and the level of accuracy ob-
tained in comparison with other FTA approaches. Future work includes the further
extension of TDFT gates in order to analyze latent faults and rare events in systems
affected by temporal faults.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
9.1 Conclusion
This thesis set out to introduce a new method of modeling and analyzing the vulner-
ability of cyberphysical systems at early stages of the design cycle. As shown in the
previous sections, this work is composed by two interconnected yet independent fault
analysis techniques (i.e., through fault tree analysis and system-level analysis). Each
of these techniques has distinct advantages and weaknesses.
From the fault tree analysis perspective, it is possible to perform a study of fault
propagation which encapsulates the whole system, as complex as it may be, due to the
high level of abstraction. This allows us to better understand the system’s behavior as
well as how that behavior can be altered in the presence of faults. This is important
because understanding and predicting the most likely sources of faults in the system
allows us to propose efficient design improvements to reduce the vulnerability to such
faults. However, the high level of abstraction is also the weakness of fault tree analysis,
since the lack of details may cause the proposed mitigation technique to be less than
optimal. Another weakness of FTA is that fault trees are generated manually from
the system specifications (usually written in English language), which can be a source
of inaccuracies.
On the other hand, the system-level component step of the analysis is able to
provide a detailed view of how faults propagate within the system, focusing on each
individual component and its internal building blocks. This allows us to identify the
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sources of vulnerability with a finer level of detail, which may lead to the implemen-
tation of more efficient fault mitigation solutions. The finer level of detail in this
abstraction also enables us to extract fault propagation paths that may have been
missed in the formulation of the fault tree, in order to enhance the system model.
However, this step of the analysis is unable to provide system analysis over time due
to the added complexity of the models.
This work has combined these two high-level techniques, for the first time, into
one multi-level verification methodology. As demonstrated in the body of this thesis,
our methodology is capable of improving the accuracy of the high-level verification
process, while providing the flexibility to move across different abstraction levels. To
achieve this goal, results of the more detailed component-level analysis are used to
characterize the CPS sub-components. Then, these results are utilized to perform
analysis of the whole system at FT-level. The combination of these approaches also
improves the scalability and efficiency of the modeling as well as the verification.
Namely, at each stage in the modeling hierarchy, an appropriate level of abstraction
may be used to propagate the effects of errors to the next higher level. For example,
the FTA step can be used to identify the critical components of a system (as a
reminder, components in a fault tree are seen as black boxes). Next, the system-level
analysis is performed in these components, and a detailed fault propagation graph is
extracted. Finally, the fault propagation graph can be added to the fault tree of the
system, replacing the black box of the component, in order to improve the accuracy
of the model. In this hypothetical scenario, we are able to bypass one of the major
weaknesses of FTA (the lack of details due to the high level of abstraction), without
increasing the complexity of the model to prohibitive sizes. A second and more
direct application of this concept is to evaluate different mitigation techniques at the
different levels of abstraction, in order to find the most efficient solution. This level
of iterative analysis is not attainable using conventional fault analysis techniques.
Aside from identifying the points of vulnerability in the system, one of the main
challenges of the proposed methodology has been to evaluate and propose the optimal
solution for the mitigation of the vulnerability. Through our work, we have identified
many behavioral patterns pertaining to each fault analysis path. For example, we
have identified the most common fault propagation paths in FTs, as well as the most
efficient ways to decrease the vulnerability of the components in those paths. However,
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in order to fully explore the vulnerability of a system, it is required to implement a
connectivity channel between the different levels of abstraction. The implementation
of this communication channel has been very challenging, seeing how it connects
models at different levels of abstraction. In order to achieve this, we have modeled the
CPS at system-level and FT-level. The fault-mitigation assessment is then conducted
by comparing the results of similar mitigation techniques at multiple fault-injection
points and establishing which abstraction-level produces the most efficient outcome.
Furthermore, our research has shown that the study of fault propagation in dy-
namic environments requires an analysis over time. For example, the effects of ioniz-
ing radiation over a circuit cannot be accurately modeled over a discrete-time model.
The reason for this is that the incidence of radiation particles is a highly dynamic
phenomena. Ionizing radiation may or may not be present, the flux of particles may
change, the affected area of the circuit may change, and the presence of latent faults
has to be considered. These events can only be accurately considered in an analysis
over time. To account for this, we have proposed the concept of temporal fault tree
analysis. This type of temporal FTs can support temporal and permanent proba-
bilistic events. This analysis also provides full compatibility between FT-level and
system-level models.
9.2 Future Work
Dependability analysis is one of the most important phases in the design flow of
complex systems. In addition to increasing the designer’s confidence in the design, an
early analysis may also reduce the associated financial cost, required time and overall
design effort. By introducing a versatile high-level approach, this thesis lays the
foundation for a promising cross-layer approach for the early dependability analysis
of CPS vulnerable to the effects of SEUs.
Since the current techniques in the literature are mostly deemed impractical and
cannot be adapted for real CPS systems, future works should seek to provide practical
frameworks to evaluate and improve CPS reliability and reduce the complexity of the
reliability analysis while improving the accuracy of the results. These goals can be
further divided into the following sub-objectives:
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 New fault models for a variety of aggressors: Study the impact of dif-
ferent possible system failures classes based on the source aggressor. Different
fault models should be considered for each type of aggressor in CPS, including
different external types of radiation and transistor aging. Furthermore, new
fault models should be proposed to characterize the impact of cyber-attacks on
the reliability of the underlying telecommunication networks of the CPS. These
fault models may vary according to the CPS application, criticality, environ-
ment, and design constraints. Moreover, the collective impact of different types
of faults at each stage of the design cycle should be evaluated.
 Compositional multilevel and cross-layer modeling: Compositional ver-
ification is an important approach for verifying complex systems consisting of
several interacting components. In this project, new methods to perform com-
positional verification should be investigated based on the concept of multilevel
and cross-layer verification. In this approach, when a component is integrated
into the system, it is verified against its timing and interface (i.e., interaction
with other components) specifications. To achieve this, formal techniques for
generating and checking both interfaces and invariants are required. Further-
more, this project should investigate analyses of unknown components at early
stages of the design cycle. High-level and low-level methods may be utilized
to handle detailed CPSs with different granularity, guaranteeing reliability and
robustness of the system obtained by integrating incompletely specified compo-
nents is a challenge for compositional verification. This should allow providing
guarantees of performance and reliability validated against the requirements,
while achieving acceptable cost and time-to-market objectives.
 New formal based analysis algorithms: Based on the target fault models,
new formal based analysis solutions should be proposed, starting from the theory
to real life CPS implementation. The proposed algorithm should be based on
a collection of formal techniques that are suitable for each different level of
abstraction. The verification of the proposed models may be achieved through
the specification of suitable liveness and safety properties. The ability to ground
such analysis on accurate abstraction of detailed physical implementation as
well as the ability to exhaustively analyze complex systems with suitable formal
methods are unheard of and will represent ground-breaking contributions.
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 Scalable architectures for complex CPS: There is a tradeoff between the
minimum number of hardware components to use and maximum reliability in a
CPS. Individual components affect directly system reliability. CPS architecture
should be specified with respect to software/hardware components and their
inter-relationship. Therefore, system reliability must be assessed based on the
reliability of components and their connections. Since cost is one of the major
consideration in realizing a robust CPS architecture, ideally the component
count should also be minimized. This can lead to exploiting new design choices
for CPSs which are resource efficient while maintaining reliability. A set of
analytical and formal tools (such as Stochastic Model Checking (SMC) and
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs)) may be utilized through the coordinated




10.1 New Insights Into Soft-Faults Induced Car-
diac Pacemakers Malfunctions Analyzed at
System-Level Via Model Checking
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Savaria
Abstract: Progressive shrinking of CMOS device sizes has permitted reductions
in power consumption and miniaturization of electronic devices. In parallel, mod-
ern pacemakers implemented with advanced technologies have proved to be more
sensitive than earlier models to soft-errors induced notably by external radiations.
Traditionally, the analysis of the impact of soft-faults, like those induced by Single
Event Upsets (SEUs), on the behavior of pacemaker devices, has been carried out
by dynamic radiation ground testing and clinical observations. However, these tech-
niques are expensive. They can only be done very late in the design cycle, after the
design is manufactured and in part after it is implanted. This paper presents a new
model-based analysis of the impact of Soft-Faults (SFs) on the behavior of cardiac
pacemakers at system-level. It is performed by: 1) introducing a new Probabilistic
Timed Automata (PTA) model; 2) verifying this model against a set of functional
properties to ensure it meets its specifications under normal conditions; 3) applying a
new methodology to inject SFs at a certain time in the PTA model of the pacemaker
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and to verify their impact on the pacemaker’s behavior is introduced; and 4) identi-
fying different scenarios for Soft-Faults (SFs) that may lead to malfunction including
Oversensing, Undersensing, and Output Failure. The reported formal modeling is
done in PRISM and the analysis is done with the Storm model checker.
10.1.1 Introduction
The rate at which pacemakers are implanted is increasing on a global scale, with more
than 700,000 new pacemakers implanted worldwide each year [102]. These devices
operate at a very low voltage to reduce their power consumption and to improve their
battery life. Moreover, the input nodes in a pacemaker are very sensitive, since the
behavior of the system relies on capturing the intrinsic electrical signals of the heart.
Therefore, the sensors of a pacemaker are very susceptible to environmental interfer-
ences. In order to achieve the high level of reliability required by these safety-critical
systems, the design of the pacemaker must feature different protective measures, such
as shielding in hermetic metal cases, signal filtering, inference rejection circuit, and
bipolar leads [25]. With such measures, a pacemaker is protected against the every-
day sources of electromagnetic radiation, such as cell phones, microwave ovens, and
articles surveillance equipment, i.e., these sources are no considerable threat to the
functionality of the pacemaker. However, sometimes these devices need to operate in
a hostile environment (high density of radiation) that can lead to soft-faults which
can then induce soft-errors. For these devices, there are two main environments under
which they are more affected by soft-errors:
 Radiation based treatment or exams in hospitals: in such case, the pa-
tient is exposed to high-density external radiations. Several accounts of deaths
in pacemaker patients due to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) were reported
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [111]. Another example of a hos-
tile environment in hospitals is the radiotherapy treatment of cancer [150].
 Latitude and altitude: Soft-Faults (SFs) due to high-energy protons and
neutrons vary with both latitude and altitude. For example, while traveling in
an airplane, the density of high-energy protons can be 100-800 times worse than
at sea-level. Electrical reset was observed during air travel due to SFs [58].
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In the literature, work related to the analysis of the sensitivity of implantable
cardiac devices to soft-errors is rather limited. Most of the existing techniques (such
as [18, 36, 58, 71, 130, 149–151]) are based on dynamic radiation ground testing. This
analysis provides a very accurate estimation of the vulnerability of the pacemaker.
However, it is very complex, expensive, and time-consuming. Therefore, there is a
growing need to analyze and estimate the impact of soft-errors due to soft-faults on
high-level models of such systems.
For this application, the methodology proposed in this thesis is used to introduce
a novel methodology to quantitatively analyze the vulnerability of pacemakers to
soft-errors induced by soft-faults in system-level models. This work is distinct from
previous works in the following ways:
 A new modeling of the behavior of the Dual Chamber, Pacing, and Sensing
(DDD) pacemaker, at the system-level, is proposed. In this model, the be-
havior of each sub-component is modeled as a Probabilistic Timed Automaton
(PTA). This is a key aspect of reliable fault analysis since probabilistic, non-
deterministic behavior often arises in the presence of soft-faults and component
errors. Moreover, we created a catalog of properties based on the DDD pace-
maker specification and previous formal analyses of pacemakers in the literature.
The correctness of the composite model is proved by verifying it against all these
properties using Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC).
 A new formal probabilistic analysis of the impact of soft-faults on the behavior
of the DDD pacemaker is proposed. The goal of this analysis is to provide
full insight into the affected components, injection time, and the impact of
SFs on the pacemaker behavior during each Window Of Vulnerability (WOV).
This is achieved by extending the PTA of each component of the pacemaker
model in order to allow fault injection and to include stochastic transitions that
represent soft-fault propagation. The proposed technique enables quantitative
investigation of SFs propagation for each injection scenario through verification
of the extended pacemaker model against a set of Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic (PCTL) properties using probabilistic model checking. With this ap-
proach, different possible WOVs of the cardiac cycle have been identified. Each
WOV is defined as the time interval within which a soft-fault at one component
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of the pacemaker might impair its behavior. Then, for each WOV, we investi-
gate the impact of a soft-fault on the pacemaker and on the proper behavior of
the heart. If the injected soft-fault results into an observable soft-error, then we
identify its impact on the cardiac cycle when it is injected and on the follow-
ing cycles. Thereafter, we link the observed behaviors based on these injection
scenarios with the pacemaker malfunction behaviors which were reported in
the literature as part of radiation experiments or clinically in patient’s records.
As it is explained later, a soft-fault can lead to undesirable events, such as
Oversensing, Undersensing, and Output failure in the pacemaker.
Existing Observations of the Impact of Soft-Faults on Pacemakers
Following, we summarize the main findings in the literature on the impact of external
radiations on the behavior of implantable cardiac pacemakers. For further informa-
tion, the reader is referred to several reviews in the literature (such as [150], [149],
[148]) that provide full details of these results. In the literature, the presence of
soft-errors due to SFs in pacemakers was proven by:
1. Clinical observations : In these approaches, data collected from implanted pace-
makers are analyzed. The reported results in [36] evaluate the incidence of SFs
induced by cosmic neutron radiation in a large population of patients with car-
diac implants. Other clinical observations (similar to the work done in [58])
demonstrate that the high density of cosmic radiation during air travel is linked
to the electrical reset identified in the cardiac devices implanted in multiple pa-
tients. Moreover, different malfunctions were observed in pacemakers implanted
in patients who suffer from cancer and have been treated by radiotherapy [71],
[126]. This kind of analysis is very time consuming and only possible after
pacemakers are implanted and operating in the patient’s body.
2. Dynamic radiation ground testing : With this approach, accelerated device test-
ing is performed under different radiation fluxes (such as [36, 71, 130, 151]).
The goal of this analysis is to replicate the observed behavior obtained from
patient data and to test the vulnerability of different pacemaker models. This
approach is very accurate and enables the testing of the device when exposed
to a specific radiation intensity in a highly controlled environment. However,
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the procedure is very expensive and only possible at post-silicon level (i.e., after
the pacemaker is fully manufactured).
Both clinical observations and dynamic radiation ground testing show that the
impact of SFs on the behavior of the pacemaker can be classified into three groups:
1) minor errors which do not impact the system and are only recorded in the data log
of the device; 2) moderate reset, not requiring correction by the programmer; and 3)
electrical reset, requiring full reprogramming of the device. Based on these results, it
is evident that SFs present a real challenge to the reliability of pacemakers. However,
existing analysis techniques are resource hungry, time-consuming, and require the
pacemaker to be fully manufactured or even implanted.
Formal Modeling and Analysis of the Functionality of the Pacemakers
Pacemakers are safety-critical devices of which faulty behaviors can cause harm or
even death. There has been much interest in developing formal verification frame-
works to verify the correctness of pacemakers implementations, at different abstrac-
tion levels. Existing techniques can be classified into two categories: formal based
techniques (such as [66, 75, 76, 131]) and testing based techniques (such as [77, 78]).
Formal verification techniques are very efficient in providing guarantees about the
pacemaker model correctness, as well as locating corner-cases and hard-to-find bugs.
In [66], the authors propose a formal specification of a pacemaker using the Z
model into Perfect Developer [43]. Thereafter, based on the pacemaker specification,
the correctness of the generated model was verified using the ProofPower-Z theorem
prover. Tuan et. al [131] proposed the modeling of the different operating modes of a
pacemaker as a Real-Time System (RTS) formal model. This model was then verified
against a number of safety and correctness properties as well as timed constraints
using the PAT model checker.
In the work proposed by [75, 76], a model-based framework for the automatic veri-
fication of the functionality of cardiac pacemakers was developed. The authors devel-
oped a detailed model of a basic dual-chamber pacemaker. This model is constructed
based on the timed automaton [8] (TA) of each of the pacemaker’s sub-components.
Moreover, in this work, the authors have developed a TA of the heart behavior. The
functionality of the pacemaker model has been verified using UPPAAL [24].
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In [38], a quantitative functional verification algorithm for implantable pacemak-
ers is proposed by connecting the MATLAB model of the heart, introduced in [42],
and the TA model of the pacemaker in PRISM, proposed by [76]. The analysis is per-
formed by combining both models (after exporting the PRISM model to MATLAB)
and verifying the pacemaker according to its specifications.
These techniques are designed to detect bugs in the pacemaker implementation
(i.e., identification of functional errors). In other words, such techniques assume that
the pacemaker always operates in an error-free environment. Therefore, with these
techniques, it is not possible to detect or analyze the impact of non-functional faults
such as soft-faults. The work presented in this experiment tries to bridge the gap
between high-level functional design verification and physical radiation testing, by
providing a technique to perform a high-level analysis of the vulnerability of pace-
makers, in hostile environments, at a very early stage of the design cycle.
10.1.2 Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) & Storm
In this work, we use Storm [47], a powerful probabilistic symbolic model checker. It
employs efficient algorithms and data structures to reduce the number of states and
optimize the size of the state-machine to be solved. In addition, Storm supports dif-
ferent implementations of Markov chains, namely discrete-time and continuous-time
Markov chains and Markov Automata. It also supports a wide range of probabilis-
tic temporal logic to specify the properties to be verified such as PCTL, PCTL*,
and Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [19, 41]. Storm supports several types of
input such as PRISM, JANI, GSPNs, DFTs, cpGCL, however, in this work, all the
models are built in PRISM language [92]. In PRISM, a model is formed by basic
constructs called modules, each designed to express a specific behavior, much like
sub-components of a system. The state of each module is given by a set of finite
ranged variables. The global state of the model is determined by the evaluation of
the values of the module variables.
10.1.3 Steps of the Proposed Pacemaker Analysis
We propose a unified verification methodology to investigate, at the system-level, the









































































Figure 49: Main Steps of the Proposed Analysis of a Pacemaker
Fig. 49, this methodology comprises the following two main phases:
Phase 1: Model construction and functional verification: this phase starts
by extracting the specification and constructing a system-level model of the pacemaker
main components. Thereafter, the model of the pacemaker is constructed based on
the PTA of the sub-components. This model is verified against a set of functional
properties to ensure its correctness.
Phase 2: Soft-fault impact analysis: this phase operates over the model
built and verified in phase 1. Based on the pacemaker behavior, different possible
SF injection scenarios are identified. In order to analyze the impact of each SF, for
each scenario, the models of the pacemaker’s sub-components and of the heart were
modified to build the required fault propagation environment. The observed results
are characterized and compared with the reported results from the dynamic radiation
ground testing and/or Clinical observations.
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10.1.4 Behavior of the DDD Pacemaker
The DDD pacemaker consists of five main components, defined as event-triggered
timing cycles. The timing cycles communicate with each other through broadcasting
channels, shared variables and events. In order to provide optimal hemodynamic
benefit to the patient, dual-chamber pacemakers strive to mimic the normal heart
rhythm. This pacemaker acts on demand, taking appropriate actions in reaction to
what is happening inside the person’s heart, at any given time. Following, we explain
the behavior of the main components of the DDD pacemaker. In this pacemaker, the
Lower Rate Interval (LRI) is the rate at which the pacemaker will pace the atrium
in the absence of intrinsic atrial activity. Similar to single-chamber timing, the lower
rate can be converted to a lower rate interval or the longest period of time allowed
between atrial events. The LRI component is responsible for measuring the heartbeat
rate and keeping it above a defined minimum value. The PTA of the LRI component
is shown in Fig. 50(A). According to this figure, the LRI component monitors the
ventricular sensing, ventricular pacing, and atrial sensing events. The clock of the
component is reset after a ventricular event is sensed. If no atrial event is sensed
within a certain amount of time, the LRI component triggers an atrial pacing (after




















































B) TA of the AVI ComponentA) TA of the LRI Component C) TA of the URI Component
D) TA of the VRP Component E) TA of the PVARP Component
Figure 50: TAs of the Components of the DDD Pacemaker
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The time that a DDD pacemaker is required to wait between a sensed or paced
atrial event and a ventricular event is called the Atrio-Ventricular Interval (AVI).
This behavior is implemented by the AVI component. Fig. 50(B) depicts the PTA
of the expected behavior of the AVI component. As shown in this figure, the AVI
component sets the longest interval between an atrial and a ventricular event. After
the occurrence of an atrial event, if no ventricular event is sensed within a certain
time (TAV I), a ventricular pacing is performed. Correlatively, the Upper Rate Interval
(URI) is defined as the upper activity rate i.e., the minimum time delay between
consecutive sensor-indicated ventricle events. The URI component implements this
behavior and its PTA is shown in Fig. 50(C).
The Post-Ventricular Atrial Refractory Period (PVARP) is the period of time
after a ventricular pace or sense, when the atrial channel is in a refractory state. In
other words, the occurrence of atrial senses during this period is identified by the
pacemaker but do not initiate the A-V interval (AR). This behavior is implemented
by the PVARP component, with its PTA depicted in Fig. 50(E). The purpose of
the PVARP component is to avoid premature atrial contractions. This inhibits the
beginning of an irregular A-V interval, which would cause the pacemaker to pace
at a higher than desired rate. Similarly, the Ventricular Refractory Period (VRP) is
designed to avoid restarting the V-A interval due to a noise wave. This behavior is
performed by the VRP component. Fig. 50(D) depicts the PTA of this functionality.
As shown in Fig. 50, ventricular sensed events, occurring in the noise sampling
portion of the ventricular refractory period, are identified but will not restart the
V-A interval.
10.1.5 PTA Modeling & Functional Analysis of Pacemaker
In subection 10.1.4, the main components of the DDD pacemaker (LRI, AVI, PVARP,
and VRP) are described as PTAs. As explained before, the functionality of each of
these components is mainly controlled by the tight synchronization with the other
components. In these PTA, the behavior of the real-time system is controlled through
a finite set of clocks χ. The values of these clocks range over the domain R≥0 (i.e.,
non-negative real numbers). A function ν : χ → R≥0 is referred to as a clock valua-
tion. The set of all clock valuations is denoted by Rχ≥0. For any ν ∈ Rχ≥0, t ∈ R≥0,
and X ⊆ χ, we use ν + t to denote the clock valuation which increments all clock
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Table 17: Results of the verification of the functional properties of the pacemaker
Verified Property Testing Result
Component Time
AVI AVI.1 Pmax =? [F (V P = 1)&(V S = 0)] ≥ TAV I Pass
AVI.2 Pmax =? [F (V P = 1)] ≥ TURI Pass
AVI.3 Pmax =? [F (V P = 1)] < TURI Pass
AVI.4 Pmax =? [F (V P = 1)] < TAV I Pass
AVI.5 Pmax =? [F (V S = 1)&(V P = 0)] ≤ TAV I Pass
AVI.6 Pmax =? [F (V S = 0)&(V P = 1)] ≥ TAV I Pass
LRI LRI.1 Pmax =? [F (AP = 1)] < TLRI − TAV I Pass
LRI.2 Pmax =? [F (AS = 0)&(AP = 1)] ≥ TLRI − TAV I Pass
LRI.3 Pmax =? [F (AS = 1)] ≤ TLRI − TAV I Pass
LRI.4 Pmax =? [F (AS = 1)&(AP = 0)] ≤ TLRI − TAV I Pass
LRI.5 Pmax =? [F (AS = 0)&(AP = 1)] ≥ TLRI − TAV I Pass
PVARP PVARP.1 Pmax =? [F (AR = 1)] ≤ TPV ARP Pass
PVARP.2 Pmax =? [F (AS = 0)] ≤ TPV ARP Pass
PVARP.3 Pmax =? [F (AS = 1)] ≥ TPV ARP Pass
VRP VRP.1 Pmax =? [F (V RP = 1)&(V S2 = 1)] ≤ TV RP Pass
VRP.2 Pmax =? [F (V RP = 1)&(V P2 = 1)] ≤ TV RP Pass
VRP.3 Pmax =? [F (V RP = 0)&(Idle3 = 1)] ≥ TV RP Pass
values in ν by t, such that ν(X) + t. We use ν[X := 0] for the clock valuation in
which clocks in X are reset to 0. The set of clock constrains over χ, denoted ζ(X) is
defined inductively by the syntax:
ζ ::= true|x ≤ d|c ≤ x|x+ c ≤ y + d|¬ζ|ζ ∧ ζ
where x, y ∈ χ and c, d ∈ N. The clock valuation ν satisfies the clock constraint
ζ(X), denoted by ν |= ζ, if and only if X resolves to true after substituting each clock
X ∈ χ with the corresponding clock value ν(X).
Definition 2. A probabilistic timed automaton is defined by a tuple A = (L,L0, χ, Act, P,L ),
where:
 L is a finite number of states.
 L0 is the initial state.

χ is a finite set of clocks.
 Act is a finite set of actions over L.
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 inv: L→ ζ(X) is an invariant condition.
 P is a probabilistic transition function L× ζ(X)×Dist(2X × L).
 L : L → 2AP is a labelling function assigning atomic propositions to different
states.
In a PTA, a state (l, ν) ∈ L× Rχ≥0 such that ν |= inv(l). In any state (l, ν), there is
a non-deterministic choice of either making a discrete transition or letting time pass.
A discrete transition can be made according to any (l, g, p) ∈ P , with current state l
being enabled and zone g is satisfied by the current clock valuation ν. The probability
of moving to location l′ and resetting all clocks in X to 0 is given by p(X, l′). The
option of letting time pass is available only if the invariant condition inv(l) is satisfied
while time elapses.
The PTA for each component is represented as a separate PRISM module. In
order to accurately construct a system-level model of the pacemaker, the parallel
composition of the PTAs of the subcomponents is required. The proposed method-
ology introduces the soft-fault (SF) injection module. This module is responsible
for injecting, tracking, and synchronizing SFs across all other components, during
the analysis when a fault is injected. Furthermore, the addition of the SF injection
module requires significant alterations to all other modules of the pacemaker. The
main challenge is to ensure that these additions and new components do not impact
the core functionality of the pacemaker device, as stated in its specifications. There-
fore, the proposed PTA model is verified against a catalog of functional Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic (PCTL [27]) properties obtained from an extensive review of
the literature. The verified set of properties are shown in Table 17. These properties
were asserted using the probabilistic model checker Storm, which provides a unique
trade-off between performance and modularity, the supported solvers, and a wide
range of supported modeling languages. These properties are defined based on the
timing requirements of the pacemaker to verify: (i) whether the pacemaker rectifies
any abnormal heart behavior by providing necessary pacing, and (ii) that the pace-
maker does not induce anomalous heart behaviors by providing unnecessary pacing
to the heart. We confirmed that the verified properties exhaustively verify the be-
havior of the pacemaker with existing analysis such as [123], [76], [38]. This analysis
proves that our model correctly implements the functionality of the pacemaker. It
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is important to note that, in this analysis, no faults were injected through the fault
injection component. As shown in Table 17, for each component, a set of properties
are verified to validate its timing requirements. The timing under which the property
is verified is shown in the fourth column. The verified properties in Table 17 are the
following:
 AVI.1: A ventricular pacing can only happen if no ventricular event is sensed
within TAVI.
 AVI.2: A ventricular pacing can only happen at a time which is equal or greater
than TURI.
 AVI.3: There is no reachable state where a ventricular pacing happens before
the TURI time finished.
 AVI.4: There is no reachable state where a ventricular pacing happens before
the TAVI time interval finishes.
 AVI.5: If a ventricular sensing happens, a ventricular pacing will not occur.
 AVI.6: If no ventricular sensing is detected within the expected time, a ven-
tricular pacing will occur.
 LRI.1: An atrial pacing event will never take place while test before the TLRI-
TAVI time interval finishes.
 LRI.2: If an atrial sensing is not detected within the time limit, an atrial pacing
will take place.
 LRI.3: An atrial sensing may happen if test time is less or equal to TLRI-TAVI.
 LRI.4: If an atrial sensing happens, an atrial pacing will not take place.
 LRI.5: If an atrial sensing does not happen within the expected time, an atrial
pacing will take place.
 PVARP.1: An atrial event happening during the time frame t ≤ TPVARP
will be considered as an AR.
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Figure 51: Proposed Formal Analysis of Soft-Faults Propagation
 PVARP.3: An atrial sensing may only happen when the time is greater than
TPVARP.
 VRP.1: A ventricular sensing will not happen if time is lesser than TVRP.
 VRP.2: A ventricular pacing will not happen if time is lesser than TVRP.
 VRP.3: Component VRP will stop filtering ventricular signals when the time
is greater than TVRP.
10.1.6 Non-functional Analysis of the Pacemaker Vulnerabil-
ity to Soft-Faults
In this subsection, we present a system-level injection and analysis mechanism repli-
cating the effects of soft-faults on the behavior of the pacemaker during the A-V cycle.
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A new formal analysis is proposed to model and analyze each of the SF scenarios, as
well as to provide new insights on the affected component, injection time, and the
impact on the pacemaker behavior. The main components of the proposed analysis
are shown in Fig. 51. In this analysis, the pacemaker model proposed in subection
10.1.5 is extended to incorporate the impact of SFs.
Soft-Fault Classification
One of the main objectives of this work is to propose a vulnerability analysis of the
DDD pacemaker to temporal faults at the system-level. At such high level, most of the
details of the system’s hardware implementation are abstracted and not yet available.
Consequently, details of the sources of the vulnerability and their characteristics are
not defined. In order to address these issues when modeling and analyzing temporal
faults, soft-faults were introduced. A soft-fault is an abstract high-level view of any
single temporal fault that can impact the pacemaker behavior for one cardiac cycle
or more. Based on our review of the literature, soft-faults in pacemakers are mainly
induced by ionizing radiation, which can be classified into two categories: 1) Total
Ionizing Dose Effects (TIDs); and 2) Single-Event Effects (SEEs) [148], [150]. TIDs
occur due to the charge accumulation in the oxide layers of the device. The oxide
layers suffer from degradation if the radiation exposure is above a certain threshold
(normally between 10-50 Gy (Gray units)). These levels of exposure are common
in medical treatments such as radiotherapy, x-rays, and fluoroscopy. It is reported
in several papers (e.g., in [148], [150]) that Implantable Cardiac Devices (ICDs) be-
come increasingly sensitive to temporal errors over time (i.e., soft-faults). On the
other hand, SEEs occur due to exposure to high concentrations of high Linear En-
ergy Transfer (LET) particles, depositing sufficient charge to disturb normal circuit
operation. Unlike total dose effects, single-event effects are ubiquitous. Thus, their
significance to device reliability is of greater importance. Recent ground radiation ex-
periments and clinical observations show that the most relevant sources of soft-faults
are Single-Event Upsets (SEUs), usually originating from cosmic radiation, electro-
magnetic interference, or radiotherapy. Other types of single-effects are reported in
the literature to have a negligible probability of occurrence [148], [150].
In the proposed modeling and analysis, soft-faults are introduced into the pace-
maker model by adding two input nodes to the pacemaker model, namely AS SF and
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VS SF. These inputs carry the SF signal i.e., it is possible to distinguish between the
native (AS and VS ) and faulty (AS SF and VS SF ) events. AS SF indicates the
presence of an SF at the atrial input node of the pacemaker. VS SF indicates the
presence of an SF at the ventricular input node of the pacemaker. In our model, the
pacemaker reacts to AS SF and VS SF as it reacts to AS and VS, respectively. As
explained before, all the components of the pacemaker are synchronized based on the
timing requirements of the pacemaker. It is important to note that in this analy-
sis, it is assumed that the SFs are initiated outside the pacemaker. In other words,
SFs are propagating through the main inputs (AS, VS ). This can be justified due to
the unavailability of a physical implementation of the pacemaker in this system-level
analysis.
Formal Modeling and Analysis of Soft-Faults
In order to investigate the SF propagation, we extended the models of each compo-
nent to include stochastic transitions representing SF propagation. This is achieved
through the SF Injection Element (SIE), which interrupts the communication be-
tween the pacemaker and the heart. The SIE component tracks and processes the
native AS and VS signals based on the desired injection scenario. Another purpose
of the SIE component is to generate either AS SF and V S SF to derive the desired
injection scenarios, as shown in Fig. 51. However, our focus is the analysis of the
pacemaker model. Thus, an abstract model of the heart is used to cover only the
desired behaviors. Our heart model is based on a simple synchronous communication
protocol. The model is pre-programmed to release signals after a certain amount of
time has passed, and to verify if the correct signals were received within a pre-defined
threshold. For each scenario in our analysis, the models of the heart and of the SIE
are slightly tweaked to produce the desired inputs for the pacemaker. For example,
to produce the desired inputs for Sce.1, the heart model is assumed to function nor-
mally (cyclic generation of AS and VS signals). However, the SIE is programmed to
eventually inject an AS SF signal in the pacemaker. This injection happens after the
native VS event, but prior to the next native AS event. Other scenarios may require
different setup, such as Sce.4. In this scenario, the heart model is assumed to fail to
produce an AS event, after a few cycles. When this happens, the SIE immediately
injects an AS SF signal in the pacemaker. Modifying the heart and SF models in
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Table 18: Results of the verification of the non-functional properties related to the
impact of SFs on the pacemaker
Scenario Injection Time Previous Events Verification Time Verified PCTL Property Result Situation illustrated
in figure
Sce.1 Tinj < TPV AB VS=1
Tver > Tinj Pmax=? [F (AS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 6
Tver > TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AS=1)] 1
Sce.2 Tinj > TPV AB VS=1
Tver < TPV ARP Pmax=? [F (AS SF=1) ] 1
Fig. 7Tver < TPV ARP Pmax=? [F (AR=1)] 1
Tver > TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AS=1)] 1
Sce.3 Tinj < TURI VS=1
Tver < Tinj Pmax=? [F (VS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 8Tver > TURI Pmax=? [F (VS=1)] 1
Tver < TURI Pmax=? [F (AS=1)] 1
Sce.4 Tinj < TV RP VP/VS=1
Tver < Tinj Pmax=? [F (VS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 9
Tver > TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AS=1)] 1
Sce.5 Tinj > TPV ARP VS=1
Tver > Tinj Pmax=? [F (AS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 10Tver <= TAV I Pmax=? [F (VS=1)] 0
Tver >= TAV I Pmax=? [F (VP=1)] 1
Sce.6 Tinj < TAV I AS=1
Tver < TAV I Pmax=? [F (VS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 11Tver <= TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AS=1)] 0
Tver >= TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AP=1)] 1
Sce.7
TPV ARP < Tinj
VS=1
Tver >= Tinj Pmax=? [F (AS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 12< TLRI − TAV I
Tver <= TLRI − TAV I Pmax=? [F (AP=1)] 0
Sce.8 Tinj <= TAV I AS=1
Tver >= Tinj Pmax=? [F (VS SF=1)] 1
Fig. 13
Tver >= TAV I Pmax=? [F (VP=1)] 0
this way greatly facilitates the conduct of the experiments.
The modeling is done by generating the PTA of each component presented in
subection 10.1.5. Each PTA is then represented as an individual PRISM module.
For the purpose of our experiments, the pacemaker model is synchronized to a very
simplistic heart model. Our heart model is a two-steps process that will generate one
of two signals at different time delays. These time delays are defined based on the
A-V cycle time delays used in [2]. The PTA of the system is obtained by the parallel
composition of all PTAs of all the components of the pacemaker and the heart.
Table 18 shows the library of properties used to verify the different SF injection
scenarios in different components. The second column depicts the time at which the
SF is injected. The previous conditions under which the SF is injected are specified
in the third column. These conditions indicate which component in the pacemaker is
active and the next expected action. The fourth column shows the time in which the
pacemaker model is verified against the desired properties. The properties verified
in each injection scenario are reported in the fifth column. The sixth column shows
the maximum probability of the verified event occurring, ranging from 0 to 1 (where
1 means 100% probability). The corresponding timing diagram of each scenario is
shown in the last column of the table.
Fig. 52 illustrates an abstract view of the different SFs injection scenarios analyzed
in this work. In each sub-figure, the default state is represented by two concentric
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(A) AVI Component Subjected to SFs (B) PVARP Component Subjected to SFs
(C) VRP Component Subjected to SFs

















































































































Figure 52: Effects of SFs on the Pacemaker Components
circles. The red arrows entering the components show the SF injection states in
the system. Finally, the red states and transitions show which subcomponents are
impacted by the SF injection. Fig. 52(A) depicts the scenario where an SF may be
injected while the AVI component operates in the AVI state. The effects of such
SFs are verified as shown in Table 18 (identified as Sce.6 and Sce.8 ). Such SF may
be interpreted by the system as a native VS signal. In other words, the component
may erroneously identify the SF as a native ventricular activity. This event causes
the state of the component to change to idle. However, this SF can have different
effects on the behavior of the pacemaker, which are detailed in subection 10.1.7. In
the case of Sce.6, after the pacemaker senses an AS from the heart, the SIE injects
an SF at a random time before TAVI. In this scenario, we verified three properties.
With the first property, we verify that the injected SF is eventually received by
the pacemaker and recognized as a native VS. The second property verifies that
after the SF is received, the pacemaker resets its clock and waits for a time interval
TLRI − TAV I, but no AS is sensed within that time interval. The third property
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verifies that the pacemaker erroneously releases an atrial pacing (i.e., wrong atrial
pacing due to oversensing). Similarly, in Sce.8 the SIE injects an SF at a random
time before TAVI, once the pacemaker senses an AS. In this scenario, we first verify
that the injected SF is received by the pacemaker and recognized as a native VS. The
second property verifies that after the SF is received, the pacemaker does not release
the required ventricular pacing.
Another possible scenario that was analyzed is the injection of an SF in the AVI
component at the ventricular input (VS SF) after a native VS is sensed (i.e., during
TURI). In this case, the AVI component operates in WaitURI state. This is shown
in Table 18 and Fig. 52(A) as Sce.3. The pacemaker model is verified against three
properties. With the first property, we verify that the incidence of SF is perceived
by the pacemaker during time interval TURI. The second property is designed to
verify that the next ventricular event is only received after time interval TURI. With
the last property, we verify that the next atrial event (AS) is sensed within the time
interval TURI after the native VS.
The PTA in Fig. 52(B) shows the two effects that SFs may produce on component
PVARP, identified by Sce.1, and Sce.2. In Sce.1, after the pacemaker senses a native
VS, the SIE randomly injects an SF at the atrial input (AS SF) during the time
interval TPVAB (while the PVARP component at state PVAB). The injection of
this SF is shown in Table 18. First, we verify that the injected SF is received by
the pacemaker at the specified time. The second property allows us to verify that
this SF has no impact on the system. This is done by checking that the next atrial
event is correctly sensed by the pacemaker (i.e., no change in the A-V timings).
In Sce.2, the SIE injects the SF at AS SF2 after VS is sensed (i.e., during time
interval TPV AB < T < TPV ARP ). The first two properties check if the injected
SF is received by the pacemaker and characterized as a native AR event. The last
property is used to verify that this SF does not affect the timing of the pacemaker.
This is achieved by ensuring that the next AS event occurs within the time period
TLRI − TAV I as expected. Fig. 52(C) shows the effect of injecting an SF at the
VRP component. In this scenario (Sce.4), after a native VS or VP event, the SIE
injects an SF at a random time within the time interval TVRP. In order to verify
this scenario, the first property is used to check that the injected SF is received by
the pacemaker at the specified time. The second property verifies that the SF is
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completely masked by validating that the next AS is sensed within the TLRI-TAVI.
Finally, the PTA in Fig. 52(D) shows the scenarios where an SF is injected at the
LRI component, represented by Sce.5 and Sce.7. In Sce.5, after a VS is sensed, the
SIE randomly injects an SF at AS SF within the time interval TV ARP < Tinj <
TLRI − TAV I. By verifying the properties for this scenario as shown in Table 18,
we observed that this SF can be sensed by the pacemaker as a native AS. Next, we
verify that the pacemaker component resets its internal clock and proceeds to wait for
the VS signal, (i.e., the pacemaker has erroneously transitioned to the ASed state),
breaking the A-V cycle synchronization. As shown in the result of the verification of
the second property of scenario Sce.5, the occurrence of the SF causes the pacemaker
to ignore the VS signal. In the last property, we verify that the pacemaker eventually
applies an erroneous VP on the heart. In Sce.7, after a VS is sensed, the SIE randomly
injects an SF at AS SF. Similarly to Sce.5, this SF is injected within the time interval
TV ARP < Tinj < TLRI−TAV I. However, this SF has a different impact, which is
verified as shown in Table 18. The first property confirms that this SF has been sensed
as a native AS. The second property validates that such SF prevents the pacemaker
from releasing the required AP.
10.1.7 New Insights on Possible Pacemaker Malfunctions In-
duced by Soft-Faults
In the previous sections, we introduced a system-level analysis approach designed to
provide a high-level view of several possible scenarios that may lead to pacemaker
malfunctions. Each of these high-level scenarios can be mapped to different occur-
rences of low-level faults. In this subsection, based on the results of the analysis
introduced in subection 10.1.6, and on the behavior of the pacemaker explained in
subection 10.1.4, the observed pacemaker malfunctions are mapped to physical-level
analysis results reported in the literature. These reports may originate from sev-
eral different sources of errors at lower-level such as SEUs and Multiple-Bit Upsets
(MBUs). Based on these reports and on our analysis results, different Windows Of
Vulnerabilities (WOVs) are investigated. A WOV is defined as the time interval in
which an SF at one component can impair the behavior of the pacemaker. For each
WOV in the cardiac cycle, if the SF results in an observed soft-error, then we identify
its impact on the cardiac cycle where it is injected and in the future cycles. For all
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these scenarios, the results of our analysis are characterized. Furthermore, we have
researched the literature to identify if the observed behaviors are reported in clinical
observations and/or as results of dynamic radiation ground testing of pacemakers. In
the next subsections, we explain all the SFs injection scenarios, which are classified
into a given subsection based on their eventual impacts. Following are some general
considerations pertaining to all scenarios:
 The impact of each SF scenario (Fig. 53 to 60) is demonstrated for two cardiac
cycles, as seen from the pacemaker.
 Native heart events (atrial sensing (AS) and ventricular sensing (VS)) are identi-
fied in the figures by solid black pulses, where the peaks represent atrial activity
and the valleys represent ventricular activity.
 Dotted pulses represent missing or masked cardiac events or pacing events.
 Red pulses represent either SF-induced events or pacing events (atrial pacing
(AP) or ventricular pacing (VP)) which are results of the injected SF.
 The “Without SF” timeline shows the expected natural progression of the car-
diac cycles in the pacemaker.
 The “With SF” timeline shows the progression of the cardiac cycles in the
pacemaker side after the SF has affected the system.
SF-Induced Pacemaker Oversensing
Oversensing is a phenomenon in which the pacemaker inappropriately recognizes ex-
ternal electrical signals and noise as native cardiac activity, and pacing is inhibited.
Normally, the main sources of oversensing are large P or T waves, skeletal muscle ac-
tivity, and lead contact problems. Moreover, it is reported in [140] that most common
sources of electromagnetic interference (such as cellular phones) may cause pacemaker
oversensing. SF-induced oversensing may lead to a disruption in the pacemaker cycle,
causing undesired behavior. Through clinical tests, Hurkmans et al. [73] has reported
that ionizing radiation can cause different functional inconsistencies due to sensing
interference in implantable cardiac pacemakers, even leading to complete loss of func-
tion in some cases. We were able to identify the following SFs scenarios which can
lead to oversensing, based on commonly adopted pacing modes, described in [115]:
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1) SF at Aget during TPVAB: As explained in subection 10.1.4, the PVARP
component operates in the refractory period TPVAB to prevent the recognition of
electrical signals (generated from P or T waves, skeletal muscle activity or lead contact
problems) as a native cardiac activity. Additionally, an SF which is injected at input
node Aget at time that is less than TPVAB is also considered as refractory noise.
Therefore, the impact of the oversensing of such SF will be natively masked, as
shown in Fig. 53.














Figure 53: Timing Diagram of SF at Aget During TPVAB
2) SF at Aget before TVARP: An oversenseing can happen in the second refrac-
tory period of the PVARP component. However, this SF will be masked if it arrives
before TPVAB interval at the PVARP component. Another oversensing scenario that
was considered happens if the input node Aget is affected by an SF during the period
of time after TPVAB but before TVARP (i.e., TAV I < T < (TLRI − TAV I)). As
shown in Fig. 54, this SF will be characterized as an Aget event which is then fed
to the pacemaker as an AR event. In this case, the SF does not directly impact the
pacemaker behavior, but it can impact the efficiency of the diagnosis algorithms.
3) SF at Vget during TURI and TVRP: Fig. 55 shows a scenario where multiple
SFs occur during time interval T < TURI. In this scenario, we assume that all the
SFs induce ventricular sensing signals in the system. Since the URI component limits
the ventricular pacing rate in the system, all ventricular oversensing induced by SFs
during TURI are masked by the pacemaker. Therefore, such SFs do not have any
impact on the pacemaker behavior. Similarly, Fig. 56 shows a scenario where multiple


















Figure 54: Timing Diagram of an SF at Aget During TPVARP














Figure 55: Timing Diagram of the Impact of SF During TURI
4) SF at Aget after TVARP: Another possible oversensing scenario is when an SF
is injected at input node Aget at a time after TVARP. This SF can have an impact
on the pacemaker behavior. This SF will be characterized as an actual AS event.
As shown in Fig. 57, once this SF is characterized as an AS, then the pacemaker
resets the clock and starts waiting for a VS, for a time interval of TAVI. This SF
will have two implications: 1) it can mask the actual AS that is released from the
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Figure 56: Timing Diagram of the Impact of SF During TVRP
heart during TAVI. Shortly after this SF, the real atrial event occurs but it will be
filtered because the pacemaker is expecting a ventricular event after T=TAVI ; and 2)
it will impact the behavior of the pacemaker for the next A-V cycles. This happens
after the pacemaker waits for the time TAVI without the heart releasing the VS.
Therefore, the pacemaker will have to release a ventricular pacing (VP). This pacing
is not required in the normal operation and will affect the cardiac cycle and may lead
to an arrhythmia, among other issues.














Figure 57: Timing Diagram of SF-Induced Oversensing
5) SF at Vget within TAVI: Fig. 58 depicts a possible SF injection scenario
that can lead to oversensing at the input node Vget within TAVI. In this scenario,
after an atrial sensing or pacing event, the pacemaker is affected by an SF which is
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interpreted as a ventricular sensing before the real ventricular events happen in the
heart. After the time period T = TLRI − TAV I, the pacemaker will be expecting
to sense an atrial event. The absence of the atrial sensing, due to the fact that the
system’s clock is ahead of time, will cause the pacemaker to perform an erroneous
atrial pacing, followed by another ventricular pacing as shown in Fig. 58.











Figure 58: Timing Diagram of SF-Induced Oversensing
SF-Induced Pacemaker Undersensing
Undersensing is the failure to sense, and it occurs when the pacemaker fails to rec-
ognize spontaneous myocardial depolarization. In other words, the pacemaker fails
to sense native cardiac activity. One possible scenario of an SF-induced undersens-
ing is shown in Fig. 59. In this scenario, an SF is injected during time interval
TPV ARP < T < (TLRI − TAV I). This SF is interpreted by the pacemaker as an
atrial sensing. However, in this scenario, the SF occurrence causes the atrial activity
to pass undetected. The issue is further aggravated since the pacemaker registers
this SF as a AS signal and starts waiting for the ventricular event at the VS signal.
After the time period TAVI, a ventricular pacing is erroneously applied. Therefore,
the pacemaker sends an inappropriate pacing pulse to the heart. Clinically, this is
normally recognized by the generation of unnecessary pacing signals and can lead to
skipped beats or palpitations, among other cardiac issues [140]. Several malfunctions
related to pacemaker sensing are described in [107].
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Figure 59: SF-Induced Undersensing
SF-Induced Output Failure
Output failure of a pacemaker occurs when an expected pacing stimulus is not gen-
erated. In the literature, multiple causes of output failure are identified including
oversensing (subsection 10.1.7), pacemaker runaway, lead displacement, and electri-
cal interference. In Fig. 60, we construct a scenario where the incidence of an SF
produces an electrical signal that is interpreted by the pacemaker as an early ventricu-
lar sensing. These effects have been reported by different researchers in the literature,
in works such as [73] and [115]. Output failure due to an ionizing radiation is a major
concern, especially in devices with low battery charge (e.g. low battery voltage due
to overdue pacemaker replacement [107]). An example of this phenomenon is shown
in Fig. 60. In this example, the injected soft-fault will prevent the pacemaker from
generating the necessary ventricular pacing. Furthermore, this SF will impact the
pacemaker behavior in the next cycles. For instance, the pacemaker will be expecting
an atrial event after time TLRI-TAVI and the pacemaker performs an atrial pacing
on the heart when the AS is not sensed. Thus, the pacemaker will apply the pacing
to the wrong heart chamber.
10.1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new methodology for quantitative and automated verifi-
cation of the impact of SFs on the behavior of the DDD pacemaker at the system-level.
The correctness of PTA implementation is proven through model checking of a set of
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Figure 60: Output Failure due to Missed Ventricular Pacing
PCTL properties, defined based on the specifications and in agreement with the liter-
ature. We introduced a new approach to inject soft faults at certain time windows in
the pacemaker model and construct an extended PTA model of the SF propagation.
The proposed modeling and analysis were performed using the Storm probabilistic
model checker. New insights on the SEU-induced malfunctions of pacemakers, such
as oversensing, undersensing, and output failure are provided. The results of this
analysis can be very useful towards improving the tolerance of the DDD pacemaker
to soft-faults, by providing the necessary insight to help mitigating detected malfunc-
tions.
10.2 System-Level Characterization, CTMDP Mod-
eling, and Analysis of Computing Systems
Reliability Applied to the LEON3 Processor
Authors: Ghaith Bany Hamad, Marwan Ammar, Otmane Ait Mohamed, Yvon
Savaria
Abstract: Reliability analysis of application failures due to soft errors has become
a significant concern for designers of embedded systems. The probability of these
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application failures due to soft errors in microprocessors is directly related to the
fault propagation path and its lifetime in the internal registers and memories. Using
fault injection to evaluate the robustness of a given application program is very time-
consuming, even when emulation is used, as several executions of the application are
required. To improve productivity and decrease costs, the application vulnerability
should be evaluated as early as possible in the development cycle. Moreover, the
analysis time should be kept at the minimum. This paper presents new advances in
the reliability assessment of computing systems, by introducing a new technique that
addresses the combination of both software and the target hardware. To achieve this
goal, we introduce a Continuous-Time Markov Decision Process (CTMDP) model-
ing, analysis, and estimation of the LEON3 processor’s vulnerability to Single Event
Upsets (SEUs). At the system level, the proposed technique provides new insights
into SEU propagation probabilities and latency. The results of the instruction based
analysis are then utilized to better estimate the application vulnerability. With the
proposed technique system-level insights are obtained into the application criticality
presented by fault lifetime and probability. Results demonstrate that the proposed
approach is able to quantify the fault propagation latency and to characterize the crit-
icality of each of the internal registers in different applications. The results also show
that the proposed approach offers a speed-up of up to 19 times over comparable tech-
niques and is up to 1042 times faster than the best reported fault injection techniques.
10.2.1 Introduction
The progressive shrinking of devices in advanced processing technologies has made re-
liability one of the major concerns in the design of embedded systems [98]. Hardware
systems can be affected by faults caused by physical manufacturing defects, envi-
ronmental disturbances (e.g., radiations and electromagnetic interference), or aging-
related phenomena. Soft-errors, induced by transient errors, are a growing issue,
which degrades the reliability of embedded systems. These transient errors, such as
Single Event Upsets (SEUs), can lead to undesirable changes in the state of one or
more memory elements, which can propagate in the system causing soft-errors. When
a soft-error reaches the software layer of the system, it can corrupt data, instructions
or the control flow [105]. These errors may hinder system reliability by changing
153
the correct software execution or prevent the execution of an application leading to
abnormal termination or application hang. Therefore, the behavior of a system in
the p]resence of SEUs needs to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover, it is crucial
to identify as early as possible the application criticality due to low-level hardware
errors. The focus of this work is to investigate the vulnerability of safety-critical
applications to faults affecting vulnerable components in microprocessors.
In the literature, there exist different methods to evaluate the reliability of complex
systems such as the LEON3 processor, which has been widely used in automotive,
multimedia systems (such as mobile phones and wireless), and other low-end and
high-end applications [62]. At post-silicon stage, the reliability analysis of this system
is done through dynamic radiation ground testing [133], [26]. In this approach, the
target hardware is built and then it is exposed to different radiation fluxes based
on the target analysis and system hardware. Thereafter, the number of soft-errors
is counted to estimate the dynamic cross section (σ), which refers to the number of
errors that occur in an area of a processor which executing an active load over time.
Static cross section refers to the number of errors that occur in an area of an in active
processor.
This approach was tested on different implementations of the LEON3 processor.
For instance, in [94], different experiments were performed on a LEON3 processor
to evaluate the σ under different setups, such as radiating different components of
LEON3 to determine which functionality has most upsets and which would require the
most mitigation in a radiation environment. The main problem with this approach is
that it is very expensive and time-consuming. This is mainly because it requires the
system to be fully fabricated, and hence any change in the application or hardware
will require a new full radiation testing to get accurate failure rate results.
In order to reduce the time and cost associated with dynamic radiation ground
testing and provide a high-level estimation vulnerability to soft-errors of some system,
different simulation and emulation fault injection methods have been proposed. These
methods provide better controllability and observability than radiation testing since
the user has access to the entirety of the system (injection site) and possible injection
timing. In emulation fault injection, specific hardware can be built to inject these
faults. For example, in [55], the direct memory access SEU emulation component
selects the time and the bit to be altered in memory. The testing of LEON3 through
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fault injection has been introduced in several works [44], [67], and [69]. Different
FPGA-based frameworks are proposed in [69], to analyze the impact of SEUs on
LEON3 and the expected time to recover. In [44], a platform with fault injection
capability named LEON3 ViP is proposed. In these techniques, different faults are
injected in the desired state elements of the LEON3 architecture, described in the
HDL language. Then, the effects of these transient faults are observed by monitoring
the system or comparing its outputs with a golden version of the system. However,
emulation and simulation require a large amount of time to simulate or to emulate
a scenario of thousands of injected faults [17]. In order to reduce the simulation
time, the system is usually tested over a subset of test vectors, which reduces the
results accuracy. Furthermore, these techniques require low-level implementation of
the system (RTL implementation and lower). Recently, new techniques, such as [40],
[105], have been introduced to analyze the expected fault lifetime in applications
executed on the LEON3. These techniques succeed in reducing the analysis time
over fault injection. However, along with the fault lifetime, the criticality of a fault
is directly related to its propagation paths and probabilities in the application trace
and in the hardware components.
Recently, formal methods have been adapted to model and analyze the impact
of SEUs at the system level. Such high-level analysis provides new insights into
the system reliability at an early stage of the design cycle. For example, in [11],
a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) model was proposed to compute fault
propagation probabilities in a self-repairable system consisting of a small pipeline
processor. This model targeted the analysis of SEUs in a three-stage pipelined unit.
We present two techniques based on fault propagation probabilities and lifetime
analysis targeting both hardware and software levels of abstraction:
 The first technique (represented by Phase 1 in the methodology) investigates
faults affecting the internal pipeline registers of the LEON3 processor. This
technique starts with hardware characterization to identify all the registers in-
volved in the computation of each type of instruction. A probabilistic model
of SEUs propagation probability and lifetime from each vulnerable site in the
microarchitecture pipeline to the output of the instruction is proposed. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time such CTMDP models are proposed.
Based on the instruction models, the vulnerability of each type of instructions
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is evaluated. This analysis identifies at what cycle instruction related informa-
tion is stored in a given register, and is, therefore, able to identify the most
critical registers. A new probabilistic model of SEU propagation through the
LEON3 architecture is proposed. For each instruction, the propagation of SEUs
is modeled as a Continuous-Time Markov Decision Process (CTMDP) based on
the hardware microarchitecture of the LEON3. The proposed CTMDP models
extend the work done in [57], [22], [9]. A library of CTMDP models for each
instruction type in LEON3 is constructed. Based on these models, a full estima-
tion of the fault propagation probabilities and latency through each instruction
is computed.
 The second technique (represented by Phase 2 in the methodology) investigates
the lifetime of the variables of the program running on a LEON3 processor. A
CTMDP model of the fault propagation through a sequence of instructions
based on an application trace is proposed. This model is used to evaluate
system reliability through a probabilistic approach, without the necessity of
extensive fault injections. Thus, the proposed technique allows the analysis of
fault propagation probabilities at the application level. This analysis provides
new insights into fault lifetime expectancy.
The combination of these two techniques yields a powerful proposed system-level
methodology, which is fully automated using the LLVM compiler, scripting, and Prob-
abilistic Model Checking (PMC). The proposed methodology was validated on differ-
ent case studies and for different workloads. The obtained results demonstrate that
there can be a significant variance in the fault latency, register criticality and lifetime,
and fault propagation probabilities between different workloads.
10.2.2 Main Steps of the Proposed Framework
The purpose of the proposed methodology is to provide a high-level estimation of the
application vulnerability to SEUs. This vulnerability is estimated by evaluating two
factors: 1) the failure probability due to the injected faults; 2) the fault lifetime. The
main steps of the proposed method are shown in Fig. 61. The analysis is performed
is done in two phases:
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Figure 61: The main steps of the proposed methodology.
 Phase 1: Instruction based characterization, SEUs probabilistic modeling, and
analysis.
 Phase 2: Application based SEUs propagation modeling and analysis.
Phase 1 starts with a high-level representation of the pipeline microarchitecture.
The registers involved in the computation are identified. The instruction type is
found with respect to the opcode. Each instruction type is associated with a model
specifying the registers involved at each stage of the pipeline for a correct execution.
This will be illustrated in subsection 10.2.3. For each cycle and pipeline stage, the
instruction models are used to update a global list of ”live” and ”dead” registers.
Next, a probabilistic model of SEUs propagation from each vulnerable site in the
microarchitecture pipeline to the output of the instruction is proposed. Based on the
instruction models, the vulnerability of each type of instructions is evaluated. This
analysis identifies at what cycle instruction related information is stored in a given
register, and is, therefore, able to identify the most critical registers. The criticality
of a register is computed by summing contributions from all the cycles in which this
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%k = alloca i32
%l = alloca i32
%3 = load i32* %k
%4 = load i32* %l
%5 = sub i32 %3, %4
Store i32 %5, i32* %l
%6 = load i32* %b
%7 = call i32 @printf(i32 %6)
LLVM IR Code
Figure 62: Example of C++ to LLVM Conversion
In Phase 2, the application based vulnerability analysis starts with the source code
in C++. From the C++ code, we use the LLMV compiler framework to generate the
intermediate representation (IR) code of the program. The IR provided by LLMV
is a virtualized instruction-set and its syntax is similar to assembly language. A
simple example of this process can be seen in Fig. 62. We then analyze the LLMV
IR code and extract an execution trace, which includes relevant processes, such as
loading from memory, storing in memory and arithmetic operations. A probabilistic
modeling of the LLMV IR is proposed and automated with the PRISM language
and an in-house developed parser. This model takes into account microarchitecture
behaviors such as fast-forwarding. This model will be analyzed for SEUs propagation
at different variables as shown in Fig. 61. In such system-level analysis, trade-offs
can be made on the modeling of each instruction between accuracy and performance.
The purpose of the application level analysis is to estimate the criticality of different
variables during the program execution. This is achieved by estimating the lifetime
of a fault that is injected in this variable and the propagation probabilities of this
fault, this done through the following methods:
 Lifetime based criticality evaluation: This estimation is obtained by measuring
the average lifetime of the variables (variables that stay alive longer tend to
be more critical). In this work, the lifetime of the variable starts once a value
is written to this variable and stays alive in the system until the last read
operation performed in the injected fault. To achieve that, the application is
first compiled into LLVM IR, however, this representation does not contain the
exact timing information of the execution of each LLVM instruction. Therefore,
we consider that each LLVM IR is executed within one clock cycle. This means
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a counter is used to assign a time for each instruction in the target program
trace. After that, the time at which the target variable is written with the
fault, any time this variable is read, and the time at which this variable is
overwritten are extracted. These times are used to estimate the lifetime of the
target variable by evaluating the times between the write and last read. The
approach of annotating the LLVM IR and the assumption that each instruction
is executed within one clock cycle are adapted from literature as the work done
in [40, 86, 105]. Although this assumption does not reflect reality, as different
instructions have different execution times, it serves as an abstract baseline to
indicate how long a variable stays alive in comparison to other variables.
 Markov reward based criticality estimation: In this method the reward is as-
signed to each variable on this system. If a fault is injected into any of a
variable then its reward is reset, this reward is then incremented at each read
operation(load). At the end of the analysis the reward of all variables will be
evaluated to provide a measure of their criticality.
10.2.3 Instruction Based Characterization, Modeling, and
Analysis
Characterization of Radiation-Induced Soft-Errors
Ionizing radiation may impact the potential on electrical nodes of micro-electronic
devices, causing them to forcefully change states. The amount of ionizing particles
traversing the device’s sensitive area is computed based on the flux intensity of par-
ticles per square centimeter per second. If these transient radiation events transfer
enough energy, then an SEU (i.e., a bit-flip in a memory cell) or a transient fault in the
combinational circuitry of the device may be generated. At this stage, the SEU may
propagate through different states but does not necessarily generate a system failure.
In fact, most generated SEUs will be masked by different masking mechanisms. These
masking mechanisms are related to SEU propagation path, system current state, and
fault characteristics (e.g., injection time, site). Thus, only a subset of the faults intro-
duced in a system will result in errors. A percentage of these errors can be detected
by the system within a certain time limit, which is defined as the system’s coverage
factor. In this work, in order to accurately estimate the SEU vulnerability of different
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variables in an application, details of the microarchitecture specification, technology
node and SEU behavior are taken in consideration. The proposed high level analysis
investigates the vulnerability of each variable by checking the SEU propagation prob-
abilities to different states and the lifetime of the different variables. The lifetime of
a variable is defined as the time period starting when an SEU is injected in a register
until the time when this SEU is masked or becomes inactive (i.e., it no longer affects
the system’s behavior). This can be characterized by the set of states in which the
variable is active, including the state where the variable is defined, every following
state in which the variable is used as an operand of another operation, and all the
states on the path between the definition state and the usage state [63].
Microarchitecture-Based Characterization
The proposed analysis introduces a characterization of the instruction set of a target
microprocessor based on its microarchitecture specifications. The purpose of conduct-
ing this characterization is to identify the registers involved in the different steps of
the required computation. The instruction type is found with respect to the opcode.
Each instruction type is associated to a model, which specifies which registers in
the integer unit’s pipeline are involved, during the normal execution of the target
instruction, as well as different fast-forwarding cases [86]. Based on the string of
instructions that needs to be executed, this approach identifies which registers are
involved and the appropriate execution path for each instruction is selected. This
enables an accurate high-level estimation of the lifetime of the inject faults.
For example, considering the LEON3 pipeline, the characterization of the arithmetic
operation multiplication (MUL) includes:
 DECODE INST register (decode stage)
 RFO DATA1 and RFO DATA2, RD CTRL (Register Access stage)
 R E OP1 and R E OP2 (Execute stage)
 R M RESULT (Memory access stage)
 R X RESULT (Exception stage)
 R W RESULT (Write Back stage)
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Similarly, other possible characterization of the MULimm instruction where R A IMM
register will be active instead of RFO DATA2. While this modeling stage is depen-
dent on the target processor, it is a step that needs to be done only once and that
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Figure 63: Proposed Probabilistic Model of SEU Propagation Through a the Proces-
sor Pipeline in an ADD Instruction
Instruction-Based Markov Modeling
The LEON3 processor implements the full SPARC V8 standard [62], including hard-
ware multiply, divide, and multiply-accumulate instructions. SPARC is a CPU in-
struction set architecture derived from RISC. The pipeline of the IU of the LEON3
consists of seven pipeline stages structured according to the Harvard architecture.
Based on the instruction type, with respect to the opcode, a probabilistic model
of SEU propagation through the registers involved at each stage of the pipeline is
proposed. This instruction-specific model includes the probabilistic details of the
propagation path and the impact of an SEU on the operation/functionality of the
instruction. For each type of instruction (e.g., ADD, ADD Imm, MUL), a model is
constructed to account for the different use of the pipeline registers. For instance,
the ADD instruction uses different pipeline registers than the ADD Imm instruc-
tion. Therefore, the possible fault propagation paths in these two instructions are
not equivalent. The fault propagation paths of all considered instruction types have
been obtained through the generation of counterexamples in our model-checking and
modeled, in a library, as Markov chains. An illustrative example of the ADD instruc-
tion model is shown in Fig. 63. Starting from state S0 (error-free fetching), at the
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fetching stage an SEU affecting the PC can alter the address of the next instruction,
which may result in wrong or invalid operations. This is shown in Fig. 63 in the
transition from state S0 to state F1 (wrong or invalid PC) with a rate λpc, which
indicates the rate of occurrence of an SEU-induced error in the PC register. More-
over, in the fetching stage, an SEU affecting the icache can result in an alteration
in the data accessed from the memory and stored in the instruction register. This is
represented in Fig. 63, in the transition from state S0 to state S1 with rate λicache,
which indicates the rate of a bit-flip in the memory. In the decode phase, an SEU
can affect the instruction register which is represented in Fig. 63 with the transition
from state S2 (error-free state) to state S4. This transition can be done with rate
λinst. Such SEU can cause an error in the decoded data for any of the operands or
operation. In the register-access phase, an SEU can propagate from the decode phase
to data1 (transition from state S4 to state S8 with rate λDT 1) or data2 (transition
from state S4 to state S7 with rate λDT 2). Moreover, an SEU can propagate from
the decode phase to the write address (RD CTRL) (transition from state S4 to state
F2 with a rate equal to λRD ctrl). Moreover, an SEU can affect any of the registers
at the RA phase. This is represented by the transitions from S5 (error-free state) to
F2, S7, and S8 as shown in Fig. 63. In the execute stage, an SEU can propagate
from the decoding phase causing execution of the wrong operation or execution of the
right operation on the wrong data. This case is represented by the transitions from
either S10, S11 to F3 with rates equal to λprop2 and λprop2, respectively. In this
case, the SEU may be logically masked in the data path. An error in the results of
the execution phase propagates to the following stages (MA, XC, WB). Moreover, an
error can be injected at the MA, XC, WB stages, resulting in an error in the stored
data in the memory.
10.2.4 Fault Injection and Analysis Through CTMDP
SEUs are random events, which means that they may occur at any point or time
during the execution of a program. Moreover, the effects of SEUs may branch through
different areas of the system with different propagation probabilities, which further
increases the complexity of the analysis. Thus, accurately modeling the effects that
SEUs may have in a system is a challenging task. It has been demonstrated in our

























































Figure 65: Probabilistic Model of SEU Propagation Through a Sequence of Instruc-
tions Based on the Target Application.
Process (MDP) [10] and CTMC [9, 11] models can offer accurate results in some
cases. MDP models can capture the behavior of SEU events since they permit both
probabilistic and non-deterministic choices. However, MDP models cannot be used
to evaluate system vulnerability over time, since MDPs do not take into account the
influence of the transition time between the states. On the other hand, CTMC models
are not able to capture the non-deterministic aspect inherent to SEUs.
To address these limitations, we propose the modeling, fault injection, and anal-
ysis using the Continuous-Time Markov Decision Process (CTMDP) formalism. In
comparison to MDPs, CTMDPs are able to better model the decision-making pro-
cess for a system that has continuous dynamics, such as the incidence of random
events over time. A CTMDP model can be defined as a tuple {S, S0, (A(i), i ∈
S), q(j|i, a), r(i, a)}, where the state space S is a finite set of fully observable states of
the system. S0 is the initial state in S. A(i) denotes a family of measurable subsets
of actions applicable in i ∈ S. The expression q(j|i, a) is the transition rate function
of state j after performing action a ∈ A(i) in state i, which can satisfy q(j|i, a) ≥ 0
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and i 6= j. Finally, r(i, a) ∈ R is a reward function such that r(i, a) is the immediate
reward for being in state i with action a.
In this work, we utilize Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) [19], which is a formal
verification technique that can be applied to systems with stochastic behavior [59]. It
does not only provide a Yes/No answer on whether a property holds, but PMC can also
quantify the probability (min/max) of satisfying the property. Moreover, PMC can
provide counter-examples for each particular case of property violation. The PMC
tool utilized is the PRISM Model Checker [92], which is an efficient probabilistic
symbolic model checker that employs efficient algorithms and data structures, such
as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). A model in PRISM is composed of several
constructs called modules. Each module expresses a specific behavior, similar to sub-
components in a system. The state of each module is decided by a set of finite-ranged
variables, and the global state of the model is determined by the evaluation of the
values of the module variables. Each module is composed of a set of commands,
expressed in the format [<act>] <guard> → <rate>: <action>, where:
 act is an action label used for synchronization of the different modules of the
system;
 guard is a predicate over the operations performed in the system’s modules;
 action is a set of n updates that will translate into operations being executed
in the modules.
 rate is the probability of occurrence of an action;
If a guard is satisfied, the command is executed. Each command corresponds to
one or more state transitions, which may be probabilistic and/or non-deterministic.
Furthermore, the analysis can be enriched with the use of Markov reward structures.
Reward structures extend the Markov model by incorporating a reward rate to certain
actions. This mechanism, with variables that record rewards accumulated with time,
enhances the analysis by providing an estimation of the most critical states in the
model. Reward structures are also crucial for the lifetime estimation of SEUs. A
simple example of lifetime estimation in our model is shown in Fig. 64. The figure
shows two SEU injections (SEU writes) at two different variables, k and l, at different
times. At the time of the injection, w, the reward count associated with each variable
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is reset, and the value of the global reward count is stored. The fault stays latent in
the system until the time of the first read of each variable (r). At the time of the first
read, and at every subsequent read, the reward count is incremented. Eventually, if
another write is performed on the variable, the value of the global reward count is
stored again, and we assume that the fault has been overwritten and the value of the
reward count of the variable is reset. By doing this, we can estimate the total lifetime
of the fault (difference between the stored global reward values), the time between
fault injection and first read, and the average time between reads. These metrics are
obtained by verifying a set of Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL [19]) properties over
the CTMDP models as follows:
PS0(♦0,TSn) (11)
Which evaluates the bounded probability of reaching state Sn within time interval
[0, T ].
10.2.5 Application Based SEU Modeling and Analysis
In order to fully understand the real impact of an SEU at the software level, the esti-
mation of its latency and propagation probabilities at the hardware level are essential.
To evaluate these probabilities, the details of the hardware microarchitecture and the
workload that is running on the processor are required. In our proposed analysis, the
details pertaining to the hardware microarchitecture are included in the library of the
instruction-based models, explained in Section 10.2.3. On the other hand, the details
related to SEU propagation through a sequence of instructions are extracted based
on the application.
This work introduces a CTMDP model of the fault propagation in an application.
An abstract view of this model is shown in Fig. 65. This model is constructed
based on the type of the instructions, the LEON3 pipeline microarchitecture, and
the memory map. Starting from the instruction where the SEU is injected (I 1 )
the SEU propagation probability is evaluated to the next instructions based on their
dependencies. In order to model the different paths for fast forwarding mechanism,
after each instruction, a decision is made on the dependencies. If the forwarding is
not needed then the faulty result is written in the register file or memory. In this case,
the following instructions will be affected by this fault only, if they use the corrupted
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data from the memory/register file before it is over-written. If forwarding is required
then the faulty result is forwarded to the next instructions. For example, as shown
in Fig. 65, if a fault at I 1 can then be forwarded to I 2, I 3, or I 4. On the other
hand, the proposed model takes into consideration the impact of SEUs injected into
the memory. This model is based on the probability that an SEU can change the
data in the memory. If this is the case, the target probabilistic model of this address
moves to the fault state (indicating wrong data). This model of the memory address
will move to the error-free state (good) when another instruction which is error free
overwrite this address. During this period the fault is considered as latent. Before the
faulty data is overwritten, any other instructions reading this address will be affected
by the fault.
In Phase 2, similar to Phase 1, we utilize the PRISM model checker to automate
model analysis. Each instruction is expressed as PRISM modules to specify the
behavior explained before. The state of each module is decided by a set of finite-
ranged variables which are controlled by the flow of the LLVM instructions defining
the application. In each instruction, based on the fault flow, the probability of the
fault propagation to the output of this instruction is evaluated. Moreover, the lifetime
of the propagating fault is updated and traced based on Markov reward structures. In
this model, lifetime estimation starts with the instruction where the fault is injected.
The value of the global reward variable is recorded and incremented for the transitions
where the fault is active and not flushed from the system. In the analysis stage, the
reward value is used to determine the relative amount of time that the SEU was alive
in the application. Similar to the instruction based analysis, the application based
analysis is conducted by verifying a set of CSLs properties over the CTMDP models.
An example of such CSL property is given below:
PI 1(♦0,T In) (12)
This expression evaluates a bound on the probability that a fault, that is injected at
instruction I 1, to eventually reach instruction I n within time interval [0, T ].
10.2.6 Experimental Results
In this subsection, we present and discuss the results of the proposed analyses which
have been performed on a machine with an Intel Core I5-4200U CPU and 8 GB of
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RAM. The instruction and application-based CTMDP models explained previously
are formulated and analyzed in PRISM 4.4 [92].
The average size of the formal models is around 7.6 million states and the average
model construction time is around 8.1 seconds. It is assumed that all the registers
and the memory are exposed to a flux of radiation. However, different bits may
have different bit-flip probabilities. The proposed analysis consists of identifying
unintended bit-flips and measuring their impact on system reliability. In order to
obtain an accurate verification environment, we utilize the results reported in [68]
to study the impact of bit-flips in different workload configurations. It is important
to note that the number of instructions in a LEON3 workload is prohibitively large
(in the order of tens of hundreds of millions of instructions), and a full trace of the
program execution is rather useless for the problem being investigated (i.e., fault
propagation and latency). Therefore, in order to efficiently estimate these metrics,
we analyze a representative subset of each workload execution trace.
As an example of such analysis, the first experiment investigates the impact of
different SEU injections in different LEON3 workloads. In this experiment, it is
assumed that the bit-flip rate in all the bits is the same, however, the probability of
SEU in a register may vary according to how many bits are used in the instruction.
For instance, in the NOP instruction, only 5 out of 32 bits are used. Table 19 shows
the failure propagation rates in different workloads. It is observed that different
workloads have different SEU propagation characteristics (i.e., error rates). This
happens because each workload applies its own algorithm for memory mapping and
memory access. Therefore, different workloads are expected to have different fault
propagation and fault latency metrics. It is observed that workloads which have
similar memory mapping algorithms are expected to have similar fault propagation
behaviors (i.e., latency and memory mapping). For example, the percentage of latent
errors is much higher in the AES workload. This happens because the memory
allocation algorithm of AES adopts a progressive-write method, which means an
overwrite is less likely to happen. Therefore, a fault in the memory will remain latent
for a longer time. This analysis consumed 477.9 Kb of memory and took 7.4 seconds
to perform.
Following up on the results discussed previously, the second experiment consisted
in computing the average fault propagation latency in the different workloads. This
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QSort 70.5 12.78 17.22
CRC32 72.2 17.4 10.4
AES 27.66 43.2 29.14
was done by estimating the average fault propagation latency inside the integer unit
(i.e., from the moment of the occurrence of the SEU in the registers until the moment
when the SEU is written in the memory). The average fault latency in memory is
also evaluated. This latency is computed from the time when the SEU is written in
the memory until it is overwritten. These results were obtained with the use of a
Markov reward model and the standard probabilistic distribution of CTMDPs. To
calculate the passing of time, it is assumed that every state transition in the model
corresponds to a one-time unit. This approach is not able to determine the number
of clock cycles that the fault remains in the system, but it provides a quantitative
baseline in which the studied workloads may be evaluated. The results in Table 20
show that the expected latency of faults in the memory in AES is significantly higher
than in the other considered workloads. This finding coincides with the results in
Table 19, which show that AES has a higher probability of latent fault. These results
also indicate that the relationship between the average fault propagation latency and
the average fault latency in memory is inversely proportional. This analysis consumed
630.2 Kb of memory and took 9.3 seconds to be performed.
In this work, the criticality of a fault is measured at different levels. In the
instruction based analysis, the criticality of each fault is evaluated by the lifetime of
this fault. These results are then used to better estimate the total criticality of each
fault at each vulnerable site throughout the application. This is done by summing
all register lifetimes in all the instructions in which that register is active. This total
lifetime is divided by the number of execution cycles necessary to run the application.
Similar methods for evaluating the application criticality can be found in other works











Figure 66: Criticality Evaluation of the LEON3 Pipeline Registers (CRC Benchmark).
Injection and Chibani 2014 results reproduced from [40]
such as [40]. An example of this analysis is shown in Fig. 66. This figure depicts
the criticality of the internal registers of the integer pipeline considering the CRC
application. It can be observed that based on the flow of the application registers
have different criticalities. For instance, for this application op 1 and imm registers
are more critical than op 2. Fig. 66 shows a comparison between fault injection
and predictive lifetimes obtained with the technique proposed in [40] for the CRC
computation. The fault injection results are based on the experiment done in [40].
As the proposed approach is based on conducting system-level analyses, it is ex-
pected to have some margin of over- or under-approximation. Based on the results in
Fig. 66, it can be observed that a very good correlation is obtained for all registers













CRC 380 10 37 616 16.2
SHA 690 14 44 941 19
AES 670 15 46 873 19.5
FFT 820 17 52 946 19.6
JPEG 990 18 57 1042 18.9
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between our prediction and the fault injection results. Furthermore, Table 21 sum-
marizes the required amount of time to perform the criticality analysis on different
applications, compared with the same metric provided by the experiments in [40]. It
can be observed that the proposed approach provides speed-ups of up to 1042 times
over fault injection and up to 19 times over the technique in [40].
10.2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a new methodology to assess the reliability of computing systems
which takes into consideration both software and the target hardware details. New
CTMDP based modeling and analysis of the LEON3 instructions vulnerability to
SEUs are proposed. The results of the instruction based analysis are then character-
ized and then utilized to better estimate the application vulnerability. The proposed
modeling and analysis are fully automated using PRISM. Results of the analysis of
different types of workloads demonstrate new insights on the fault lifetime and prop-
agation probabilities through the LEON3 are provided at high-level. The proposed
methodology allows the designers to evaluate the criticality of different components
and variable in the hardware and the application, respectively. It is faster than ex-
isting techniques (speed-up of up to 19 times over the technique in [40] and 1042
times over the best previously reported fault injection techniques). This allows itera-
tions without requiring any specific set-up development or dedicated equipment. The
accuracy of the proposed methodology is comparable to statistical fault injections.
The provided precision is sufficient to identify the most critical flip-flops or execution
cycles.
Further works include combining our results with data extracted from radiation
testing, in particular, the application cross section (σAP ), to obtain an accurate high-
level estimation of the system’s sensitivity. Furthermore, based on the results of the
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